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327. If a lion could talk, we wouldn’t be able to understand it.
— Wittgenstein, PI
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Abstract
This thesis offers positive reasons for thinking that, at its core, cognition is interactive
in character. In making room for this possibility, it however challenges the widespread
assumption that cognition is fundamentally theoretical in character. Analytic
philosophers of cognition and cognitive scientists tend to model all forms of cognition
on theorising of some kind or other: they assume Cognition is Essentially Theoretical,
or CET. CET, as a thesis about cognition, is inspired by the idea that we always and
everywhere take an intellectual, theoretical stance towards the things we deal with in the
world, whatever they may be. Standard views inspire the picture of what adopting such
a theorising stance involves in the philosophy of science. Scientific theorising is the basis
of predictions and explanations, where this is typically assumed to involve making
inferences, and forming and testing hypotheses about various subject matters. To
assume that cognising is always some kind of theorising leaves open whether the
theorising in question is always conceptually grounded and propositional or couched in
some form of modelling that need not be intrinsically contentful. Yet whatever particular
view one takes on the character of the theorising in question, those committed to CET
assume that cognition always involves theorising of some kind or another.
A serious challenge for CET emerges from the more radical versions of E
approaches to cognition. For radicals, cognition is best understood in terms of
dynamically unfolding, situated, embodied interactions and engagements between the
organism and aspects of its world. Radically Enactive Cognition, or REC, disputes that
the most basic forms of cognition involve or constitute any mediated form of knowledge
or content. Interestingly, even radical forms of enactivism need not reject CET. In the
case of modelling, cognition is intrinsically contentless and yet a form of modelling,
which is sufficient for CET. In this case, there must be special reasons why systems that
can be modelled, like the nervous system, must themselves be modelling and, therefore,
are theorising.
The aim of this thesis is to raise doubts as to whether we need to conceive of
cognitive interactions in terms of modelling and thereby theorising. What is distinctive
about the position defended in this thesis is that it argues that cognition is not special in
this regard: it rejects the thesis that cognition is, always and everywhere, essentially a
form of theorising.
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Introduction

This thesis offers positive reasons for thinking that, at its core, cognition is active and
interactive in character. Its chapters are inspired by the enactivist idea that cognition is
at root, a kind of world-involving embodied action.
The proposal to be explored and defended is very much in the spirit of the more
radical versions of E approaches to cognition. E can stand for Embodied, Enactive,
Extended, and/or Ecological, or all of the above – and there are other E-descriptors
too: E-approaches to cognition form quite a heterogeneous family. As such, distinctively
different positions occupy the logical state space of E-cognition, ranging from the
conservative to the radical.1 The radicals are defined by their rejection of representations
and their embracing of interactions as being at the core of cognition (Thompson 2010;
Chemero 2011; Hutto and Myin 2013; 2017; Di Paolo et al. 2017; Fuchs, 2017 Gallagher
2017, 2020). For E-radicals, cognition is best understood in terms of dynamically
unfolding, situated embodied interactions and engagements between the organism and
aspects of its world – interactions that are not always best characterised as involving
mental representations or content.
An interactive or enactive conception of cognition as action also animates
Wittgenstein’s writings. Moyal-Sharrock (2013) finds the emphasis on action in
Wittgenstein’s corpus “is everywhere – not only at the origin of thought and language
for the human species and for all individual human beings, but at the origin of any
human thought or utterance” (p. 2). Here too we find a steadfast rejection of a
conception of – or better, a picture of – cognition, as modelled on intellectual activity
that takes place in the brain, in the form of the manipluation of “content, propositions,
representations, engrams or intelligent neurons” (p. 2).
The greatest challenge to the interactionist conception of cognition comes from

The E in E cognition can stand for many things and it is not clear how all of these things fit together. For a discussion of what
distinguishes conservative and radical approaches, see Hutto and Myin (2013; 2017). For detail of the nuances among the different
approaches within E-Cognition family see the Newen et al. (2018) and Ward et al. (2017). See also the Synthese special issue edited
by Silva and Ferreira (2019) “Radical views of Cognition”.
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those who seek to characterize all of the interactions in question in wholly theoretical
terms. Thus, to advance an interactionist take on cognition in the spirit suggested above
requires engaging with and challenging the widely received view that cognition always
and everywhere takes the form of theorising. In taking up that challenge this thesis
attempts to show that there are positive reasons to believe that some forms of cognition
are atheoretical.
Analytic philosophers of cognition and cognitive scientists tend to model all
forms of cognition on theorising of some kind or other: they assume Cognition is
Essentially Theoretical, or CET. CET is the idea that we always and everywhere take an
intellectual, theoretical stance towards the things we deal with in the world – whatever
those targets may be: objects of perception, other people, and so on. Scientific theorising
is the basis of our ability to make predictions and explanations where this is typically
assumed to involve making inferences and forming, testing and refining hypotheses
about various subject matters. Whether ‘inferences’ are propositional, representational,
or contentful is a live question with many options in the literature for thinking about
‘theorising’ in the field. What unites these accounts is that they still assume that cognition
is essentially theoretical in character. Although the notion of theorising operates in a
vague, open-ended manner – housing the many ways it is possible to think of cognition
as an intellectual activity through and through – it shapes experimental designs and the
interpretation of results. Specifically, cognitive scientists understand and use the
meaning of terms like “representation” or “inference” to describe or categorise an
observation as a cognitive activity that is theoretical in nature.
Those committed to CET assume that the activity of theorizing that constitutes
cognition is understood in this broad sense. There is plenty of scope for them to
disagree, however, on the specifics of what taking up a theorizing stance involves. Thus
the core assumption that cognizing is always some kind of theorising leaves open
whether the theorising activity in question is conceptually grounded and propositional
in character or couched in some form of modelling that need not be intrinsically
contentful, or understood in some other way.
The CET assumption is a common denominator for philosophers as far apart
on the philosophy of cognition spectrum as Fodor (1983), Paul (1979) and Patricia
Churchland (1986), or Egan (2019). On one end of the spectrum, Fodor assumes the
theoretical character of cognition is conceptual and propositional. The Churchlands also
defend CET, regarding cognition as theoretical; but they understand theories to be
12

grounded in representational models that are dynamic and plastic. Like Fodor, they
assume representations are contentful and thus, as per a long tradition, have the property
of being true or false. Yet, unlike Fodor, they do not conceive of representations in the
propositional form, but instead as a model. Cognising, according to this view, is always
a kind theorising, where theorising is always a kind of modelling.
Godfrey-Smith (2006) proposed a definition of what it is for something,
minimally, to be a model. According to his widely accepted view a model has structural
similarities with some target domain, and the function of a model is to exploit aspects
of those structural similarities with its target, for a purpose (Giere 1999; Godfrey- Smith
2006; Ramsey 2016). Thus, going by this definition, if theorising is understood as
modelling it may be, but need not be, thought of as propositional, representational or
contentful.2
Acknowledging this possibility, some philosophers have explicitly abandoned
the idea that models that constitute cognition are intrinsically representational or
contentful (see, e.g. Maibom (2009) and Egan (2019, 2020)). Following Egan, cognising
can be understood as a kind of modelling that is not intrinsically contentful, hence any
content involved in cognising must come from an extrinsic source. For her, content
comes in the form of an intentional gloss. In some accounts, like Dennett’s (2009), it is
easy to see who is doing the gloss or the attribution. In Egan’s account however this is
not so clear. She thinks what is important is that the possibility of the glossing becomes
available under certain contexts. This raises a question as to who or what is doing the
glossing. Be that as it may, the core of Egan’s argument is that cognising is an intrinsically
contentless form of theorising. Hence, at all ends of the spectrum, even at the furthest
ends, there remains a commitment to CET – a commitment to the assumption that
cognition is essentially theoretical, even if the theorising isn’t contentful.
It is important, for our purposes, to note that even the most radical forms of
enactivism need not reject CET. The most Radically Enactive account of Cognition, or
REC, holds that there are basic forms of cognition that do not involve content or
constitute any content-mediated form of cognition (Hutto 2005; Hutto and Myin 2013;
2017). For RECers, dynamic information-sensitive activity – which constitutes basic
cognition – does not involve picking up and then processing any kind of informational
content, not even of the ecological kind.3
The way some philosophers think that all cognition is theorising is similar to the way some philosophers think that all theorising
is models or modelling. For example, Giere (1999) when conceiving of theorising in terms of models, tells us that, "It is models
almost all the way up and models almost all the way down" (p. 41).
3 How to interpret Gibson’s notion of ecological information is a topic of much debate. Clark (2015) and Millikan (2017, §4.6)
2
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The rejection of CET does not follow automatically from REC’s rejection of the
assumption that content is essential for all forms of cognition.4 Consider the case of
modelling. Cognition involving modelling might be intrinsically contentless and yet still
qualify as a form of theorising that is sufficient for CET. In this territory, we must be
on guard to avoid the mistake of thinking that anything that can be modelled is therefore
a model or that it is engaged in modelling. For example, as scientific model of the
behaviour of objects subject to Newton’s Law of Gravity, such as a falling stone. Yet no
one assumes that the falling stone itself models the laws that explain its behaviour when
falling to the ground (Hutto 2005). To think otherwise would be to commit to a panmodelist position that is similar in character to pan-computationalism.5 Thus, Linson,
Clark, Ramamoory and Friston (2018) note, although equations can be used to model a
planet’s orbit, “most people however do not assume that this approach suggests the
planet itself is computing anything” (p. 14). Further, the activity of living organs, such
as the stomach, can be modelled to explain the dynamics of neurochemical signalling.
Any dynamical system that exhibits complex patterns of behaviour can be
modelled mathematically. Yet few will make the mistake of assuming that stones or
stomachs do what they do by modelling simply because we can model the behaviour of
stones and stomachs. To move quickly to such a conclusion would be to commit what
we might call the model-model fallacy. Slors (2012) highlights the dangers of this fallacy
by focusing on the tendency to think that theory of mind attributions are ubiquitous
even in the face of challenges posed by enactivists for believing that the best
explanations of social cognition do not always involve theorizing of any kind, at any
level. To fall foul of the model-model fallacy in such cases, as Slors diagnoses it, is “the
result of mistaking the model in terms of which we understand the ubiquitous way we
understand others for the real thing” (p. 522). Williams (forthcoming) makes a similar
observation about our suspectiblitiy to model-model fallacy, which he calls the Pygmalion
syndrome, when it comes to understanding Bayesian prediction error minimization
theories of cognition. Williams (forthcoming) observes that:
Probabilistic descriptions of biological systems are an artifact of a contingent decision about
how to describe such systems, however, and not – or at least not necessarily – a feature of
biological systems themselves. Thus, any connection between such probabilistic descriptions
read Gibson by representational lights and think that even ecological information involves the ‘picking up’ of content, while
others dispute this view (Segundo-Ortin, Heras-Escribano and Raja 2019).
4 This thesis is not a rehearsal of REC’s distinctive account. Building on it, this thesis takes the argument a step further because it
interrogates whether cognition is essentially theoretical.
5 Pan-computationalism is the view that all physical systems perform computations. (Chrisley 1995, Chalmers 1995, 1996).
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and variational approximations to Bayesian inference does not have any logical implications for
our understanding of the systems themselves. To assume that it does is to confuse properties of
a possible representation of a system with properties of the system being represented (p. 23).

In short, making the case that a given system is, in fact, theorizing in some sense and
not just that it can be described as theorizing requires special justification. Defenders of
CET are inclined to think that there are special explanatory reasons why, at least, brains
or nervous systems, unlike other systems, are engaged in activity that is correctly
characterized as theorising of some kind.
Against this trend, this thesis offers and seeks to make room for interactionist
alternatives to theories of the cognition that embrace CET as a serious proposal about
the nature of cognition across the board. Under a standard realist interpretation,
massively modular theories of cognition embrace CET: they assume that cognition is
constituted by isolable, information-rich theories and processing systems which ground
various domain-specific forms of cognitive activity. Similarly, under a standard realist
interpretation, Bayesian theories of cognition also embrace CET: they assume that
cognition is constituted by brain-based modelling and theorising occurring across
multiple levels of a predictive hierarchy (Hohwy 2013; Seth 2014; Clark 2016).6
The work of this thesis is to show there are reasons to think that certain
embodied interactions are atheoretical and can suffice for cognition. On the one hand,
the thesis makes a positive case for this possibility by showing there is room and reason
to explore this proposal. On the other hand, it defends this possibility by raising doubts
about the explanatory power of its CET contenders, highlighting reasons for thinking
that it is not always theoretically or explanatorily advantageous to conceive of all forms
of cognition as theorising of any kind.
A crucial strategy of the thesis is to show that even if it can be useful to borrow
the machinery of CET-friendly frameworks in some cases it is always possible to resist
a strong realist interpretation that would lead to taking CET seriously as a metaphysical
thesis about the nature of cognition.
Gallagher (2017) notes the ambiguity that is present in some accounts of
cognition on this score, such as Clark’s (2016) Bayesian predictive processing account
of cognition. Clark (2016) is friendly in many respects toward an embodied and enactive
conception of cognition, yet in adhering to the active inference framework he is also
The history of the Bayesian brain (Friston 2012) includes predictive coding (Shea et al. 2019; Cao 2019) prediction error
minimisation (Hohwy 2020); cybernetics (von Bertalanffy 1956, Seth 2014); motor control theory (Rosenbaum 2009; Arsiwalla et
al. 2019); active inference under the free-energy principle (Hinton and Sejnowski 198; Friston 2013).

6
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pushed to take seriously the CET idea that all cognition is a matter of advancing and
testing inferentially based hypotheses. Gallagher (2017) proposes that although the
Bayesian machinery can help us to get a handle on certain forms of cognitive activity,
when it comes to thinking about the metaphysics of mind we should instead think of
the processes themselves in de-intellectualised terms, “as a kind of ongoing dynamical
adjustment in which the brain, as part of and along with the larger organism, settles into
the right kind of attunment with the environment” (p. 18). Ultimately, Gallagher
proposes that if we take this line, we will see that “active inference is not ‘inference’ at,
it’s a doing, an enactive adjustment, a worldly engagement” (p. 19).
A likely objection to this sort of move would be to argue that if PP theories talk
of ‘brains making inferences’, and we draw on such theories, then we should commit to
taking the attribution that ‘brains infer’ at face value and metaphysically seriously. Yet
there is a prior question. In what sense is PP actually committed to the claim that brains
‘make inferences’?
Importantly, to be of philosophical interest the sense of ‘inference’ in play here
cannot be “a sense that is wholly “introduced by new-fangled philosophical or scientific
theories” (Glock 2017, p. 91). The situation, as Glock (2017) reminds us, is the same
with many other concepts used in the cognitive sciences: “in presenting and interpreting
the results of empirical research … philosophers and scientists do not uniformly stick
to technical terminology. Instead, they often employ everyday terms like
‘representation’, ‘symbol’, ‘map’, ‘image’, ‘information’, or ‘language’ in ways which
either remain unexplained or illicitly combine ordinary with technical uses (Bennett and
Hacker 2003)” (p. 91).
At this juncture we must be alive to the kind confusion that can arise, in doing
philosophy, when everyday and scientific uses of what is nominally the same notion are
conflated. Thus to assess Gallagher’s proposal about how best to interpret ‘active
inference’ we must distinguish and keep track of everyday and theory-bound notions of
‘inference’. It is only by getting clear about these different uses that it is possible to
determine in what sense PP is actually committed to the idea that brains are ‘making
inferences’, and how metaphysically seriously we should take that commitment.
Overview of Chapters
This is a thesis by compilation. The majority of the papers have been published.
16

Conforming with the University of Wollongong guidelines, I am the sole or first author
of each chapter included in the thesis. The common denominator unifying the chapters
is to show that there are compelling reasons to endorse interactionism while challenging
CET commitments.
The first three chapters make the positive case for interactionism by focusing
on the advantages of embracing it in order to best understand various cognitive
phenomena: visual illusions; social cognition; and skilful action. In each case, it is argued
that interactionism provides a better means than CET rivals to understand the
phenomena under scrutiny.
The final two chapters take a different turn. They attempt to make room for
interactionist approaches by providing reasons to resist CET theories. Chapter 5 blocks
a possible alliance of two, seemingly opposed, CET approaches that, if successful, might
pose a challenge to the interactionist position advanced in earlier chapters. It defuses
that threat by reviewing and rejecting three arguments that are designed to show that
predictive processing accounts of cognition can successfully incorporate and benefit
from modular theories of cognition. Chapter 6 advances a novel way of thinking about
the nature of Markov blankets in order to show that this construct can be understood
in a way that is at least compatible with, if not friendly to, an enactivist, interactionist
way of understanding the cognition in terms of dynamically unfolding interactions.
Chapter 1: Accommodating Visual Illusions: An Interactionist Account of
Perception
Modular and predictive processing theories of cognition embrace CET. When it comes
to their theories of perception both of these accounts regard it as a kind of theoretical
activity. This is so even though these two frameworks disagree as to the flexibility and
openness of the theorizing that they assume constitutes perceiving.
This first chapter begins by explicating the sense in which both of these
frameworks adhere to the Communication Assumption. The Communication
Assumption holds that both perception and other forms of cognition can, in principle,
communicate and update one another because all forms of cognition are theoretical in
character, in that they advance contentful hypotheses about the state of various aspects
of the world. If cognition is fundamentally theoretical in this respect, it follows that
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perception and other forms of cognition could, in principle, contentfully inform and
update one another – that they might ‘communicate’ in this very special sense.
Against this backdrop, the chapter scrutinizes explanations offered by Modular
and Bayesian predictive processing theories of cognition as to why and to what extent
there is a failure for perception to update in line with background knowledge in cases of
perceptual illusion that have the profile of Müller Lyer illusion cases. Both explanatory
proposals are found wanting, for different reasons. In the end, the chapter proposes an
alternative, interactionist explanation of the Müller-Lyer effects – an alternative that
assumes interaction, not characterized as some kind of contentful theorizing, provides
a better explanation of this phenomena. The chapter ends by offering reasons for
thinking that an interactionist explanation not only adequately and elegantly accounts
for the full set of Müller-Lyer effects, but also avoids metaphysical and epistemological
problems that plague its rival proposals.
Chapter 2: Understanding Autistic Individuals
Certain theories of what best explains social cognition fully embrace CET. This is true
of approaches that assume that social cognition is best characterized in mindreading
terms and is best explained by appeal to Theory of Mind (ToM) capacities.
This chapter challenges the prevalent mindreading characterization of social
cognition that promotes the view that the social cognitive profiles of autistic individuals
are due to an underlying condition that is best explained in terms of theory-related
deficiencies. First, it provides a background of the current state of thinking that
motivates acceptance of various mentalising proposals about how to best characterise
and explain autistic social cognition. Two main types of proposal are examined.
The chapter first focuses on old school proposals. What makes modularist
accounts attractive to many as a possible explanation of autism is that mental modules
are dissociable, hence if a ‘theory of mind’ module is ‘faulty’, it need not affect the
exercise of other cognitive capacities. It is argued that there are crucial explanatorily
limitations that arise if we understand what drives social cognition in terms of dissociable
‘theory of mind’ module and, hence, this approach should be rejected.
The chapter then examines new school theory proposals that are framed, more
flexibly, in terms of Bayesian inference framework. By these insights, social cognition is
thought to be best explained in terms of flexibly updated theorizing. The Bayesian brain
18

framework claims that social cognition is best characterized in mindreading terms and
that theorizing on the part of the brain is what drives and explains such mindreading.
The chapter concludes by providing reasons for being sceptical of mindreading
characterization and, concomitantly, questions the hypothesis that subpersonal
theorizing best explains social cognition, in general, and the specific patterns it takes for
autistic individuals. The chapter closes by encouraging the adoption of alternative, nonmindreading ways of understanding the social cognitive styles of the general population
and autistic individuals.
Chapter 3: Explaining Embodied Skill: Where the Action Is
Instructionist theories of cognition propose intellectualist explanations of skilful
action. At the core of such accounts is the proposal that instructions in the form of
commands are sent to and direct the motor system to execute movements (Levy, 2017;
Pavese, 2019). The idea that skilled action is best explained in terms of top-down
instructions that are sent to the motor system finds its home in Optimal Control
Theory (Stengel, 1994; Anderson and Moore, 1990).
Under the auspices of Active Inference Framework, it is shown that the Optimal
Control Theory account can be updated by the idea that the brain makes inferences
that inform and update the commands it instructs the motor system to execute when
controlling and directing skilled action. Yet, the chapter argues, there are technical
aspects of the Active Inference Framework which reveal the instructionist assumption,
as it is understood by Optimal Control Theory, to be ill-motivated.
Leveraging the active inference framework and sensorimotor account of skilled
action, it is proposed that embodied skills are better understood in terms of unfolding
enactive engagements without the need to assume that such engagements are driven
by instructions couched in terms of the content of internal representations. On the
proposed enactive account, the brain does not actually contain a detailed list of
instructions that it uses to move the body. The alternative interactionist account
proposed in this chapter achieves this result by avoiding two sets of commitments. It
does not assume that generative models used in the active inference framework are
models that are used by organisms or systems themselves. It does not assume that the
explanatory story offered by sensorimotor accounts need posit any causally efficacious
mediating knowledge.
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Chapter 4: Questioning the Compatibility of Predictive Processing and Modular
Theories of Cognition
Traditional modular and Bayesian predictive processing theories of cognition are
seemingly inherently opposed to one another. Although both assume that cognition is
theory-based, these two approaches disagree about the flexibility and openness of the
theories that they claim constitute cognition.
As seen in Chapter 2, perceptual illusions explained by means of predictive
processing accounts of cognition face anomalies thrown up by empirical evidence. The
empirical evidence appears to show that in some cases we fail to update our thinking in
the ways we should if cognition were a fully open-channel prediction-driven process. To
explain this fact, some proponents of predictive processing theories of cognition have
sought to incorporate some aspects of modular theories of cognition, at least to some
limited extent, within their framework so as to account for the informational or
functional constraints on what would otherwise be fully open-channel cognitive
processes.
Chapter 4 appraises three arguments that attempt to show that these aspects of
modular theories of cognition are, in fact, compatible with and can be incorporated into
the wider explanatory machinery of predictive processing accounts of cognition. If such
arguments prove successful, two seemingly rival accounts of cognition, accounts that
are standardly interpreted along CET lines, will be seen as complementing and
completing, rather than competing with, one another. Success on this score would also
provide a solution to the longstanding questions about how to accommodate and
understand the limited degree of flexibility and plasticity exhibited in various cognitive
acts and domains.
With these stakes in mind, this chapter reviews three arguments to show that
modularity can be incorporated within a predictive processing framework, as advanced
by Hohwy (2013; 2020a), Drayson (2017), and advocates of machine learning (Pearl,
1988). These three arguments are: (1) the courtroom of perception argument; (2) the
intransitivity argument; and (3) the Markov blanket argument. Chapter four reviews each
argument in turn and concludes that none of them offer convincing reasons to think
that modular restrictions are compatible with the predictive processing framework or
that they can do the kind of explanatory work needed to solve its particular limitations.
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So, as things stand, we have no positive reason to think that an alliance of
modular and Bayesian theories of cognition is on the cards. A fortiori, we have no reason
to think that such alliance will enable predictive processing theories of cognition to deal
with the empirical evidence that poses anomalies to its predictions about the character
of cognition.
Luckily, as the chapters in this thesis have argued, a proposed alliance of modular
and Bayesian theories of cognition does not exhaust all of the possibilities for
understanding cognition. This chapter motivates taking such alternatives seriously and
exploring those other possibilities.
Chapter 5 Markov blankets of the Nervous System
This chapter challenges the trend in neuroscience to understand the nervous system as
inference machine by offering a novel way of understanding neuronal activity from
micro- to macro-scales that is compatible with the interactionist alternative explored and
promoted in this thesis. Instead of assuming Bayesian inference takes place in the
nervous system, neuronal activity can be seen in terms of dynamical interactions among
areas or regions of the brain. This activity need not be understood as inferential in
nature. It is argued that even if we endorse some of the formal machinery of the
predictive processing framework, such as talk of Markov blankets, there is no special
reason to think that the nervous system ““is” Bayesian or “implements” Bayesian
models” (Linson et al., 2018, p. 14).
This chapter considers the case of Markov blankets and seeks to understand this
construct in a way that is compatible with thinking of the dynamic activity that unfolds
in the nervous system in non-inferential terms. The major contribution of this chapter
is to show that it is possible to make sense of the scientific evidence of contemporary
neuroscience in a way that does not force us to accept CET as a philosophical
framework. It demonstrates that there are ways to understand the neuroscientific
evidence without committing to the philosophical assumptions of CET.
Conclusion
The thesis concludes that there are positive reasons to make room for atheoretical forms
of cognition. It gives reasons to be sceptical of the claim that cognition is essentially
theoretical.
21

In future work, I will further investigate how to understand cognition in terms of
unfolding interactions that adjust and adapt without assuming those adjustments and
adaptations necessarily involve theorising or modelling the world.
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Chapter 1
Accommodating Visual Illusions:
An Interactionist Account of Perception

Introduction
Sometimes what we perceive and what we think are at odds. Visual illusions, such as
the classic Müller-Lyer illusion depicted in Figure 1, have taught us at least this much.
Illusions of this stripe have various sorts of known effects on cognition which operate
on a number of levels simultaneously. It is empirically well-established that such
illusions exert influence on our executive-level intellectual tendencies to make explicit
perceptual judgements as well as influence perception and action at the coalface of
action by interfering with sensorimotor behaviour (see, e.g., Meegan et al. 2003).
This chapter focuses on the Müller-Lyer illusion as a case study to motivate
taking seriously an interactionist account of perception. Explaining the full set of
cognitive effects of visual illusions poses special challenges for existing theories of
perception. As is well known, for anyone who is suspectable to this particular illusion,
the lines of the Müller-Lyer look as if they are of different lengths. Indeed, the illusion
exerts its influence on the uninformed by initially inclining them to judge, and say, that
the lines they see are of different lengths. Notoriously, what makes this and other
similar illusions of such great interest, is that perceptual experience is recalcitrant in
light of updated knowledge: the lines continue to look to be of different lengths even
after those affected are informed, and come to believe and judge, that the lines are, in
fact, of equal length. Hence, this optical illusion reveals that there are circumstances in
which viewers cannot bring what they see – how things look to them – in line with
what they think or know to be the case. Or, at least, they cannot do so without making
special efforts.
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Figure 1. Müller-Lyer illusion

In the light of the challenge posed by this type of visual illusion, this chapter reviews
and rejects two prominent attempts to address the special explanatory challenge that
is posed by the Müller-Lyer illusion. We consider possible explanations of the reasons
why perception fails to update in these cases as proposed, in turn, by traditional
modular and predictive processing theories of perception.
Importantly, for our analysis, under their standard cognitivist interpretations
both of the aforementioned frameworks, modularist and the predictive processing
accounts, are united in adhering to what we call the Communication Assumption. The
Communication Assumption holds that both perception and other forms of cognition
are theoretical in character in that they advance contentful hypotheses about the state
of various aspects of the world. The assumption is that cognition, being fundamentally
theoretical, makes it possible that perception and other forms of cognition could, in
principle, contentfully inform and update one another – that they might ‘communicate’
in this very special sense. On the assumption that it is possible that perception and
other forms of cognition might communicate, it becomes important to explain why
they fail to do so when confronted with certain kind of perceptual illusions.
In what follows, we scrutinise two mainstream cognitivist explanations –
offered by Modular and Bayesian predictive processing theories of cognition – of why
and to what extent there is a failure for cognition to update perception in cases of
perceptual illusion that have the profile of Müller Lyer illusion cases. We find both
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explanatory proposals wanting, for different reasons. In the end, we propose an
alternative, interactionist explanation of the Müller-Lyer effects – an alternative that
assumes interaction, and not some kind of contentful theorising, is the common
denominator and very core of cognition. We give reasons for thinking that an
interactionist explanation not only adequately and elegantly accounts for the full set of
Müller-Lyer effects, it also avoids metaphysical and epistemological problems that
plague its rival cognitivist proposals.
Section one explicates the Communication Assumption and the role it plays in
cognitivist theorising about how early perception and post-perceptual cognition
inform or fail to inform one another. Using the Müller Lyer illusion as a foil, Section
2 examines how traditional Modular theories of perception, those that endorse the
information encapsulation hypothesis, fare in explaining this kind of visual illusion,
and where they fall short. Section three considers three of the most prominent
attempts by defenders of Bayesian predictive processing theories of cognition and
finds these to fail to meet that explanatory challenge adequately. This, according to our
analysis, holds true even of those predictive processing proposals that emphasise the
interactional character of the theorising that allegedly constitutes cognition. Section
four offers an explanation of the phenomena by focusing on how contentless,
interactional forms of perceiving would relate to cognition that takes the form of
contentful theorising.
1.1.

The Communication Assumption

Philosophers and cognitive scientists who are committed to the assumption that
cognition is essentially theoretical assume that perceiving is primarily an epistemic and
communicative business. Its core work is to theorise about how things stand with the
world in light of incoming sensory data – and to advance hypotheses which, even if
they are not wholly true, are accurate enough such that the perceiver can make a living.
So understood, the common assumption of cognitivist theories of perception of this
stripe is that, fundamentally, perceiving is a matter of using evidence to form, test,
revise and update theories, understood as contentful hypotheses, that, in some suitable
sense, depicts the world correctly or incorrectly, even if only on a more-or-less basis.
From this starting point, it is clear that the standard cognitivist story about perception
adheres to the Communication Assumption as a default. That perception and other
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forms of cognition could contentfully communicate and update one another follow
from the idea that perception, just like other forms of cognition, says something
contentful about how things stand with the world. From the assumed contentful
character of perception, it follows that an intelligible link is possible between
perceiving and other forms of cognising. In other words, the baseline assumption is
that different forms of cognition can inform and contentfully update one another, even
if for some reason, they do not happen to do so in some or all cases.
It is important to bear in mind that the question of whether or not perception
might be cognitively penetrated only arises – indeed, it only makes sense – if the
Communication Assumption is in play. Pylyshyn (1999), who like Fodor offers a fullscale defence of the idea that early perception is encapsulated, observes that for
cognitive penetration to occur in perception it must be that perceptual systems are
“sensitive, in a semantically coherent way, to the organism’s goals and beliefs” (p. 343,
emphasis added). That there is a potential for semantic influence assumes there is the
possibility of communication between perception and other forms of cognition.
More recently, when discussing what cognitive penetration must involve, Ogilvie and
Carruthers (2016) underscore the need for “semantically-relevant effects of postperceptual cognitive states” (p. 722, emphasis added). There must be crosstalk between
perception and cognition such that any signals or messages sent “mediate a semantic
relation between high-level states and low-level visual processing” (Ogilvie and
Carruthers 2016, p. 733, emphasis added).
Such a free exchange of content is assumed to be the norm elsewhere in the
cognitive domain. Ideally, when a thinker changes a contentful theory, say by changing
a background belief about a given topic, this should – ideally – make an appropriate
epistemic difference to all relevant aspects of the theory in question. At least, that
should be the case assuming that other things hold – for example, that the belief change
is appropriately communicated; that the individual in question is not irrational, and so
on. Cognitive systems of the free-exchange-of-ideas variety are assumed to be
unencapsulated: the content of cognitive states is adjusted in light of what a cogniser
learns, thinks and knows.
Crucially, as Ogilvie and Carruthers 2016 observe, perceptual systems should
ideally work in this way too if they are part of a system of sound and reliable epistemic
trade. Thus, these authors remind us that, “everyone agrees that what the visual system
must do is parse and organise the incoming signals by relying on background
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knowledge and expectations of the structure of the world” (p. 724, emphasis added).
This follows if it is also assumed that “an important part of what perception is for is
to provide some degree of confirmation or disconfirmation of one’s beliefs” (p. 725,
second emphasis added).
While this much is agreed amongst card-carrying cognitivists, there has been
long-standing disagreement about just how much confirmation or disconfirmation
perception can provide to the cogniser. Just how much do perception and more central
and higher varieties of cognition communicate and how far-reaching are their
communications?
Traditional modular theories of perception hold that although early perceptual
processes communicate up the line to more central forms of cognition, they are
impervious to adjustments down the line and cannot be informed by the cogniser’s
background belief or knowledge. This is because they are assumed to lack access to
such background information: they are communicatively cut off from it. Accordingly,
although perception can inform cognition, the reverse is not true: there is no free
crosstalk between perception and cognition, if traditional modular theories are correct.
The hallmark assumption of traditional modularist theories of perception is that
perceptual processes are informationally encapsulated. Perception is modular such that
it provides input to but does not receive input from central cognitive processes. Fodor
(1983), the champion of this theory, describes a consequence of such informational
encapsulation in terms of the quantity of what perceptual systems can know. He tells
us that thinking of input systems as informationally encapsulated is “equivalent to the
claim that the data that can bear on the confirmation of perceptual hypotheses
includes, in the general case, considerably less than the organism may know. That is,
the confirmation function for input systems does not have access to all the information
that the organism internally represents” (Fodor 1983, p. 69).
According to traditional modular accounts of perception, the reason
perceptual systems know less is that they have restricted access to certain kinds of
knowledge. They are domain-specific in that they have limited cognitive interests and
concerns. In getting their epistemic work done, they operate on a strictly need-to-know
basis, and they – apparently – don’t need to know much. On this theory, it is assumed
that they work better and faster by restricting their concerns to specialised dealings
with only certain topics. It is because of their informationally encapsulated domainspecificity that they are not informed and updated by all the contentful knowledge that
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might possibly be communicated to them. For traditional modular theorists, the
limited communicative repertoire of perceptual systems is the peculiar characteristic
that secures their status as mental modules. Traditional modular theories posit features
of fixed cognitive mechanisms to account for the limited communication that occurs
between perception and cognition, and the lack of access that perception has to the
contents of other, more central varieties of cognition.
Bayesian predictive processing theories of cognition go in a different direction
on the question of the openness of the channels of communication between
perception and other forms of cognition. Instead of assuming that the possibilities for
contentful exchange and update are unidirectional and fixed once and for all by the
nature of cognitive mechanisms, these theorists assume that there are always
opportunities for exchange and update, but whether such communication actually
occurs depends on the epistemic needs of the situation at hand.
Consider Clark’s (2016) example of the sort of meta-cognitive toggling that
needs to happen when driving on a foggy road. In such a case, it is wise to take greater
stock of our background knowledge of how such conditions can affect and influence
our perceptual deliverances and adjust our expectations about the trustworthiness of
the latter accordingly. Going the opposite way, when driving on an unfamiliar, highrisk mountain road it would be wise to adopt a strategy of giving close and careful
attention to our sensory inputs and trusting them more than usual in such
circumstances. Basically, “vision needs to be flexible in the way that it deals with
variations in context” (Ogilvie and Carruthers 2016. p. 725, emphasis added). It
“should be influenced by one’s knowledge of where one is” (Ogilvie and Carruthers
2016, p. 725).
Assuming that perception and cognition can communicate freely, it becomes
important for cognitive systems to set the parameters for their epistemic exchanges in
just the right measure to suit particular circumstances. Predictive processing theorists
hold that we must adjust the precision weights of specific perceptual hypotheses in
light of their epistemic credence on a case-by-case basis. Doing so is necessary because
“the precise mix of top-down and bottom-up influence is not static or fixed. Instead,
the weight given to sensory prediction error is varied according to how reliable (how
noisy, certain, or uncertain) the signal is taken to be” (Clark 2016, p. 57, emphasis
added).
The basic idea here is that in any particular instance of perceiving, in lieu of
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fixed cognitive mechanisms, exchanges between perception and cognition are
moderated by “an onboard process of reliability estimation”, such that the system
selects “strategies according to context” (Clark 2016, p. 252). Ultimately, because there
is no ban on the free exchange of content in play, “the context-dependent balancing
between … sources of information, achieved by adjusting the precision-weighting of
prediction error, then allows for whatever admixtures of strategy task and
circumstances dictate” (Clark 2016, p. 253, emphasis added).
Since adjusting epistemic bets is thought to occur across multiple scales and
levels, all at once, it is assumed that contentful exchanges on each and all of these scales
and levels will need to abide by “a broadly Bayesian ‘principle of arbitration’ whereby
estimations of the relative uncertainty associated with distinct-neural controllers …
allows the most accurate controller, in the current circumstances, to determine action
and choice” (Clark 2016, p. 253).
Fundamentally, the difference between traditional modular and Bayesian
predictive processing accounts of the perception-cognition exchange is that those who
adopt the latter framework must explain any lack of communication between
perception and cognition in any given case in terms of the effects of flexible epistemic
policies as opposed to fixed, informationally encapsulated cognitive mechanisms.
Having sketched the relevant background, in the next two sections, we raise doubts
about the ability of either modular or predictive processing accounts of cognition to
adequately account for the effects of the Müller-Lyer illusion. 7
1.2.

Explaining Müller-Lyer Effects: Traditional Modular Theories of Perception

Traditional modular theories attempt to overcome the explanatory challenge of the
Müller-Lyer illusion by the claim that a fixed feature of our cognitive architecture

7

It should be evident from the discussion above that predictive processing theorist who embraces cognitivism will also endorse

the Communication Assumption, just as strongly as traditional modular theorists about perception. A commitment to the
Communication Assumption is clear from the explicit statements made by those predictive processing theorists who in embracing
cognitivism also commit to representational theories of mind. More than this, adherence to the Communication Assumption is
also revealed by their widespread reliance on the language of ‘message passing’ which is used to describe the exchanges between
higher and lower levels of cognitive processing. Thus, Kiefer and Hohwy (2018) tell us that, “hypotheses are tested by passing
messages (predictions and prediction errors) up and down in the hierarchy” (p. 2405). Likewise, some speak of signals being
constantly passed both up and down the hierarchy, where such hierarchical message-passing is taken to be the basis for
unsupervised learning. Borrowing from Yedidia, Freeman and Weiss (2003), Vance and Stokes (2017) hold that top-down and
bottom-up information processes, “constitute what is sometimes called ‘message-passing’” (p. 88).
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explains why perceptual contents fail to update.
That failure is to be expected if perceptual modules are contentful but
informationally encapsulated (Fodor 1983; Raftopoulos 2019). Traditional modular
theories seek to explain the fact that perceiving is impervious to update in such cases
by positing an informational boundary between perceiving and cognising. By modular
lights, perception is only sensitive to inputs from specific modalities. It is domainspecific in that it only has interest in and access to the information contained in special
kinds of inputs, plus certain other information that may be available within the module.
Information in each module is thus vertically encapsulated from information or
content in other modules, and horizontally encapsulated from the information or
content of other forms of central cognition.
Accordingly, perception operates in ways that are independent of and prior to
central cognitive processes. The work of a modular sensory modality is to transduce
the content of the input, through computations that only have access to contents
within the module, to generate representations that can be made available to the rest
of the cognitive system. Raftopoulos (2017) observes that, for modular theorists,
“[e]arly vision is not directly affected by cognition since its processes do not draw on
cognition as an informational resource” (2017, p. 1156). The flow of information in
encapsulated perceptual systems goes only one way. Put metaphorically, it can be said
that there is a horizontal boundary that prevents central cognition from penetrating
modular systems.
Perception conceived of as modular only responds to a limited range of inputs.
In the visual system, for example, the informational reach of the system is limited to
visual inputs – the early visual system carries out complex representational
computations that are specifically sensitive to visual inputs. This account suggests that
the visual system’s job is the specialised computation of light hitting the retina and
converting these inputs into perceptual theories, i.e. contentful representations, as
outputs, making the latter available to central cognitive processes. That is to say, the
visual system takes attentionally modulated signals from the eyes, and perhaps
information from other sensory modalities, as inputs and produces visual
representations (of shape, size, colour) as outputs. The informational reach of the
visual system, according to such theories, only extends to “spatiotemporal [properties],
spatial relations, surface shading, orientation, colour, binocular stereopsis, size, shape
and movement” (Raftopoulos and Müller 2006, p. 210).
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Even though traditional modular theorists conceive of perception as
informationally encapsulated, they allow that other non-modular forms of cognition
can have effects on early vision without directly communicating with it. That is to say,
central cognition can influence the modular perceptual system in ways that do not
change the theoretical computation taking place (see Firestone and Scholl, 2015). This
could happen if the inputs to perception are influenced by attention under the direction
of central cognition (Pylyshyn 1999). Central processes can, for example, direct
attention to specific locations or specific properties prior to the operation of early
vision. Our background beliefs and knowledge may drive us, by such means, to
spatially focus on the most relevant parts of a visual field. Attention thus provides an
indirect interface between cognition and vision, even if no direct communication is
possible between the two from the top-down direction. The outputs of perception can,
of course, inform decisions after the operations of early vision. This takes the form of
post-perceptual operations of accessing background knowledge that pertains to the
interpretations of a particular stimulus. Importantly, if traditional modular theories of
perception hold true, then neither cognitive attention nor post-perceptual judgments
can directly inform perception or its processes.
In sum, on the standard account, perceptual modules are impenetrable in that
they are insensitive to direct informational feedback and adjustment from top-down
cognitive processes. Modules, ultimately, are encapsulated from cognition and from
other modules by horizontal and vertical boundaries.
This is the traditional modular theory of perception’s explanation of the
Müller-Lyer illusion effects. The putative fact that perception is informationally
encapsulated at once creates a sharp perception-cognition boundary and also explains
the lack of communication, exchange and update in these cases.
Prima facie, traditional modular theories of perception offer a neat explanation
of the main effects of Müller-Lyer illusion. If perception is modular in the traditional,
information-encapsulation sense, then this easily accounts for failures to update what
one perceives based on what one knows or thinks. If perception is cognitively
impenetrable, then it is easy to explain the failure of perception-cognition
communication in the Müller-Lyer illusion cases.
That said, is not clear that modular theories of perception can handle other
effects of the illusion, such as the empirical finding, discussed in Section 4 below, that
perception can be adjusted through action-based attunements to relevant stimuli over
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time.
Such a failure would be a serious concern. Yet even more glaring empirical
challenges to traditional modular theories of perception have been offered of late.
Indeed, Ogilvie and Carruthers (2016) boldly claim that “the notion of encapsulation
has outlived its usefulness in the study of vision” (p. 739). They cite empirical evidence
which suggests that/that interactive processing operates at all levels in the visual
system in a way that puts direct pressure on traditional modular theories of perception.
Drawing on neuroscientific evidence of widespread interconnectivity and
neuroplasticity, they claim that a downward connection between cognition and
perceptual experience is achieved through the coordinated functioning of spatially and
temporally distributed neuronal populations that have feedback connections to
perceptual systems. They tell us:
there is a good deal of accumulating evidence of such higher-to-lower influences …
Certainly, there is nothing in the neuroscience to support a cleavage between low-level
and high-level vision in respect of feedback connections. On the contrary, such
connections are rife at all levels outnumbering feed-forward ones (Rockland and
Pandya 1981; Felleman and Van Essen 1991; Gilbert and Li 2013). (Ogilvie and
Carruthers, 2016 p. 726).

Ogilvie and Carruthers’ (2016) reading of the empirical literature suggests that the
encapsulation hypothesis is false and that cognition can and does communicate in a
top-down fashion with perception after all.
These authors do not think central cognitive states of mind are just interacting
with perception, they think the former is contentfully updating the latter. Reporting on
recent findings of the link between high-level intentions and activity in monkey visual
systems (V1), they tell us, it is “not just the strength of each neuron’s response, but the
information that is carried by its pattern of responding. The effect of attention on V1
in this experiment is thus a content related one, which is inconsistent with Pylyshyn’s
account of encapsulation. For there is a semantic relationship between the high-level
intentions created by the monkey’s task on a given trial … and the information about
the stimulus that is carried by a given V1 neuron” (Ogilvie and Carruthers, 2016 p.
733, emphases added).
Citing other experimental results by Schapiro et al. (2014) on the link between
episodic memories and implicit learning of new statistical associations in humans, they
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hold that “the presence of that information has an impact on people’s reports of what
they see, it is reasonable to think that top-down modulations of activity in early vision
are altering the representational contents encoded in early visual areas, and
subsequently conscious perception” (Ogilvie and Carruthers 2016, p. 735, emphases
added).
We agree that traditional modular theories of perception have a serious
empirical case to answer. Nevertheless, we question whether the interactions between
basic forms of perception and other states of mind, such as beliefs and judgements are
best understood in terms of cognitive penetration at all (See Hutto et al. forthcoming).
We return briefly to this issue in Section 4, offering an interactionist account of how
to make sense of our responses to perceptual illusions.
1.3.

Explaining Müller-Lyer Effects: Predictive Processing Theories of Cognition

In light of the aforementioned challenges to traditional modular theories of perception,
Bayesian predictive processing theories of cognition, PPC, might seem better placed
to explain why we respond to perceptual illusions as we do. PPC has been offered as
a perfectly general and unified framework for understanding all forms of cognition –
placing perception, memory, imagination and related cognitive phenomena under a
single theoretical roof.
As noted above, when cast in purely cognitivist terms, PPC assumes that there
is a regular back-and-forth exchange between perception and cognition: they can, and
often do, mutually inform and update one another, in both directions. Top-down
influences at the executive end of the processing hierarchy result in statistical
estimations that fuel predictions that inform and directs activity at the lower levels.
Knowledge communicates with perception from the top-down (Clark, 2015; Hohwy,
2013; Rao and Ballard, 1999). Accordingly, “whenever information from the world
impacts on your sensory surfaces, it is already, even at the earliest stages, greeted by a
downward-flowing prediction on the part of the nervous system” (Wilkinson et al.,
2019, p. 102). Going the other way, executive-level predictions get adjusted by activity
at the perceptual coalface too: sensory input influences adjust top-level hypotheses. All
of this is done in a common effort to minimise prediction error.
How does this work in detail? According to cognitivist renderings of predictive
processing account, cognition is characterised as a series of cascades of theories that
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operate bidirectionally, interacting and adjusting the content of hypotheses on multiple
scales and levels. Information propagates up and down the hierarchy: the contents of
higher levels, in the form of statistical hypotheses, travel down the hierarchy, while
error signals travel up. Each processing layer predicts what is happening at the layer
below, using the contents of its representations – which capture its prior knowledge
or beliefs, known as priors – the system advances hypotheses about the hidden causes
of sensory signals and adjusts these in reply to error signals from lower layers in an
effort to minimise prediction error. Bottom-up error signals provide information that
travels up the hierarchy, either confirming the hypotheses of the predictive or
generative model or disconfirming them and forcing updates. Technically, estimates at
different levels of the hierarchy are predictive of each other. These estimations are
hierarchically organised, tracking features at different spatial and temporal scales to
estimate aspects of lower levels, and are adjusted by the incoming sensory signals.
Top-down predictions are compared with, and adjusted by, incoming error
signals. The brain is incessantly searching for possible mismatches that will give it an
error signal. The hypothesis either matches or mismatches the content of the sensory
signal. Depending on the precision ascribed to the signal, on some account of
predictive processing account if there is no match, error signals are communicated, up
the line, in a feed-forward way to higher levels of processing to correct and adjust the
predictive model (Clark 2013, Hohwy 2014). Other accounts of predictive processing
account hold that more than error signals are communicated up the line since failures
in matching are thought to lead to “a sharpening and an increase in the volume of the
incoming signal” (Ogilvie and Carruthers 2016, p. 727). The predictive or generative
model is made more accurate when there are only minimal prediction errors in every
layer. Through further recurrent loops, a better predictive model is generated and fed
down to the sensory input layer until a sufficiently low error signal is achieved.
As an upshot, perception and cognition are assumed to mutually inform one
another by passing along content and adjusting hypotheses up and down the hierarchy
and between levels. Higher cognising can inform even the lowest levels of perceiving,
and vice versa. Under the right conditions, error detected at lower-levels can adjust the
predictions generated at higher-levels just as error detected at higher-levels can adjust
the predictions generated at lower-levels. PPC posits flexible epistemic policies, as
opposed to fixed cognitive mechanisms, allowing for adjustments in particular cases in
the game of error minimisation.
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In describing how precision weight estimates get adjusted in such exchanges,
Clark (2016) tells us that,
Within the PP framework, this would be implemented using the familiar mechanisms
of precision estimation and precision-weighting. Each resource would compute a
course of action, but only the most reliable resource (the one associated with the least
uncertainty when deployed in the current context) would get to determine highprecision prediction errors of the kind needed to drive action and choice. In other
words, a kind of meta-model (one rich in precision expectations) would be used to
determine and deploy whatever resource is best in the current situation, toggling
between them when the need arises (Clark 2016, p. 253).

Accounting for the effects of the Müller-Lyer illusion presents a particularly serious
challenge to PPC. For in such cases there appears to be a systematic failure to adjust
what is perceived in tune with the perceiver’s background knowledge. Why, if
cognition operates with flexible epistemic policies, do the relevant adjustments
systematically fail to occur when we are confronted by this type of perceptual illusion?
Why, according to PPC, do we not find perception and cognition communicating
effectively to minimise and iron out error, as a flat-footed reading of PPC ought to
predict?
Putting their finger on the problem, Ogilvie and Carruthers (2016) observe that
given PPC’s commitment to communicative interactionism “it might seem mysterious
why one’s belief should fail to modify the erroneous perceptual representation” (p.
726). Defenders of predictive processing accounts of cognition need to spell out why
believed contents systematically fail to inform and improve perceptual hypotheses in
such cases. Notably, what needs to be explained is why conscious beliefs of the sort
that ‘the lines are of equal lengths’ never manage to adjust the content of the low-level
perceptual hypothesis. If cognitive activity is in the open channel business of updating
hypotheses against the best evidence, is there an inability to update the perceptual
hypotheses in these sorts of cases?
Ogilvie and Carruthers (2016) propose explaining this systematic failure to
update by appeal to the alleged fact that when perceptual input is sufficiently
unambiguous to lower-level systems the high-level, background knowledge does not
and need not come into play. In their own words:
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We suggest that something like this occurs when the visual system is processing depth
and size information while one looks at a Müller-Lyer figure. As far as the early levels
of processing are concerned, relative depth and size have been accurately calculated
from unambiguous cues. Hence systems monitoring noise and error levels are being
told that everything is in order: there is no need for further processing (Ogilvie and
Carruthers 2016, p. 727).

No doubt that from the purely perceptual level everything might look
unambiguous: indeed, the lines look to be, unambiguously, of differing lengths. The
trouble is that in predictive processing accounts of cognition, focusing on what is
happening at the lower perceptual levels can be only part of the story. For if perceptual
hypotheses can be informed by high-level hypotheses, then the question is why the
perceptual input remains unambiguous given that it is known at the higher level that
the lines are the same length. Surely, ambiguity should creep into the story when the
high-level hypotheses clash with those of bottom-level perceptual processes. The
trouble with the answer supplied by Ogilvie and Carruthers (2016) is their account may
adequately describe what is going on at the perceptual level that only sets up the
problem, it goes no way to explain it. To do so convincingly would be to say why there
is a persistent failure to update perceptual content in light of the presumed theoretical
exchanges that should be taking place across the various levels.
Unlike Ogilvie and Carruthers (2016), Hohwy (2013) describes what is
happening at the perceptual level in different terms but, ultimately, he gives much the
same answer as these authors. He tells us that the Müller-Lyer illusion confronts
viewers with an “ambiguous input: either the lines are the same length or they are not”
(p. 124). However, as per the answer above, the ambiguity is thought to be resolved
decisively at the perceptual level because “the context provided by the wings trigger
fairly low-level priors … [leading] to the inference that they are of different lengths
rather than to the competing inference that they are of the same length” (Hohwy 2013,
p. 124). Accordingly, it just happens that, “the uncertainty induced by the ambiguity is
dealt with relatively early on in the visual system” (Hohwy 2013, p. 124).
As an explanation, Hohwy’s answer suffers in precisely the same way as the
one just reviewed. Why in a system which seeks to maximally minimise error – a system
which has flexible, open channels of communication running from top to bottom and
back again – does the perceptual system systematically settle on this less than desirable
epistemic outcome? As Hohwy (2013) himself asks, why is it that “the higher-level
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prior belief in equal lengths cannot penetrate and create veridical experience of the
lengths?” (p. 124). After all, we are told that the knowledgeable supervisor is the world
itself. To borrow Hohwy’s own slogan: “The world is the truth” (p. 123). Given the
fundamental epistemic concerns of cognitive systems, according to PPC, “perceptual
content … is supervised very closely … by the world” (p. 123).
Here Hohwy has in mind the way contact with the statistical regularities of the
world influence the content of perceptions at the perceptual level. Yet as Hohwy
(2013) also observes, “Perhaps there is some objective truth about how probable each
hypothesis is, based on the frequency of the events it describes. This kind of knowledge
would be useful but mostly it is not something we have.” (p. 17, emphasis added).
When confronted by the Müller-Lyer illusion and others like it we are,
however, in a rare case in which we have certain knowledge about the truth of the
matter – in this case, we know, with certainty, the true length of the lines. We have the
truth, but our perceptual contents are impervious to it – they cannot be supervised by
it. Worse, the perceptual level seems utterly oblivious to the fact that what it is
reporting is at odds with the cogniser’s knows.
The epistemically sound verdict, in this case, should be that “you cannot trust
the signal from the world, but must arrive at a conclusion, so you rely on prior
knowledge” (Hohwy 2013, p. 123). Illusions such as the Müller-Lyer illusion pose a
serious challenge to the adequacy of PPC of cognition in general. Why should a
cognitive system that is designed to minimise uncertainty settle on outcomes that
ignore top-down prior knowledge that is absolutely certain and fail to systematically
update lower-level perpetual hypothesis accordingly? Why would a predictive system,
entirely geared to getting ‘the world right’ – one equipped with the capacity to freely
exchange and update its theoretical hypotheses – be satisfied to keep getting the world
wrong on some levels?
Pointedly, the issue for PPC is the following: according to the proposals
reviewed so far, in dealing with Müller-Lyer type illusions, there is simply no prospect
of progressively improving the accuracy of our perceptual hypotheses. The trouble in
such cases is not how the system should work to minimise uncertainty but why it fails
to deal adequately with absolute certainty. Why, if we assume cognition is adjustable
and Bayesian in the way proposed, is it wholly unable to accommodate true
representations about known states of affairs in our wider cognitive economy.
Worse still, there is no evidence of any ambiguity in such cases. We do not
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experience the lines as looking ambiguous. In the first instance: they look, for all the
world and for all we know, as if they are clearly of different lengths. There is no
ambiguity at the perceptual level. And herein lies the rub, there really ought to be – or
rather there ought to be, if we assume a free exchange of content is in place. In this
light, Hohwy’s (2013) answer looks just as ad hoc and inadequate as that proposed by
Ogilvie and Carruthers (2016).
Is it possible to do better in explaining why a Bayesian predictive processing
system would systematically favour low-level contents over what is known at the higher
level in these cases? Could this fact be explained and justified by the operation of some
overall epistemic policy for error minimising over the long term? Clark (2016) makes
a bold attempt to provide a positive answer to these questions by laying stress on the
paramount yet quite general need for cognitive systems to attune to statistical
regularities in the system’s most familiar ecological contexts. Naturally enough, so
attuning is a good idea if creatures are to interact successfully with the statistically
regular features of their environments.
By focusing on the action-related needs of cognitive systems, Clark’s (2016)
answer builds on the assumption that both perception and cognition are driven by
“webs of inner resources that are both prediction-based and fundamentally actionoriented” (Clark’s 2015, p. 23). In attempting to combine these two aspects, he offers
us a model-based account of PPC – one that assumes that cognition everywhere “deals
extensively in internal models – rich, frugal, and all points in-between – whose role is
to control action by predicting complex plays of sensory data” (Clark 2015, p. 21).
Even though Clark’s account of PPC is action-oriented, it is still “precisionweighted estimates [that] drive action” (p. 21). Although these precision weight
estimates are assumed to be contentful, whatever content such estimates are assumed
to have, Clark (2016) maintains it is not the kind of content that represents the world
in a purely passive, descriptive manner. Importantly, the cognitive work gets done,
fundamentally, by “exploiting all manner of environmental structures and
opportunities along the way” (Clark 2015, p. 23).
Bearing all of this in mind, there is good reason for perceptual systems to fail
to update and correct errors at their level of processing – even if the truth is known
with certainty at the higher level – because acting in a certain way that is consistent
with making those errors is necessary in order to make a living in certain contexts. Put
otherwise, the perceptual systems do better by getting it wrong systematically in certain
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contexts because getting it wrong systematically is what enables the cognitive systems
to maintain a “history of viable interaction” (Clark 2015, p. 19). As Clark (2015)
elsewhere emphasises, in such contexts what matters is getting a grip on the
“interactions that matter” (p. 22).
Understood in this way, the task of the perceptual system is not to minimise
prediction error simpliciter, rather it aims to minimise what Clark, following Lupyan
(2015), calls ‘global prediction error’ – namely, it seeks to minimise error in the great
bulk of cases, over time. Thus Clark (2016) tells us that the reason the system does not
make that update is because doing so would result in “failures of veridical perception
in many other (more ecologically normal) circumstances” (p. 200).
Clark (2016) tells us that “relative to the full set of circumstances that the
perceptual system has needed to deal with, the hypothesis that the lines are of unequal
length is the best hypothesis” (p. 200, emphasis added). In explicating and stressing
this point, Clark (2016) insists that:
in general, our perceptual systems are well-calibrated as devices for mediating between
sensory stimulation and action, and their deliverances (though subject to alteration by
extensive re-training) are not simply overthrown by our endorsement of sentences
such as ‘yes, the two lines are indeed of equal length’ (p. 200).

Indeed, in light of the many action-oriented tasks that the cognitive system needs to
perform, Clark (2016) goes so far as to say that, “our susceptibility to the illusion is not
really a cognitive failure at all” (p. 200).
There is a problem in making this answer work so long as one sticks with an
intellectualist, theoretical conception of the best explanation. The answer might work
to help us understand what is best for perceptual systems to do when they operate solo
in the service of achieving successful action-oriented interactions. Yet this proposal
fails to explain how systematic perceptual error could contribute to best global theory
aimed at getting a coherent, true picture of reality given that it is known with certainty
that the content of such perceptual hypotheses, however useful, must be mistaken.
Epistemically speaking, it is not as if this systematic failure to advance true hypotheses
at the perceptual level results in minimising error overall, not even in the long run. In
the cases described, the unchanging fact is that lines are of equal length even though
perception systematically hypothesises that they are otherwise – and this systematic
error occurs in the organism’s statistically regular, ecologically normal contexts and
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appears to corrupt rather than improve the global theory, epistemically speaking.
This bids us to ask Clark: In what precise sense or way can the false contents
of these perceptions in the statistically regular contexts be regarded as veridical?
Assuming there is no ready answer to that question, it could simply be admitted that
such perceptual responses are useful in such contexts despite having false or inaccurate
contents. We expect defenders of PPC to resist this move since it does not jibe with
standard representationalist assumption that one must represent the world truly in
order to act successfully.
Sticking with the idea that perceptions are theories, an alternative way to go
would be to embrace the idea that, though contradictory, the high-level and the lowlevel contents are both true or accurate enough – where truth and accuracy are
relativised to particular contexts or perspectives. Yet such a relativising move will also
be unattractive to defenders of PCC since it regulates the explanatory value of positing
true or accurate enough contents to the backburner: for on this account, it is the
contexts, not the contents that do all the real explanatory work.
In light of these problems, we recommended going a quite different way – that
of abandoning the idea that perceiving is essentially theoretical in character in favour
of thinking of it as essentially interactive in character – and interactive in a way that
does not involve content or the making of hypotheses about the state of the world.
There are advantages to taking this line. As has been argued extensively elsewhere
emphasising the fundamentally interactive and the action-oriented character of
perception raises other thorny questions about where any assumed representational
contents might come from and how they are supposed to get in on the explanatory act
(Hutto and Myin 2013, 2017).
What the above analysis of the shortcomings of standard cognitivist attempts
to explain visual illusions reveals is that positing contents, however, action-oriented
they are imagined to be, adds nothing to interactive accounts of cognition. Attendant
contents – even if they are imagined to exist – appear to be, at best, troublesome
explanatory danglers. Far from driving the explanations of perception-in-action,
imagined perceptual contents seem, at best, to be superfluous backseat passengers.
Content just isn’t where the explanatory action is, at most, in these case, they are
coming along for the ride.
In light of the aforementioned litany of problems, we think the best move is
to abandon the idea that at the most basic level perception is in the business of
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advancing contentful hypotheses that are assessed for their truth or accuracy. A simpler
and more elegant account of perception – one that is consistent with much of what
Clark (2016) defends – favours the view that perception is only interested in actionorientated effectiveness.
This proposal has independent empirical support. Let’s consider another kind
of case in which theoretical knowledge and our ability to interact successfully with the
environment come apart. Consider the way people adjust their perception to
accommodate statistically unusual or irregular circumstances. This capacity is
illustrated by experimental findings of the way people respond to wearing inverted or
upside-down goggles. These findings suggest that interaction is what really matters in
driving visual adaptations At first, people fumble wildly when trying to grasp an object,
navigate around a space, or even respond to parts of their own bodies. Naturally, these
people know that the world is now inverted and upside down. Assuming their
perceptual theories could be freely updated by their accurate background knowledge,
we should expect that knowledge to make a difference in how and what they perceive
in the inverted conditions. But it doesn’t. Research shows that successful perceptual
adjustments needed to adjust to this new ecological context only occurs after people
have interacted with the world under these new conditions for a sufficiently extended
amount of time – in these cases that typically means wearing the inverted goggles for
weeks (Sachse et al. 2017).
People do adapt to the new constants and patterns of perceiving the world
upside-down, even though they know everything is really rightside-up. According to
Kohler’s (1962) experiments, some people became so at home in their reversed world
they could even drive a motorcycle while wearing the goggles. Examples like this
support the proposal that perception takes the form of dynamically unfolding, yet quite
a-theoretical, interactions with the environment.8
A comparison with the super-scientist Mary of Jackson’s (1982) famous
thought experiment. Mary knows everything there is to know in theory about colour
in her black-and-white room. Yet, the one thing she does not know is what-it-is-like
to see a colour. Similarly, we can imagine that Mary knows everything there is to know
about the properties and effects of inverted goggles and how they influence the visualmotor systems in microdetail. Yet all that theoretical knowledge would be useless in
enabling our Mary to interact successfully with the world the first time she dons the
Klein (2017) raises an argument against this being evidence for strong enactivism. It is a separate argument that requires its
appropriate treatment, which is beyond the scope of this chapter.
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inverted goggles.
The goggles are an excellent example that even if there is theorizing going on,
it is superfluous and epiphenomenal. This occurs because the interaction and adaption,
as opposed to theorizing, is what really matters to drive the visual adjustments. This
example tips the balance in favour of our proposal that perception does not necessarily
involve theorizing, as opposed to Clark’s proposal that it is the theorizing that drives
visual adjustments.
What this shows is that, for successful perceptual engagements, it is the
interactions, not the imagined theories that matter. Even if we imagine, as Clark
proposes, that perceiving is not just action-oriented but also involves advancing
unconscious hypotheses, it appears that such hypotheses are explanatory superfluous.
Worse, going by the evidence of the cases of visual illusions discussed, if such
hypotheses exist, they also appear to be systematically false. We recommend steering
clear of such unattractive posits.
In sum, all of the cognitivist accounts of PPC we have surveyed in this section
encounter an insuperable challenge when it comes to explaining perceptual illusions of
the Müller-Lyer variety. We propose that Clark’s line about the action-oriented nature
of perceiving is essentially right. But to get everything working in proper order, it is
best to drop the idea that perceiving is fundamentally in the epistemic business of
theorising about the world aright.
1.4.

Explaining Müller-Lyer Effects: A Radically Enactive Account

As the Müller-Lyer cases reveal, we cannot always talk ourselves into seeing what we
epistemically ought to see. Given the problems that attend the cognitivist accounts
surveyed above when it comes to explaining why this is so, an atheoretical
interactionist conception cognition becomes attractive.
An interactionist account of cognition obviates the need to explain the
recalcitrance of perceptual systems to update their contents in Müller-Lyer cases
because it does not assume that low-level perceiving has any content to update.
Whereas perceptual judgements are contentful if it is assumed that low-level perceiving
is contentless, it follows that perception cannot be directly informed by other
contentful forms of cognition, such as knowledge or belief.9
9 For detail on how in what sense an illusion can be an illusion without having content (i.e. without representing the world) see
Hutto (2013, chap. 5 and 6; 2017).
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If perception does not essentially involve theorising, if it is a form of
atheoretical cognition, this would explain why those susceptible to the Müller-Lyer
illusion cannot simply update what they perceive by informing perception of what is
elsewhere known to be the case. Perceiving and cognising do not communicate in that
free and easy way, not because there is a fixed informational encapsulated boundary
between them nor because of some or other epistemic policy but rather because
perceiving is action-oriented but not theoretical in character. This explanation is
completely at home with empirical findings, which include cases in which adjustment
to a perceiver’s quite basic perception-action routines can make a difference to the
subject’s ability to execute interactive tasks, successfully, such as grasping (Daprati and
Gentilucci 1997; Franz et al. 2001, Westwood et al. 2003) and manual aiming
movements (Elliott and Lee 1995, Gentilucci et al. 1996). For example, Meegan et al.
(2003) show how the Müller-Lyer illusion affects action in manual aiming movements,
revealing that movements executed where subjects could view their hand were less
affected by the illusion than movements executed without such vision of their hand.
What this shows is that perception and action profiles can adjust over time through
extended interaction with environments in ways that matter to how we respond to
these illusions. Importantly, it has been found that the influence of visual illusions can
be modulated by practice as systems adapt (Kopiske et al. 2017, Säfström and Edin,
2004).
Assuming the perception is a form of atheoretical cognition easily
accommodates the finding that it is possible to alter what is perceived by significantly
altering pertinent aspects of the environment with which the system actively engages.
Considerer the large-scale cross-cultural empirical study on visual illusions, conducted
by Segall, Campbell, and Herskovits (1966). They conducted studies using five figures,
including the Müller-Lyer figure, and concluded that susceptibility to visual illusions is
dependent on the cultural context. Their results showed that European and American
samples made significantly more illusion-supporting responses than specific nonWestern populations, which lends credence to the carpentered-environment
hypothesis that peoples systematically engaging with differently constructed
environments will be differentially susceptible to geometric illusions because they have
ingrained different, yet equally ecologically valid, visual expectations.
Europeans and Americans, on the one hand, and certain groups of non-
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Westerners, on the other, expect the world in different ways, according to the history
of their interactions due to prior experiences of different perceptual environments.
The crucial point, foreshadowed in the previous section, is that it is possible for
cognitive systems to act adaptively and succeed in completing world-relating tasks
without any contents, accurate or inaccurate, coming into play to guide behaviour.
Taking an interactionist line on perception and the explanation of visual
illusion data avoids a problem that all cognitivists need to address. That is to
accommodate somehow the fact that there can be cognisers attuned to different
environments that have equally true or accurate perceptual contents which contradict
one another. The interactionist does not have to make this sort of hard choice about
which population sees the world correctly and which sees it incorrectly. Various
populations can succeed in their respective interactions without the above question
ever arising since, ex hypothesi, perceiving is not, pace Schlicht and Venter (2019), at
the base, a matter of ‘getting the world right’.

Conclusion
We have assessed two kinds of cognitivist CET explanations of the effects of MüllerLyer illusion and found both wanting. Both modularist and predictive processing
theories of perception encounter fundamental explanatory problems. The
interactionist alternative we propose here offers a different sort of explanation as to
why our cognising does not update our perceiving – an explanation that appears to
accommodate the full set of empirical findings better than its rivals.
There is a price for admission. Unlike Ogilvie and Carruthers (2016), the
interactive account of basic perception that we have defended here, though
philosophically motivated if adopted, would result in “scientifically radical” change to
mainstream thinking. That is to say, it demands a considerable theoretical shift in
standard conceptions about the nature of perceiving and not merely “a modest
amendment to standard models” (p. 739). We think the price is well worth paying.
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Dr Nick Chown

Chapter 2
Understanding Autistic Individuals

‘I will teach you differences!’
King Lear, Act I, Scene 4

Introduction
What autistic people tend to think about, the way they think about things, and the ways
they interact with others is atypical when compared to the population at large. The
cognitive diversity of autistic people, and its many variations, is well-documented and
much discussed.
This chapter has the potential to contribute to the neurodiversity movement by
providing philosophically motivated reasons for thinking differently about the cognitive
styles of autistic individuals. In particular, it challenges the prevalent mindreading
characterisation of everyday social cognition that promotes the view that autism is an
underlying condition that is best explained in terms of deficiencies in inferential
capacities to form and test hypotheses.
In a recent opinion piece on the neurodiversity movement published in Scientific
American on 30 April 2019, Baron-Cohen (2019) reminds of what he describes as the
‘huge heterogeneity’ among those people who fall within the autistic spectrum. Some
autistic people have no functional language and severe developmental delay (both of
which I would view as disorders), others have milder learning difficulties, while yet
others have average or excellent language skills and average or even high IQ. What all
individuals on the autism spectrum share in common are social communication
difficulties (both are disabilities), difficulties adjusting to unexpected change (another
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disability), a love of repetition or ‘need for sameness,’ unusually narrow interests, and
sensory hyper- and hypo-sensitivities (all examples of difference). Autism can also be
associated with cognitive strengths and even talents, notably in attention to and memory
for detail, and a strong drive to detect patterns (all of these are differences). How these
are manifested is likely to be strongly influenced by language and IQ. Undeniably, there
is enormous variability in the full spectrum of cognitive styles exhibited by autistic
individuals. Every autistic individual has their own distinct cognitive style, just as every
non-autistic individual does.
Beyond merely acknowledging and carefully cataloguing the heterogenous
cognitive diversity of autistic individuals, those attracted to the medical model have
made persistent attempts to classify these cognitive styles, treating them as a part of a
constellation of symptoms that are expressive of an underlying condition – a condition
that is typically denoted by the labels ‘autism’ or ‘autistic spectrum disorder’.
Over the decades there have been many attempts to understand the true
character and ultimate basis of the totality of symptoms generated by the supposed
underlying autistic condition from which autistic people allegedly suffer. Yet the current
received view is that the hunt for a single condition that explains and accounts for the
full set of autistic symptoms in a unified manner is a snark hunt. It is now widely
accepted that ‘no single aetiology can account for all differences in presentation’ (Ure et
al., 2018, p. 1068). Naturally, the idea that autism is comprised of a cluster of underlying
conditions – not a single condition – lends itself naturally to classifying the heterogeneity
of autistic individuals in terms of various species and subtypes of autism.
The aim of empirical research into these assumed underlying conditions that
make up autism is directed at identifying specific biological markers for distinct aspects
of autistic disorder – aspects which, by the lights of those who buy into the medical
model wholesale, are understood to be neurodevelopmental in nature.
In line with these developments, some researchers have set their explanatory
sights more modestly. They zoom in to focus only on what underpins the atypical
patterns of social cognition exhibited by autistic individuals – namely, their distinct style
interacting with others and their limitations in fluidly understanding what motivates
actions. For them, understanding what explains the social cognitive aspects of autism
alone would still constitute a major advance. This would surely be so if, as Baron-Cohen
(2019) maintains, social communicative difficulties are found across the autistic
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spectrum and ‘aspects of social cognition reflect areas of disability in autism, and are
often the reason for why they seek and receive a diagnosis’.
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) (APA,
2013) concurs, taking the atypical styles of social cognition of autistic individuals to be
among the most diagnostically important criteria and defining features of the condition.
The DSM-5 tells us that Autism Spectrum Disorder is characterised by persistent
deficits in social-emotional reciprocity, ranging, for example, from abnormal
social approach and failure of normal back-and-forth conversation … to failure
to initiate or respond to social interactions; Deficits in nonverbal communicative
behaviours used for social interaction; Deficits in developing, maintaining, and
understand relationships. (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 50)
The goal of accounting for the distinctive patterns of social cognition of autistic
individuals has launched a thousand explanatory ships, all of which set forth to discover
what underpins at least the social cognitive aspects of the autistic mind. This chapter
raises doubts about a specific class of explanations of the social cognitive styles of
autistic individuals – Theory Theory, or TT, explanations.10TT comes in many forms –
but what is common to all versions is the proposal to explain the basis of our social
cognition by appeal to machinery of mind that makes use of theories of some sort that
are understood to involve contentful inferential processes. TT is a worthwhile target
since it is the dominant and most popular framework for answering the Explanatory
Challenge of what, supposedly, underpins everyday social cognition and what goes
systematically wrong with social cognition for autistic people.
Social cognition can be neutrally understood as denoting ‘our ability to
understand and interact with others’ (Spaulding, 2010, p. 120). As such, it is important
to remind ourselves that everyday social cognition can be depicted in various ways.
Appropriately characterising the nature of social cognition poses a special kind of
philosophical challenge. Let us call this the Characterisation Challenge.
In this chapter we focus exclusively on TT proposals: however, our conclusions generalise. They apply with equal force to any
Simulation Theory, or ST, proposal which assumes that neutrally based mindreading involves some kind of inference. ST
proposals hold that inferences about other minds are achieved by co-opting or reusing planning or practical reasoning systems –
rather than forming theories about goal planning, as is the wont of TT proposals (see, e.g. Gordon, forthcoming). However, on
our analysis, the difference between ST and TT about the character of the central processes involved in modelling other minds –
while technically interesting – is unimportant with respect to the larger concerns we raise in this chapter. This is because both
classes of theory, TT and ST, characterise everyday social cognition in mindreading terms. Our objections apply to any explanation
that takes the mindreading characterisation of everyday social cognition for granted. Hence, our analysis applies with equal
strength to any mentalising proposal – whether ST or T – which assumes that it is the job of the brain to infer the goals or reasons
(or otherwise ‘the causes’) that lie behind another agent’s observed behaviour.
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Ultimately, we will argue that the various explanatory proposals of TT only look
promising so long as a certain kind of answer is given to the Characterisation Challenge.
That is to say, TT proposals look promising if we accept the dominant characterisation
of social cognition – the standard mindreading story – which holds that ‘in order to
understand and successfully interact with other agents, neurotypical adult humans
attribute mental states to other agents in order to explain and predict their behavior’
(Spaulding, 2018, p. 7).
Depicting social cognition in such spectatorial terms licenses the received and
longstanding view in the field that, ‘many people with autism spectrum conditions have
a specific impairment in mindreading’ (Heyes, 2018, p. 149). As we shall reveal, it is no
accident that the credibility of TT explanations of the alleged social cognitive deficits of
autistic individuals depend on thinking of social cognitive styles of autistic individuals in
terms of impoverished mindreading – as impaired attempts to get at the contents of
other minds, that occur whenever autistic people attempt to engage in everyday social
cognition.
This chapter argues that the fate of any proposed TT answer to the Explanatory
Challenge stands or falls with the appropriateness of giving a Mindreading answer to the
Characterisation Challenge. The first two sections provide details of the current state of
the art with respect to TT proposals about how to understand and explain autistic social
cognition. Section 2 focuses on old school modularist TT proposals, noting their
theoretical and explanatory limitations. Section 3 examines new school predictive
processing TT proposals, highlighting what has made them appear more theoretically
and explanatory promising to many researchers.
Section 4 then provides a diagnosis of why we should reject any kind of TT
proposal about the supposed social cognitive deficits of autistic individuals. Our
concerns are about any TT proposal that takes seriously the core assumption that the
primary and pervasive way that we engage and connect with others is by means of
theorising. We raise objections to TT proposals as a class by providing reasons for
thinking that a Mindreading answer to the Characterisation Challenge obscures the true
nature of everyday social cognition. We conclude that the crucial step of characterising
the social cognitive styles and tendencies of autistic individuals as some kind of
Mindreading deficit is a mistake. The paper closes by encouraging the adoption of
alternative, non-Mindreading ways of understanding the social cognitive styles of autistic
individuals. We contend that an enactivist alternative can offer an antidote to thinking
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of the diverse social cognitive styles of autistic individuals in terms of underlying subpersonal cognitive deficits rather than in terms of the cognitive differences of whole
persons.
2.1. Old School, Mental Module TT
A longstanding, high profile TT hypothesis about what best explains the distinctive
social cognitive patterns of autistic individuals holds that these stem from those
individuals having a faulty or poorly functioning Theory of Mind or, ToM, module.
In general Theory Theory, or TT, proposals about social cognition assume that
when we understand minds in daily life, we use the same sorts of tools that we use to
understand other non-mental phenomena. That is to say, we use the same sort of tools
we use everywhere in the sciences – namely, theories that aim to tell us about the
unobservable, hidden causal structure of the world.
A ToM is a very particular kind of theory; it is assumed to have a distinctive sort
of content. A ToM is made up of mental-state concepts that feature in theoretical
postulates that comprise the core general principles of a theory of everyday psychology.
The content of the ToM that normally developing humans use, so the story goes, is what
enables most of us to navigate our everyday social world fluidly and with ease. We
succeed in understanding others if we manage to infer their mental states correctly by
applying a ToM, thereby bringing the laws of everyday psychology to bear on particular
cases.
As such, ToM variants of TT hold that, for most of us, the heavy lifting in
everyday social cognition is done by our acquaintance with and use of laws of governing
everyday social cognition. Modularists take this idea a step further. They hold that ToM
laws are housed in a special cognitive mechanism – a ToM Module, or ToMM. A ToMM
is an architecturally distinct mental module – one that is solely dedicated to the special
work of enabling us to predict and explain the actions of others by accurately attributing
mental states contents to them. Believers in classic ToMMs assume that ‘the mind
contains a single mental faculty charged with attributing mental states (whether to
oneself or to others)’ (Carruthers 2011, p. 1).
Those who posit ToMMs assume that however such modules are acquired, they
are the means by which everyday social cognition is normally conducted by our species.
Nativist accounts of ToM assume that it is a biological device that comes built-in as
standard for all normally developing members of our species (Fodor 1983). Others hold
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that ToMMs are acquired during ontogeny (Karmiloff-Smith, Klima, Bellugi, Grant, &
Baron-Cohen, 1995). Some, such as Scholl and Leslie (1999) even propose that ‘normal
children seem to develop the same ToM at roughly the same time’ (p. 138).
In their heyday, modularist theories of mind aided and abetted the idea that
impaired mindreading abilities, rooted in damaged or atypically functioning
neurocognitive machinery of a ToMM, were responsible for the social cognitive patterns
displayed by autistic individuals.
We see these ideas brought together in the work of Baron-Cohen. According to
its original formulation, Baron-Cohen’s (1995) mindblindness hypothesis proposed that
‘children and adults with the biological condition of autism suffer, to varying degrees,
from mindblindness’ (1995, p. 5; Brewer, Young, & Barnett, 2017; Gilleen, Xie, &
Strelchuk, 2017; Livingston and Colvert 2019). By Baron-Cohen’s (2000) lights,
difficulty in social cognition, understood as a mindreading impairment, is the ‘core and
possibly universal abnormality of autistic individuals’ (Baron-Cohen, 2000, p. 3).
Summarising work in this vein, Brüne (2005) reports a range of findings that
suggest to many that we find the fingerprint of an ‘impaired ToM in a variety of
neuropsychiatric disorders’ (Brüne, 2005, p. 21). Concomitantly, modularists
hypothesised that these various patterns of autistic mindblindness are caused and
explained by problems with the ToMMs of people in these populations. Thus, a standard
proposal in the field, even today, is that ‘the functional or structural disruption of the
neural mechanisms underlying ToM may give rise to various types of psychopathology’
(Brüne, 2005, p. 21).
The faulty ToMM proposal contends that autistic individuals are prevented from
attributing contents to other minds accurately or, in the most extreme cases, doing so at
all. What makes the faulty ToMM hypothesis about the social cognitive tendencies of
autistic individuals attractive to many is that

to see a person with autism, we are told, is to see what happens to a human being when the
ability to mentalize … is switched off … On the surface, this is neatly specific … The ‘theory of
mind’ explanation seems to fit the facts. (Belmonte, 2009, p. 121)

As traditionally understood, a defining feature of modules is that they are
informational encapsulated, both vertically and horizontally (Matthews, 2019; QuiltyDunn, 2019; Raftopoulos, 2019). Information contained in each module is vertically
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encapsulated from other modules and horizontally encapsulated from the information
available in the cognitive system.
Modules have limited cognitive interests and concerns. In getting their epistemic
work done, they operate on a strictly need-to-know basis, and they – apparently – don’t
need to know much. It is assumed that modules work better and faster by restricting
their concerns to specialised dealings with only certain topics. It is because of their
informationally encapsulated domain-specificity that they are not informed and updated
by all the contentful knowledge that might possibly be communicated to them. The
limited communicative repertoire of modules is the peculiar characteristic that secures
their status as mental modules.
Accordingly, each type of mental module is assumed to be restricted in the
subject matter of its concern. Modules are domain-specific in a sense that only a
circumscribed class of inputs will activate them. It is this feature of modules that makes
them dissociable such that they can be selectively impaired, damaged, or disabled
without effecting the operation of other systems.
Putting all of this together, ToMM theory holds that the main work of predicting
and explaining the behaviour of others by assigning mental states is done in isolation
from the operation of other cognitive systems. The essential character of ToMM is that
it provides specialised theoretical knowledge of its particular domain and it can function
by and large independently of other modules and central cognitive processes.
Since ToMMs are dissociable components, both from other modular devices
and from central cognition, impairment of a ToMM will not directly impair the
functioning of other cognitive mechanisms. In conclusion, the awkward and failed social
interactions of autistic individuals are thus put down to the alleged fact that they lack a
ToMM or are unable to wield their ToMs well in practice so as to accurately represent
the mental states of others.
It is not enough to have a working ToMM, to mindread successfully. Successful
mindreading also requires being able to apply one’s ToM sensitively in ways that address
the particularities of specific cases. That requires adjusting for relevant differences
between cases by making allowance for a range of variables including a great deal of
background belief and knowledge about what the other person knows and thinks, how
they are likely to react, what is the most likely way someone would react in such cases,
and so on and on. In short, believers in ToMMs are obliged to explain how the core
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ToM we allegedly use is applied sensitively in situ (for a more detailed discussion of this
point see Hutto, 2008, Chap. 1).
It is wholly unclear how having a general ToM machinery that works in isolation
from relevant background knowledge could possibly enable us to cope with ad hoc
details and idiosyncratic attitudes we need to cope with in each new situation. Without
supplement, ToMMs would be at a loss precisely when it comes to explaining how we
deal with details; it is uncomfortably quiet on how we fluently come to understand
particular people and in particular circumstances. Yet, as Maibom (2009) observes ‘folk
psychological knowledge is knowledge of the (empirical) world only if it is combined
with knowledge of how to apply it’ (p. 361).
An adequate explanation of how ToMMs could underpin everyday social
cognition is required if a ToMM story is to be believed about how social agents grasp
these social idiosyncratic details so as to understand and come to make sense of one
another.
How could a ToMM operate successfully in isolation from the background
knowledge and belief that appears to be needed to inform and direct its use in specific
cases? Pivotally, the supporting knowledge needed for applying a ToM sensitively
cannot be supplied by a ToM and, indeed, given the contextual nature of the supporting
knowledge, it isn’t possible to specify it in advance at all. This reminds us that the
business of socially engaging with and coming to understand others is deeply context
sensitive. There are simply no algorithms with the right properties that would allow us
to anticipate the relevant possibilities.
2.2. New school, Bayesian Brain TT
It is neither clear how, nor if, defenders of the classic ToMM can respond adequately to
the serious theoretical and explanatory concerns raised in the previous section. In this
light, a tempting way to go might be to seek to change theoretical horses by jumping on
the Bayesian brain bandwagon.
The Bayesian Brain Hypothesis, or BBH, contends that cognition is, through
and through, concerned with making and improving on its predictions about the causal
structure of the world. Tirelessly and proactively, our brains are forever trying to look
ahead in order to ensure that we have an adequate practical grip on the world in the here
and now. On this view, our brains do not sit back and receive information from the
world, form truth evaluable representations of it, and only then work out and implement
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action plans. Instead, the BBH holds that the basic work of brains is to get ahead of the
curve by making the best possible predictions, in advance, about what the world is likely
to throw at us. This is all part of the bigger job of cognition which, in all its varieties, is
to try to get a sense of what is going on behind the sensory scenes by advancing, testing,
and refining inferences to the best explanation on multiple spatial and temporal scales.
Through this continual and dynamic process, so the BBH claims, we get a better and
better fix on the true causal structure of the world.
Although the BBH made its name for its attempts to better account for the
nature of perception–action cycles there has been a move to apply it to understand a
much wider range of cognitive phenomena, including social cognition – especially when
the latter is construed in Mindreading terms (see, e.g. Pezzulo, 2017).
The BBH is a full-blooded type of TT. Like its ToMM cousin it seeks to give an
account of the Mindreading processes that it assumes lie at the heart of everyday social
cognition. As noted above, the idea is that – at its core – cognitive activity is always
about making inferences concerning the hidden causes of sensory phenomena.
Advocates of the BBH hold that the processes used in Mindreading are the same basic
kind used elsewhere in every variety of cognition – including acts of basic perception.
The only difference in the case of social cognition is the target of the activity.
Thus, just as non-social objects in our environment are causes of our visual
input, the mental states of other people are a part of the physical structure of the world
that produces the stream of sensory impressions that our brains receive. In this view,
mentalising occurs implicitly and shares a fundamental similarity with the representation
of non-social objects: each is a natural result of the brain’s endeavour to best explain its
sensory input (Palmer, Seth, & Hohwy, 2015, p. 377).
There are no simple one-to-one links between sensory experience and its
possible causes, which can be many and various. Things are even more tricky in the
cases of the mental states that are presumed to lie behind and cause behaviour. Unlike
the causes of sensory simulation that lie at the shallow end of the perceptual pool, mental
states are much more hidden, usually staying at the deep end.
By engaging with the world to test hypotheses, over and over again, cognisers
actualise and maximise their learning potential, gradually improving their accuracy in
representing the causal structure of the world. As Hohwy (2018) puts it, ‘the ability to
minimise the prediction error over time depends on building better and better

55

representations of the causes of sensory inputs. This is encapsulated in the very notion
of model revision in Bayesian inference’ (p. 134).
An efficient system is one that ‘knows’ how to determine what is relevant within
a context. Social contexts are much more complex than simple sensory feature detection.
Being appropriately sensitive to varying contexts, according to the BBH, is a matter of
being able to flexibly adjust the degree of attention given to particular sensory inputs
(Hohwy & Palmer, 2014; Van de Cruys, Perrykkad, & Hohwy, 2014). This process,
known as precision weighting, is effectively the capacity for determining the relevance
of sensory inputs, differentiating between noise and signal. Clark (2016) describes it in
terms of the system’s ability to ‘to treat more or less of the incoming sensory information
as ‘news’, and more generally in the ability to flexibly to modify [sic] the balance between
top-down and bottom-up information at various stages of processing …’ (p. 226).
To be effective, the precision-weighting of inferences has to be context-sensitive
(Ward, 2018; Van de Cruys et al., 2019). For well-adapted systems, learning and
experience is the means by which they come to determine the relevance of evidence in
the form of sensory inputs by asking whether these contain content that contradicts and
should thus revise what is known or expected. Over time, the system becomes better
and better at making these adjustments through a bootstrapping process, learning ‘from
[changing] regularities in the sensory input’ (Van de Cruys et al., 2019, p. 165). This is a
form of ‘experience-dependent learning that accompanies evidence accumulation’
(Friston, 2018; see also Bzdok and Ioannidis, 2019). The outcome of such learning is
that the system gains the ability to attend to what is relevant and ignore what is not.
As discussed in the previous section, being able to cope with context-sensitivity
is particularly important in social situations considering that they ‘always vary in their
sensory details’ (Van de Cruys et al., 2019, p. 165). Crucially, it should now be clear why
the Bayesian Brain TT proposals about what underlies social cognition look more
promising than their Mental Module TT rivals. This is because according to the BBH
the brain is always attempting to calculate which state of the world is ‘most likely to be
causing the sensory input that our brain receives, given prior beliefs about these causes
that are furnished by previous experiences, development, and evolution’ (Palmer et al.,
2015, p. 377).
The BBH differs from a ToMM precisely in not being encapsulated. The BBH
assumes that there is open channel communication – back and forth – that allows
inferences to be updated, such that the whole predictive effort is informed by and
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updated at all levels. The brain’s hypotheses and inferences about expected causes of
the behaviour of others are thus:

situated as part of a causal hierarchy and share reciprocal interactions with higher and lower
levels of representation. Thus, mental state inferences are statistically constrained by
representations of longer-term expectations – perhaps regarding, for example, the kind of mental
states that people tend to have in a given context, or the sense of your friend’s mood that has
been reflected in a variety of her behaviours since she showed up to the restaurant, or even
culturally defined social contexts and norms. (Palmer et al., 2015, p. 378)

Not only does the BBH overcome the problem of how to account for the contextsensitive use of a ToM in situ, it has been claimed that the approach holds out the
promise of illuminating ‘a variety of pathologies and disturbances, ranging from
schizophrenia and autism to “functional motor syndromes” (Clark, 2016, p. 3).
Palmer et al. (2015) offer a specific BBH proposal about what explains the
signature features of the social cognitive profiles of autistic individuals. Crucially, these
researchers conjecture that the autistic social cognitive profiles are a result of the autistic
brain’s failure to generate relevant inferences and thus to update or revise expectations
about other minds. Autism, on this theory, is the result of a deficient precision
estimation system.
Autistic individuals lack the flexibility to determine what is relevant because their
brains treat too many sensory inputs as signals. This would explain autistic
hypersensitivity or sensory overload (Clark, 2016; Pellicano & Burr, 2012) and autistic
hypo-responsivity, which is the absence of context-sensitive responses (Van de Cruys et
al., 2019). Accordingly, Clark (2016) suggests, this ‘would result in a constant barrage of
information demanding further processing and might plausibly engender severe
emotional costs’ (Clark, 2016, p. 225).
Developing this proposal, Clark (2016) suggest that ‘autistic subjects can
construct and deploy strong priors but may have difficulties applying them’ (p. 226). Yet
impaired precision-weighting capacities may:

lead to overspecific, overfitted internal models that will less efficiently explain away sensory
inputs of, for example, social situations that always vary in their sensory details. The sparse,
generalizable hidden causes that explain inputs best are not formed (or properly applied). (Van
de Cruys et al., 2019, p. 165)
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On this view, incapable of sifting out what is and is not relevant, the autistic brain may
be unable to form or update its generative model to get an accurate representation of
what causes and lies behind the behaviour of others. If the brains of autistic individuals
consistently fail to advance appropriate inferences, then they will not have the
opportunity to improve the accuracy of their representations of the mental causes that
allegedly drive the behaviour of others.
The animating idea behind the BBH is that the work of brains is analogous to
what scientists do when making inferences in an effort to best explain phenomena.
Brains advance hypotheses, which are developed, refined and improved as those
theories are tested against what the world has to offer. As Hohwy (2019) presents it, the
BBH’s core commitment is that ‘perceptual inference is a process that arrives at revised
models of the world, which accurately represent the world’ (p. 166).
In an earlier publication, Hohwy draws attention to the longstanding analogy,
drawn by both Helmholtz and Gregory, ‘between perception and scientific hypothesis
testing’ (Gregory, 1980; Helmholtz, 1860/1962; Hohwy, 2013, p. 77). Clark (2016)
makes a direct comparison between what scientific experimenters and brains do (p. 95).
Likewise, Yon et al. (2019) note that BBH talk of perceptual inference ‘likens perceptual
processing to the scientific process’ (p. 6).
How seriously should we take the brain–scientist analogy? In what respects
should we take it seriously? Sometimes, the analogy is described as ‘merely a heuristic
description’ (Hohwy, 2019, p. 166). Yet, to let go of a realistic reading of the idea that
the brain poses and updates inferences raises deep questions about the status of the
explanations offered by the BBH. As Hohwy (2018) observes:

If the inferential aspect is not kept in focus, then it would appear to be a coincidence, or
somehow an optional aspect of perceptual and cognitive processes that conform to what Bayes’s
rule dictate. Put, differently, anyone who subscribes to the notion of predictive processing must
also accept the inferential aspect. If it is thrown out, then the ‘prediction error minimization’
part becomes a meaningless, unconstrained notion. (p. 132)

In line with the claim that the BBH embeds a non-negotiable commitment to the brain
trading in inferences, Hohwy (2018) tells us that the BBH operates with ‘a concrete
sense of “inference” where Bayes’s rule is used to update internal models of the causes
of the input in the light of new evidence’ (p. 131).
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Hohwy also tells us that the Bayesian way in which the brain updates its models
and theories is unlike what goes on in explicit deductive reasoning in key respects.
Hence, the BBH does not entail that the brain actually gets its work done by an ‘overly
intellectual application of theorems of probability theory’ (Hohwy, 2018, p. 132). As
such, the way the BBH construes the brain’s inferences differs ‘from the use of the term
“inference” to describe a higher-order, cognitive and consciously effortful process’
(Palmer et al., 2015, p. 379).
This leads us to the view that the brain’s inferences are implicit and unconscious,
unlike those inferences of scientists that are explicit and conscious. The brain’s
inferences are swifter and abductive in character and thus unlike inferential operations
of the sort found in deductive proofs. Yet, for all that, the brain’s inferences are like the
inferences of scientists in being contentful and aiming to get an accurate depiction of
the true causal structure of reality. That is what all inferences have in common. That is
why ‘mentalising slots into predictive processing as constituting the same kind of
unconscious inference that the brain is already engaged into represent [sic] its
environment’ (Palmer et al., 2015, p. 378; see Hohwy & Palmer 2014; Kilner, Friston, &
Frith, 2007).
What we can conclude from this is that the BBH, like all versions of TT, is
committed to the assumption that we always and everywhere understand others by
advancing and improving inferences about the hidden causes of their observable
behaviour. This TT picture of what underpins social cognition – and what explains
typical and atypical varieties – trades upon and gets its life from the assumption that
everyday acts of social cognition are rightly characterised in terms of Mindreading. It is
that assumption that suggests that we must always adopt a spectatorial stance toward
others, even if, unbeknownst to us. In the concluding section, we expose how the
spectatorial assumption mischaracterises everyday social cognition and why our exposé
should cast doubt on the BBH’s attempted explanations of the social cognitive profiles
of autistic individuals.

2.3. Characterizing social cognition correctly: diversity not deficit
TT explanations of everyday social cognition – both of the general population as well as
that of autistic individuals – are only attractive to those who adhere to a Mindreading
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picture of such cognition. The Mindreading picture is bound up with a host of
metaphors. Under its sway, philosophers are wont to claim that individuals have no
direct access to other people’s minds; that mental states are the out-of-sight, hidden
causes that drive behaviour; that in trying to understand what drives another’s behaviour
we need to posit hypothetical entities in our efforts to accurately get at hidden causes,
and so on and on.
The Mindreading characterisation of social cognition gets its life from the
spectatorial assumption that holds that our situation with respect to others is
fundamentally that of a scientific spectator to target phenomena (Hutto, 2004). That
assumption is fostered by thinking that the primary point and pervasive purpose of
everyday social cognition is to bridge an assumed epistemic gap that exists between us
and others for the purposes of accurately depicting the mental states that move them.
Despite the Mindreading picture’s status as the received view, many
philosophers have argued that, on close inspection, modelling everyday social cognition
on a scientific enterprise paints a distorting picture of its character (Hutto, 2004, 2008;
McGeer, 2007, Ratcliffe, 2007). Positively characterised, our everyday social cognition is
bound up with engaging with the attitudes and emotions of others, understanding their
projects and commitments, trusting or not trusting the accounts that give us why they
do what they do. In these practices we are not taking up a scientific stance towards
others.
The point of this reminder is not, pace Carruthers, to say that sub-personal
theorising cannot be interactive because it is third-personal. The BBH demonstrates that
scientific theorising can ‘straddle the interaction–observation dichotomy’ (Schönherr
and Westra 2017, p. 5). The objection to the TT framework made by its so-called
phenomenological critics is more fundamental: it is that our everyday engagements with
one another are misdescribed when they are depicted as being essentially theoretical in
character. We are not always and everywhere attempting to discover the underlying
causes of another’s behaviour. This is because we are interested in the other’s reasons
for acting and the best way to get at those reasons is to be told what they are without
even having to ask. To understand those social exchanges aright is, to use McGeer’s
(2007) words, to recognise that we do not ‘interact with one another as scientist to
object, as observer to observed’ (p. 146).
We maintain that reasons to doubt that the Mindreading picture paints a reliable
portrait of everyday social cognition are also reasons to doubt that TT proposals, of
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whatever stripe, can provide the best explanations of social cognition. Thus,
relinquishing the spectatorial assumption raises questions about the explanatory
appropriateness of applying a TT gloss to characterise so-called sub-personal processes
that underwrite social cognition. In other words, giving close attention to the character
of our everyday social cognitive practices should make us wary of taking the brain–
scientist analogy at all seriously. Rejecting the Mindreading answer to the
Characterisation Challenge should make us question the credibility that scientific
inference, or even something near enough, really lies at the heart of all of our social
cognitive endeavours – namely, that scientific inference really is the driving force in the
engine of social cognition.
Some have denied that this sort of conclusion follows. They hold that
phenomenological reflections on the character of everyday social cognition do not
strongly constrain theorising about its sub-personal drivers. In this vein Spaulding (2018)
argues that careful introspection of what it is like to engage in social cognition should
not constrain theorising about its underlying mechanisms because ‘many of our social
interactions consist in tacit or implicit mindreading, i.e. subconsciously explaining and
predicting targets’ behavior on the basis of attributed mental states’ (pp. 14–15).
Apart from begging the question at issue, the trouble with this line of defence is
that phenomenological critiques of the mindreading depiction of everyday social
cognition are not based, pace Spaulding, on ‘careful introspection’ of our
phenomenology. Rather they are based on giving careful attention to the character of
our everyday practices (Hutto, 2013; Hutto & Satne, 2018). In addition, there have been
other substantial critiques that raise doubts about the tenability of accounting for the
source and basis of the implicit, unconscious contentful inferences upon which the
Mindreading story and TT explanations rely (see, e.g. Hutto and Myin 2013, 2017).
Together, this clutch of objections constitutes a pincer movement that brings the
Mindreading–TT package into question from two directions, above and below.
Under pressure, Spaulding (2018) admits that when characterising the subpersonal processes that allegedly underwrite social cognition ‘one could substitute
“interpretation” and “anticipation” for explanation and prediction’ (p. 15). That is
certainly closer to the mark and, if we are right, that move has much better prospects of
bringing attempts at providing sub-personal explanations of social cognition into line
with its actual character.
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In this light, Spaulding’s proposed adjustment to the TT gloss is a step in the
right direction. An even bigger and better step, in our view, would be to embrace an
enactive account of cognition and abandon the quest to find underlying sub-personal
mechanisms that explain cognitive phenomena all together (see Hutto & Myin, 2013,
2017).
It matters which of these philosophical frameworks we adopt for thinking about
cognition – the choice has practical and ethical significance. Consider that, on the one
hand, it is easy to espouse that autistic individuals deserve our full respect and support
as ‘persons who try to make sense of themselves and the world’ (Procter, 2001, p. 117).
Yet, on the other hand, it is equally easy to hold – at the same time – that the impaired
mindreading of autistic individuals bars them from making adequate choices in the social
domain and, as such, ‘caring for them may require making these choices for them’
(Procter, 2001, p. 114). This way of reasoning can lead to bad outcomes, as in Melanie
Yergeau’s case. She reports a harrowing story in which she was forcibly detained by
therapists-cum-faculty in which, in her words: ‘I found myself deeper within a narrative
of neurological determinism … Regardless of what I said, it was my autism saying it’
(Yergeau, 2013). Enactivist approaches to mind and cognition give us tools for resisting
rather than encouraging the idea that who ‘we’ are reduces to something inside us, that
who ‘we’ are is the product of something inside us – the intelligent, sub-personal activity
of our brains.
The foregoing analysis is not designed to deny or obscure the fact that certain
autistic and cognitively typical individuals, given their particular cognitive capacities and
profiles, find some kinds of social cognitive tasks difficult, perhaps even impossibly so.
It does, however, serve to remind us that the cognitive challenges and achievements in
question are challenges and achievement of individuals – of persons – and that these are
not best explained by focusing solely or primarily on sub-personal parts of people.
Had there been more space, it would have been illuminating to provide more
detail about enactivist alternatives to the mainstream cognitivist approaches that take
the Mindreading characterisation of social cognition as given. In lieu of doing so in more
depth, we must be satisfied with dwelling on this lesson for now: once we stop thinking
of the main action of social cognition as happening in the heads of individuals and put
it back in the space of interactions themselves it becomes clear that successful social
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engagement is a joint responsibility.11 It is best conceived of as a shared endeavour in
which adjustments need to be made by all parties involved to ensure successful
outcomes. Success in these tasks, given their true point and purpose, is not something
that can be achieved privately and separately in the heads or brains of the individuals
involved, however remarkable those individuals may be at inferring each other’s mental
states.
Enactivists conceive of cognition in terms of dynamic, ‘out-of-the-head’, worldinvolving activities. Emphasising these aspects, they make much of the metaphor that
cognitive engagements are a matter of ‘laying down a path in walking’. That metaphor
helps to illuminate that in all cases, when it comes to completing cognitive tasks there
are other possible ways of getting to the same place. Getting there by other ways might
require going slower, or taking a different path than the beaten one, or they might require
the cooperation and assistance in meeting one part of the way.
The pivotal point is that we have reason to surrender the idea, enshrined in the
intellectual individualism embraced by mainstream cognitivism, that successful social
cognition depends on and aims at a gap-bridging epistemic achievement. Concomitantly,
we have reason to avoid the idea that such gap-bridging can only be achieved by the
theorising that goes on in the brains of individuals.12 If we manage to resist these
prevalent pictures, we open the door for thinking of the success of social cognitive tasks
in ways that are not purely epistemic and to recognising that the success of such
engagements depends on and is the mutual responsibility of all of the individuals, both
autistic and cognitively typical, involved in social encounters.

The double empathy hypothesis (Milton, 2012) states that cognitively typical people have just as much difficulty empathising
with autistic people as vice versa because difficulties will inevitably arise when different cognitive styles are in communication.
This hypothesis is based on the view that autism involves autistic cognition, not impaired neurotypical cognition.
12 We do not discount the importance of brain-based aspects of cognition. The monotropism theory (Murray, Lesser & Lawson,
2005) is regarded by many autistic scholars, including the third author, as capable of describing the features of autism, including
differences in sensory perception and sociality.
11
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Chapter 3
Explaining Embodied Skill: Where the Action Is

Introduction
Expert performance dazzles us. The performance of a dance, of a musical piece, or of
martial arts brings before us a display of human skills that, from a cognitive perspective,
can only result from extensive practice. As opposed to bare movements, such as
breathing and blinking, skilful performances are intelligent bodily activities, which
harness knowledge about how to perform certain movements expertly.
This knowledge, however, is not always ready-to-hand in an explicit fashion, if
at all; and indeed, explicit conscious monitoring of one’s performance while it is still
ongoing often leads to ‘choking’. Choking under pressure occurs when failing to
complete a task that has already been mastered. Although deliberative strategies
sometimes lead to better performance, in real-world and do-or-die scenarios, thinking
about the process or the outcome can lead to worse performance results13 (Cappuccio
and Ilundáin-Agurruza 2020; Cappuccio et al., 2019). Thus, we claim, what is involved
in skilful action is not explicit knowledge.
Skilful performance – as a fine-grained bodily response to salient features of an
ever-changing situation – can be described in terms of norms, knowledge, and expertise.
This motivates a tendency to think of skilful action exclusively in terms of normative
knowledge. However, it does not follow that bodily performance is itself the result of
acting according to an explicit norm. Intelligent behaviour, beyond deliberating and
thinking, also involves intending, perceiving, understanding others, and so on. The
remarkable intelligent behavioural adaptation in the bodily performance of a skill
suggests an understanding of knowledge beyond mere cognitive theorizing.

Dimensions of self-consciousness, such as sensorimotor, affective, narrative consciousness, have been identified as a general
factor of choking under pressure. See Cappuccio et. al (2019); see also Gray (2020).
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This brings the case of skilful performance to highlight for us a seemingly
paradoxical relation to knowledge: action both requires and is inhibited by it. Skilful
performance involves both an exquisite sensitivity to cultural norms and situational
context. Thus, the impulse to think that knowledge somehow becomes internalized
through practice without leaving the intellectual domain. However, as we observe in the
phenomenon of choking, the explicit use of knowledge also seems to hamper expert
performance. How then to make sense of the relation between knowledge and skilful
performance? Surely knowledge is involved in skilful performance. But is it entirely in
the form of a theory that ought to be executed as a top-down instruction?
Philosophers of cognition and cognitive scientists tend to model (skilful) action
as essentially of a theoretical nature, in the sense that it is mediated by knowledge. Skilful
acting is, on this view, a matter of the brain ‘knowing’ (in a very strong sense) what
actions need to be executed. That is, a cognitive top-down instruction, in form of a
belief, instructs the lower level motor system to behave in a certain way, giving rise to a
skilful performance.
Following Wheeler and Clark (1999), we will refer to this position as
instructionism. We cast instructionism in terms of explicit instructions, that is, forms of
knowledge that directly guide performance. Applied to skilful performance, the Instructionist
assumption prescribes that instructions are harnessed in separable structures, such as
beliefs, that are internal to the performing agent (Jeannerod, 1997, 2006; Jankovic, 2019;
Stanley & Williamson, 2017; Pacherie, 2017; Mylopoulos & Pacherie, 2019; Pavese,
2019; Piñeros Glasscock, 2019). In more detail, the Instructionist assumption says that
skilful performance is enabled by motor representations, which harness knowledge about
how a specific skilful performance should be executed in the form of instructions for
movement. Instructionism, then, is the view that skilful performance depends on the
capacity of an agent to represent to itself explicitly the procedure to be accomplished. In a
nutshell, the Instructionist assumption is representational in character – skilful action is
driven by motor representation (Levy, 2017; Schack and Frank, 2020).
Indeed, the construct of motor representation has been cashed out in different,
sometimes overlapping ways. In the philosophy and cognitive science literatures, we find
flavours of this construct variously formulated either as propositional (Stanley &
Williamson 2017), or as “practical representations” (Pavese, 2019), “action-based ways
of thinking” (Peacocke, 1986), “ability-entailing concepts” (Stanley, 2011), “executable
concepts” (Pacherie, 2011), “genic representation” (Wheeler & Clark, 1999), “action-
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oriented representations” (Clark, 1997; 2015b), and so on. What diverse accounts – as
far apart as the propositional (Stanley & Williamson 2017) or the practical (Pavese, 2019)
– of motor representation have in common is that they are knowledge-driven. That is
to say they make of action as essentially a theoretical activity. Assuming motor
knowledge is harnessed in internal structures that theorize explicit instructions for
movement, and they will be our focus here.
To serve naturalistic purposes, in computational science, action is often studied
under the rubric of optimal control theory (OCT) (Stengel, 1994; Anderson & Moore, 1990).
OCT is a field in mathematical optimization that deals with finding a control for a
dynamical system. Optimal motor control theory (OMCT) is a label for the modelling
tools used to study motor behaviour and its neural processing. We target specifically
OMCT to show that it rests on the Instructionist assumption that the brain literally
contains and leverages explicit instructions for movement. These models instantiate
modularity (Fodor, 1983)14 and the separation principle (Baltieri and Buckley, 2018), since
they take motor control to be realized by concerted processes performed by separable,
modular subsystems (we will return to this below, in section 6.1.) According to (linearly
separable) OCT, skilful performance – indeed, all motor control – is realized
computationally by three separate modules: (1) the inverse model, (2) forward model,
and (3) state estimator (Friston, 2011). OCT is Instructionist in that it posits that skilful
performance is realized through the construction and execution of an explicit motor
command, which harnesses knowledge about (instructions for) skilful, knowledge-driven
motor task execution. Thus, on this model of motor control, the so-called forward
model and optimal controller work together to select an optimal action, based on a value
function specified in terms of desired states; where the motor command is specified in
terms of instructions for movement formulated in an intrinsic frame of reference (i.e.,
formulated in terms of the states of motor effectors, such as stretching and compressing
of muscle fibbers).
The aim of this chapter is to discuss critically the limitations of Instructionist
control-theoretical models of skilful performance. More specifically, we target the
plausibility of separable, modular forward and inverse models and estimators
responsible for the selection of actions based on a (value) function of future states, as
postulated by OCT. The first section of the paper characterizes the Instructionist
assumption, which casts skilful performance as being based in the construction and
14 See

also Drayson (2018); Jeannerod (2018); Levy (2017); Mylopoulos and Pacherie (2017); Fridland (2015, 2017).
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execution of explicit motor representations. The following two sections characterize the
implementation of motor representations as motor commands (OMCT). We attempt to
show that its Instructionist assumption is ill-motivated. The brain does not literally
contain a detailed list of instructions that it uses to move the body. The final section of
this chapter leverages work in the active inference and sensorimotor frameworks –
behavioural modelling frameworks distinct from OCT – to understand how skilful
performance unfolds based on embodied interaction with its environment. The account
understands skill as enacted without the need to assume it is driven by instructions
couched in in terms of the content of internal representations. The alternative
interactionist account proposed here achieves this by avoiding two sets of commitments.
It does not assume that generative models used in the active inference framework are
models that are used by organisms or systems themselves. It does not assume that the
explanatory story offered by sensorimotor accounts need posit any causally efficacious
mediating knowledge. Crucially, the distinction operating here is not between an abstract
model and a literal description, but between a realist and instrumentalist account of
generative models. The difference between a control theory and active inference account
that we offer is that the former implies a realist account of instructions that are internal
to the performing agent (Wheeler and Clark, 1999)15. The latter, what we propose, is an
instrumentalist interpretation of the formalisms of active inference to explain skilful
performance of action. Note not all interpretations of active inference remain on the
purely instrumentalist interpretation (in fact the majority of the philosophical accounts
are realist, see van Es and Hipólito 2020). In the instrumentalist account of active
inference defended in this chapter, skilful action does not imply instructions.
Specifically, action does not require the instructions, not in the form of taking a realist
account of a inference, as supposed by Control Theory, nor is it a conceptually useful
metaphor.

3.1. The Instructionist model of skilful performance

15 See also (Jeannerod, 1997, 2006; Jankovic, 2019; Stanley & Williamson, 2017; Pacherie, 2017; Mylopoulos & Pacherie, 2019;
Pavese, 2019; Piñeros Glasscock, 2019).
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In this section, we examine the commitments of instructionism. Instructionist
models define motor control of the kind involved in skilful performance as the
execution of a set of instructions for movements to be executed according to a
prespecified method or procedure. A motor representation is defined as a structure internal
to an agent that encodes, lists or otherwise harnesses a set of explicit instructions for
movement, the execution of which leads to skilful performance. As we will see, such a
motor representation prescribes the specific manner in which a task is to be
accomplished.
How should we make sense to this? What does it mean for a thing to explicitly
represent some state of affairs? It is common in the philosophy of mind to argue that
representations involve modes of presentation (Frege, 1892; Millikan, 1997). This
construct of mode of presentation has two main components: a representation presents
some state of affairs (1) as being so-and-so (2) from a specific vantage point. For
instance, when I visually perceive the presence of a red apple, I perceive it from a certain
point of view (i.e., from my visual vantage point), precisely as being a red apple (i.e., as
opposed to perceiving it as being, say, a fruit or as being a red object). To represent a
state of affairs thus entails that we represent it in a perspectival way as being a certain
way; which is equivalent to saying that representations, essentially, must have a mode of
presentation (Millikan, 1991; Zalta, 2001; May, 2006; Burge, 2010), i.e. a “Fregean
presentationalism” (Sacchi, 2018). In a nutshell, if there exist motor or practical
representations, there must also exist a motor or practical mode of presentation (Glick,
2015).
The modes of presentation at play in perception, thought, and action involve a
set of (perceptual, conceptual, and motor or practical) abilities that constitute a motor or
practical perspective (Pavese 2019; Burge 2009, 2010; Prosser 2019). Pavese’s (2019)
discussion of representations situates what she calls practical representations (which we
equate to motor representations as defined above) with respect to other kinds –
perceptual and conceptual representations. The different varieties of representation
differ in the manner in which they enable agents to represent states of affairs. Consider,
e.g., the nature of perspectives that are involved in the perceptual representation of a
situation. On this account, perceptual abilities (e.g., being able to discriminate between
a middle C and a D sharp) constitute a perspective from which one can perceive states
of affairs in the world; in this case, a musical state of affairs about the key of a song. To
be endowed with such perceptual abilities enables an agent to track states of affairs in the
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world from a given perceptual perspective opened by these abilities (Dretske, 1988;
Millikan, 1984; Fodor, 1983). Conceptual representations, similarly, are related to the
conceptual abilities with which agents represent states of affairs to themselves
conceptually (Laurence & Margolis, 1999; Machery, 2009; Peacocke, 1992; Prinz, 2004).
To represent some state of affairs conceptually thus entails the existence of a conceptual
perspective, itself rooted in the conceptual abilities of the agent.
Importantly, this account allows us to fix the content of a representation, namely,
the state of affairs that the representation is about, i.e. that which is disclosed by the
relevant set of (perceptual and conceptual) abilities with which an agent is endowed –
and thereby constituting the perspective from which it can represent that content. In
the perceptual and conceptual cases, what is represented is the state of affairs that can
be represented as being so-and-so thanks to the perspective that is opened by the
perceptual and conceptual abilities with which an agent is endowed; i.e., the state of
affairs that is perceived or that is entertained in thought or predicated, respectively.
Pavese (2019) extends this line of reasoning to practical representation. Similarly,
to perceptual and conceptual varieties, practical representations also represent by virtue
of a set of motor or practical abilities that constitute a perspective from which state of affairs
in the world is represented practically, in a format amenable to motor control. Practical
abilities are defined as abilities to execute an action in a prespecified and typified manner.
The content of a practical representation is a method: a specific sequence of physical
movements to be carried out by the agent (Wolpert 1997; Pavese 2019, 2015). To be
more precise, a method decomposes a particular task to be executed into component
actions, perhaps nested the ones within the others, that when orchestrated bring about
the desired outcome (Pavese, 2019, 2015; Mylopoulos & Pacherie 2017). Thus, to
explicitly represent the world from the perspective provided by practical abilities means
to represent a task as having to be accomplished practically in a prespecified manner,
i.e., according to the method or procedure by which the content of the representation –
the task – is presented. The distinctive feature of practical representation is their
‘direction of fit’: they function to make the state of affairs in the world fit with the
prescriptions harnessed in the practical representation (Pavese, 2019). Whereas
perceptual and conceptual abilities have a world-to-mind direction of fit, practical
representations have a mind-to-world fit, which is what gives such representations their
practical aspect.
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Mylopoulos and Pacherie (2017) provide a definition of motor representations that
dovetails nicely with Pavese’s (2019) account of practical representations and
computational neuroscience research in motor control (Jeannerod, 1997, 2006). In sum,
they argue: (1) that motor representations represent objects and situations in terms of
their properties relevant for action, in a proprietary format specified in terms of an intrinsic frame
of reference – defined, e.g., by the state of motor effectors, muscle fibber extension and
contraction, etc.; (2) that these motor representations are informed by or contain
implicitly some knowledge about the body’s biomechanical and kinematic constraints; (3) and
that motor representations – at least usually – serve the execution of transitive movements,
specified in terms of an extrinsic frame of reference (i.e., a representation of states of
affairs that is ‘objective ’in three-dimensional space rather than body-dependent).
The broad strokes of this definition seem common to most specific accounts of
motor representation. For instance, on Pavese’s (2019) account, motor commands
(which, as we will see below, implement motor or practical representations in OCT)
represent the procedure or method according to which a task is to be accomplished, and
are informed by a sensorimotor mapping from the actions being generated to their
sensory consequences, satisfying condition (2). Moreover, they represent the method of
task execution in a format that can both be used by the motor system to generate a
motor action – i.e., in an intrinsic frame of reference, satisfying condition (1) – and also
in a format that is sensitive to online, real time sensory feedback – i.e., in a manner that
renders it responsive to outcomes specified in an extrinsic frame of reference, satisfying
condition (3) of the definition just discussed.
Pacherie (2018) notes that motor representations meet criteria for
representationality as set out by Bermudez (1998): they have correctness or satisfaction
conditions; they have a structure that exhibits and leverages some form of
compositionality (i.e., evinces identifiable constituent or elementary units); and they also
have a “grammar” that regulates the assembly of the constituent units into a coherent
pattern. In cognitive science, this has led to the investigation of principles common to
all skills, premised on the idea that what is thus common must be some set of
representational processes. This view is labelled intellectualism (Stanley & Williamson
2017) and can be seen as the broader rubric under which falls our target in this article,
namely, instructionism. At the root of such unifying models of skill is the Instructionist
assumption, which would allow for the construction of a general theory of skill, with
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epistemic attributes such as generativity, abstract rules or norms, and patterns of learning
(Christensen, 2019; Christensen & Sutton, 2018).
Finally, we distinguish two kinds of instructionism (Wheeler & Clark, 1999;
Wheeler, 2005), one strong and one weak. Strong instructionism is the claim that neural
representations (in this case, motor representations) completely specify, on their own,
the specific movements to be executed by an agent. We will see that this assumption is
prevalent in many versions of motor control theory (e.g., Jeannerod, 1997, 2006). The
weak version of instructionism is the more modest claim that, among the many
dynamically coupled systems that generate skilful performance (e.g., an able body, a
normal ecological backdrop of cultural practices and standards, and so on) one kind
stands out: structures internal to an agent that are responsible for encoding information
that can be interpreted as explicit instructions for action, given a background of
ecologically normal processes that enable them to play this role (Clark, 1997; Engel et
al., 2013).
On this more modest account, motor representations would play in the
generation of behaviour a role analogous to that of genes in the generation of phenotypic
traits (Wheeler & Clark 1999). Genes however do not code for proteins (e.g., epigenetic
transcription factors, the overall healthy and normal functioning of the cell, that cell’s
being embedded in an organism, etc.) (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch 1991; GodfreySmith 2007; Woodward; 2010; Griffiths and Stotz 2013; Hipólito and Martins, 2017).
Analogously, the weak Instructionist framework for motor representation says that
skilful performance is the result of an orchestrated process spanning components in the
brain, body, and world, but that of these components, some special structures in the
brain play the specific, explanatorily irreducible role of encoding explicit instructions for
motor performance. Note, en passant, the conformity of this definition of representation
with the definition of motor representation by Mylopoulos and Pacherie (2017) that was
discussed above. In what follows, we will argue that neither kind of instructionism is
warranted.

3.2. From motor representations to motor commands
An appropriate scientific representational theory of motor action must elucidate both
the kind of content in which motor representations traffic and, crucially, how such
content is supposed to causally guide the generation of skilful performance – lest the
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story have no explanatory bite. Mylopoulos and Pacherie (2017) note that a scientifically
respectable theory of motor action “cannot provide a full account of purposive action
without appealing to motor representations and without explaining how intentions
interface with motor representations.” (2017, p. 334). Computational models of OMCT
must explain the manner in which motor representations are able to play the role of
interface between the conative states of an agent (that is, desires and intentions to
perform some task) and the motor performance.
Pavese (2019) argues that the construct of a motor command, which is widely used
in the study of motor control, implements the construct of practical (or motor)
representations in computational models of motor control. On this model, motor tasks
are realized through a process involving “a series of sensorimotor transformations that
map the intentions of the agent together with visual and other sensory information about
the location of the targeted objects […] and the location of the limbs into a series of
motor commands” (Pavese, 2019, p. 791). On this view, a motor command is a practical
or motor representation that enables the transformation from conative states or
intentions of a motor agent (i.e., the agent’s intention to perform a task according to a
prespecified method) to the actual motor performance itself (i.e., to the sequence of
muscle movements that together comprise the skilful action).
On Pavese’s (2019) denotational model, the content of a motor command is the
task to be performed itself; a view which finds echoes in related theories of motor
representation (e.g., Wolpert 1997). More precisely, the content of a motor command is
the task outcome. hat the task is meant to accomplish; e.g., moving one’s body to some
location in space. The motor command thus comprises the specification of the outcome
of a task in an external frame of reference (i.e., in terms of movement in three-dimensional
space). A motor command is thus the output of a (conative) system responsible for motor
planning.
Thus far, we have discussed what the contents of motor or practical
representations are: they represent a specific method or procedure, which is defined as the
explicit specification of movements in three-dimensional space (i.e., limb movements
prespecified by a method or procedure, and harnessed as instructions for movement in
an intrinsic frame of reference) that lead to some desired task outcome. We also
examined how such practical representations get their content through their coupling to
those practical abilities that open up a practical or motor perspective. The mode of
presentation of a motor command is the prespecified method according to which the task is
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to be carried out. Thus, motor commands are also the inputs of the system that controls
motor actions (Fridland, forthcoming). They stand as an intermediary between the
cognitive system of the motor agent (intention and desire) and the motor system
responsible for carrying out the actual motor performance that ends up being executed.
Crucial to note is that, in order to play the intermediary role of informing the
motor plant about what movements it must execute, motor commands must be
generated via the inversion of a process mapping consequences in an extrinsic frame of
reference, in which the desired movement is specified in terms of a task outcome in
external coordinates (e.g., moving my finger to a point in three-dimensional space), from
an intrinsic frame of reference, specified in terms of muscle movements. This entails an
inverse inference problem, which requires working back from the desired sensory
consequences (e.g., desired visual and proprioceptive sensory feedback) to a
specification of their motor cause in an intrinsic frame of reference (i.e., a set of muscle
activations that can generate such desired consequences). In other words, given some
goal state that is specified in terms of extrinsic coordinates (and given conative states
like desires and intentions), the problem to solve is the generation of a sequence of
muscle movements, explicitly specified intrinsically in terms of stretching and
compressing of muscle fibbers. This has been called the “interface challenge” (Butterfill
& Sinigaglia, 2014). In other words, how are motor representations implemented such
that they can realize or cohere with the intentions of an agent while also instructing
motor performance?

3.3. Motor commands and their representational role in optimal motor
control theory
In this section, we examine how motor representations are implemented as
motor commands in computational models of motor control under Optimal Control
Theory (OCT). Optimal Motor Control Theory (OMCT) is a label we use to refer to the
modelling tools of motor behaviour and its neural processing. We will see that the
Instructionist assumption that motor behaviour is underwritten by the construction and
execution of explicit motor representations that are implemented in the brain as motor
commands is, as it turns out, a pervasive one in studies of motor behaviour.
This inverse inference discussed in the previous section – to wit, the problem of
inferring how to specify muscle movements in an intrinsic frame of reference that bring
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about a goal state specified in an extrinsic frame of reference – is a nontrivial one, which
has been addressed and finessed by OMCT. A general schema as how motor control is
implemented in OMCT is depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1. A computational model of optimal control. This figure presents a schematic of the
computational architecture that underwrites optimal control theory. Note the separate optimal control or
inverse model, state estimator, and forward model and the use of a cost function by the optimal control.
Reproduced from Friston (2011).

In OMCT (Wolpert, 1997; Kawato, 1999; Todorov, 2004; Scott, 2004, McNamee &
Wolpert, 2019), there are four main components at play in the generation of motor
action: the motor plant, the state estimator, the forward model, and the optimal control
(also called the inverse model). The motor control scheme functions, heuristically, as
follows. The core of the model is the optimal controller, which tackles the inverse problem
that was just discussed (hence, its other name, the inverse model). The optimal controller
maps desired trajectories, specified in extrinsic coordinates, to muscle movements (i.e.,
to changes in muscular states specified in terms of intrinsic coordinates). The optimal
controller selects an action based on the minimization of a cost function: the action that is
selected is the one that leads to outcomes associated with the lowest cost or,
equivalently, that leads to the most valuable states. The output of the controller is a motor
command, which in our reading is a kind of practical representation, as discussed above.
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Once an action is selected by the optimal controller – i.e., once the controller
has constructed a motor command – the latter is sent to the motor plant for execution.
The motor plant is the physical motor system (e.g., a limb) that executes the task to be
performed; it carries out the movement prescribed by the motor command, which
contains a specification of the muscle movements needed to realize the task outcome (a
representation of the method, in the parlance of practical representation theory). Thus,
the optimal control generates motor commands, which implements a specific method
or procedure as specified in terms muscle movements in an intrinsic frame of reference
(the motor command). It follows that the motor command qualifies as a motor or
practical representation in the sense discussed above.
Physical movements of the motor plant, in turn, generate sensory information.
This information is conveyed to a state estimator, via a sensory mapping. The function of
the state estimator is to infer in what state the system finds itself, given its sensory
feedback. The state estimator, technically speaking, comprises a probabilistic mapping
from hidden parameters and states (i.e., hidden causes) to sensory observations; and its
inference process inverts this mapping, to infer the most probable hidden cause, given
available sensory data.
As the motor command is being relayed to the motor plant, a copy of the motor
command, known as an efference copy, is sent to a forward model. Actions have sensory
(e.g., visual and proprioceptive) consequences; and accordingly, the function of the
forward model is to improve the execution of action by helping to finesse the inferences
of the state estimator. Forward models do this by converting the (efference) copy of the
motor command generated by the optimal control into a prediction of its sensory
consequences, which can be discounted in state estimation. In effect, the state estimator
uses information, pooled from the motor plant (via the sensory mapping) and the
forward model, to form a prediction error: it compares the sensory outcome predicted
by the forward model with the actual sensory data that is receives from the motor plant.
It uses this error to finesse its posterior state estimates. Of note is that, in optimal motor
control schemes, this prediction error is not typically represented in the model explicitly
with a distinct variable or parameter; in Figure 1, it is denoted as the update term s - g(x)
weighted by the (Kalman) gain K. Finally, posterior state estimates are used to guide the
process of action selection that is carried out by the optimal control; which brings us to
where we began.
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The standard approach to computational models of separable subsystems is
based on linear quadratic gaussian (LQG) control (Stengel, 1994). LQG-based models
focus especially on formulations of perception and action in terms of (Bayesian)
inference on the hidden states of the environment and on (deterministic) optimal control
of a motor system (i.e., the body). Following this architecture, perception is often
implemented using Kalman filters or similar Bayesian methods for estimation; while
action is modelled as a process of feedback control based on linear quadratic regulators.
The applications of the LQG framework in optimal motor control are ubiquitous, but
often only implicit, with a few major exceptions more directly advocating its use in
cognitive (neuro)science (Todorov and Jordan, 2002; Todorov, 2004; McNamee and
Wolpert, 2019).
3.4. The Instructionist assumptions of optimal control theory
The formulation of sensorimotor control in terms of OMCT heavily hinges on two
different, but highly interconnected, assumptions: (1) the central specification of
descending motor commands, and their (efferent) copies, in the form of detailed lowlevel instructions for control of the motor plant, which is specified in terms of an
intrinsic frame of reference (i.e., extension and contraction of muscle fibbers), and (2) a
separation of forward and inverse models, operating on complementary aspects of
action planning and execution.
As highlighted in the previous section, the constructs of motor commands and
their efference copies are typically used in frameworks focusing on the computational
role of various components (the state estimator, forward and inverse models) derived
from (optimal) control theoretic approaches to the problem of motor control. In this
light, motor commands are cast as the product of an optimal controller (or inverse
model), which builds accurate action policies based on explicit internal models of the
biomechanical and kinematic properties of an agent’s musculoskeletal system (the
sensory mapping). While forward models are thought to emulate the mechanical
properties of a body and its interactions with an environment, once a certain action
policy is implemented, inverse models are normally portrayed as inverting these causeeffect relationships to form plans over future actions, based on state estimators (also
called comparator models) that combine internal simulations of agent-environment
couplings and desired target states.
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Let us recall the main features of the construction of motor command as it
figures in OMCT. The presence of these two models, forward and inverse, naturally
introduces the idea of different frames of reference over which internal models must
operate: an intrinsic one, specified in terms of musculoskeletal properties of the body
(e.g., muscle fibbers), and an extrinsic, movement-based one, characterising the external
features of motor programs (e.g., hand position); see Friston, (2011) for a discussion of
these ideas in the literature. In particular, a forward model takes a system from an
intrinsic to an extrinsic frame, predicting the effects of different movements using
musculoskeletal plans specified by neural activity, and essentially translating motor
commands into actions on the world and their consequences. On the other hand, an
inverse model builds motor commands by inverting this causal chain. The inverse model
first leverages a value function of states, to form a mapping from desired target states in
an extrinsic frame of reference (i.e., in a coordinate system based on external
consequences of movements) to a set of intrinsic coordinates in the space of muscle
fibber activations; and then maps these activations to a set of neural activation patterns
in the motor system that are capable of generating the appropriate and desired muscle
activations. From a more mechanistic perspective, frameworks based on OMCT are
sometimes characterized in terms of “force control,” stressing the idea that, in these
models, motor commands specify actions in the form of muscle forces and joint torques
(Hollerbach, 1982; Kawato, 1999; Ostry and Feldman, 2003).
This architecture rests on the assumption, central to OMCT, that value (valuable
states) is what causes action. As we have discussed, in models from OMCT, sequences of
actions are selected according to a value function of states. This means that actions are
selected by the optimal control that maximize the value of – or, equivalently, minimize
the cost or risk associated with – future outcomes, defined in terms of desirable states.
A second major assumption in computational models of optimal control for
action (OMCT) is their (often implicit) reliance on a sequential, modular architecture of
perception-cognition-action, notably described as the “sense-model-plan-act” paradigm
(Brooks, 1991) or the “classical sandwich” of cognition (Hurley, 2001); see Baltieri and
Buckley (2018) for discussion. On this conception, action, perception, and cognition are
depicted as separate processes, working relatively independently with specialized kinds
of representations (practical, perceptual or conceptual, respectively) based on different
mechanistic and neurophysiological (e.g., localised) implementations (cf. the idea of
“vertical modularity” in (Hurley, 2001)). This is a classical idealisation of the
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sensorimotor loop, in which perception is portrayed as a bottom-up or feed-forward
process with the primary goal of receiving information through the senses in order to
build internal representations of the surrounding environment (Marr, 1982). Action is
then cast as a process of deriving appropriate motor commands based on the outcomes
of cognitive internal manipulations, such as thinking and planning.
This notion of separable subsystems has its roots in the classical hypothesis of
the modularity of the mind (Fodor, 1983) and often constitutes one of the underlying
assumptions in various applications of OCT to the study of cognitive agents (Wolpert,
1997; Wolpert & Kawato, 1998); see Baltieri & Buckley (2018, 2019a) and George &
Sunny (2019) for some reviews. On the modularist view, more ‘peripheral 'components
of cognitive systems, i.e., those subserving action and perception (but according to
some, perhaps also some of “central processing”) are implemented as separable
modules, working independently to transform sensations incoming through input
interfaces (perception) into internal models, used to plan actions executed via output
layers (motor control, behaviour). The information content of each specialized module
is encapsulated (i.e., the module is informationally semi-independent from other parts
of a system), and the kinds of computations it performs is specialised as well; an idea
closely related to the concept of cognitive impenetrability typically discussed in the
context of perceptual processes (Pylyshyn 1999; Coltheart, 1999; Barrett & Kurzban,
2006; Raftopoulos, 2019).
In summary, motor control schemes in OMCT are Instructionist, as we described
the notion in the opening sections. This can be seen from the modular architecture in
these schemes, which is based on sensorimotor representations in the form of separable
forward-inverse models and estimators. This architecture for motor control is used to
compute explicit motor commands, which implement the construct of motor
representation: they harness explicit motor instructions, canvassed in a proprietary
format that the motor plant can use to guide an instruct the execution of action (i.e.,
specified in an intrinsic frame of reference), so obtain desired states specified in extrinsic
coordinates. We now critically examine this assumption.
3.5. Less control, more action!
Thus far we have claimed that the Instructionist assumption of OMCT has two parts:
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1) The presence of separate forward and inverse models, with the latter being in
charge of selecting motor plans according to a cost function expressing
the value of states to be attained through action; and
2) Instructions expressed in the form of motor commands, lists of low-level
motor outputs that are built using internal representations of the
biomechanics properties of a motor plant, i.e., the body.
In what follows, we critically examine these two assumptions.

3.5.1. From forward-inverse models and cost functions to generative models
The optimal control approach has been repeatedly challenged over the years, with work
questioning its neurophysiological plausibility (Ostry & Feldman, 2003; Feldman, 2009;
Feldman, 2015; Latash et al. 2010; Latash, 2020), the computational scheme of forward
and inverse models with separate roles (Adams et al., 2013, Clark 2015a; Pickering &
Clark, 2014), its reliance on cost functions, and its claims regarding optimality expressed
in terms of the value of states (Friston 2011; Friston et al. (2012); Pezzulo et al. 2015).
The account of separable, modular perceptual and motor subsystems, in
particular, has recently been suggested to reflect a classical result in the control theory
literature, where modular regulators are defined using the “separation principle” (Baltieri
& Buckley, 2018, 2019a). In control theory, this principle describes a set of necessary
and sufficient conditions for the independent optimisation of the two main components
of a device regulating a system in the presence of uncertainty: a paired state estimator
and forward model, and a (deterministic) controller. Under the assumptions of the
separation principle, teleological behaviour can be cast as a sequential process of optimal
estimation, combining state estimation and forward models, followed by a phase where
internal world (forward and inverse) models are refined and used for off-line planning.
This leads to an optimal control stage, where actions are produced by an inverse model
of the dynamics of a plant (e.g., the body) using accurate estimates of the current state
of a system. An intrinsic assumption of optimal motor control approaches based on the
separation principle is thus that sensorimotor control is orchestrated mainly by two
separate modules: a combined state estimator/forward model and an inverse model.
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The assumptions behind the separation principle in control are, however, rather strict
and include, for instance, the presence of linear dynamics, the use of quadratic cost
functions and dynamics where uncertainty is expressed using Gaussian noise. As
previously suggested, some of these assumptions can be easily violated when applied to
the study of biological systems (Todorov, 2005; Baltieri & Buckley, 2018).
Perhaps the most important shortcoming of this approach comes from the fact
that its formulation expresses motor signals as neutral, or equivalently, the lack of dual
effects of motor actions (Bar-Shalom & Tse, 1974). In practice, this means that the
canonical controls generated by LQG models cannot reduce (or even increase) a
system’s uncertainty in the future, i.e., actions can only be instrumental, and have no
epistemic effect on future state estimates – with a possible exception to this account
found in the optimal feedback control extension of the model by Todorov & Jordan
(2002) and Todorov (2005). In accordance with the differences in terms of epistemic
actions, approaches based on the separation principle have variously been addressed
also as adaptive (as opposed to dual) controllers (Kappen, 2011), or feedback (as
opposed to closed-loop) methods (Bar-Shalom and Tse, 1974).
The active inference framework offers an alternative account of skilled action
(Friston et al., 2012; Friston et al. 2017). In the active inference framework, some of the
assumptions that underwrite the separation principle are dropped in favour of a more
cohesive and unifying perspective on forward and inverse models (Baltieri and Buckley,
2018, 2019a; see also George and Sunny (2019)). The active inference framework thus
comprehensively challenges the optimal control theoretic approach to sensorimotor
behaviour, highlighting some of the limitations associated with such schemes based on
value functions (Friston et al., 2012; Friston, 2011), with natural implications for
accounts of skilful performance. In particular, here, we refer to the idea that traditional
OMCT accounts of behaviour can only specify performance using a single number, a
scalar that is defined and consequently tracked by a value function. Value functions
express criteria of optimality for motor behaviour that instantiate an index of
“accuracy,” which reflects how a specific definition of value uniquely maps to an act or
motor plan conforming to a goal. Indeed, the physics of flow embedded in active
inference accounts of sensorimotor behaviour show that motion in a biologically
realistic state space irreducibly includes two orthogonal kinds of motion: an irrotational
(or curl-free) component and a solenoidal (or divergence-free) component. Heuristically,
the irrotational component is what allows the flow to climb a gradient towards more
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valuable or probable states (i.e., moving from less to more valuable states); while the
solenoidal component specifies a flow around an isoprobability contour, where all states
entered have an equal value or probability (i.e., different configurations of states
expressing the same value, or rather skilfulness, relevant for instance in different
contexts). Heuristically, the irrotational component contributes the appetitive,
motivated aspect to behaviour, getting the agent closer to desired states or observations;
whereas the solenoidal component describes behaviour that does not aim directly at
need satisfaction (e.g., turning on a light to find food in the pantry). Together, these
flows provide a richer framework for expressing skilfulness as a process whose
characteristics go beyond a simple gradient of value/accuracy. Value functions – and
indeed any motor scheme based on functions that return scalars – are not up to the task
of modelling the variety of (skilful) acts describing human behaviour because, by
construction, they cannot account for the solenoidal aspect of flow.
The active inference framework does away with the possibility of positing
inverse models, previously claimed to be physiologically not realisable (Ostry &
Feldman, 2003) and computationally intractable without extra constraints (Adams et al.,
2013). The active inference framework replaces value functions and solutions to optimal
control problems formulated as motor commands based on dynamic programming
methods with priors (or Bayesian ‘beliefs’). That is, the active inference framework
replaces the inverse-forward model pair with an expanded forward model (a generative
model) that is expanded to harness probabilistic beliefs about expected sensory
consequences of action. Rather than using a separate inverse model to infer the most
appropriate course of action, active inference schemes use Bayesian inference
techniques to invert the generative model in order to select action policies.
The active inference framework does not operate with value functions (Friston,
2011; Friston et al., 2012; Adams et al., 2013). Instead of selecting actions using a (value)
function of states, active inference models directly construct a prior preference over
sensory outcomes or observations, which is used to guide motor control in a feedbacksensitive, online fashion, in an extrinsic frame of reference. Technically, active inference
extends popular predictive coding models used in neuroscience, where perception is cast
in terms of prediction error minimisation (Rao and Ballard 1999). The active inference
framework extends this account to model motor control, and explains action selection
by appealing to the minimisation of divergence between predicted sensory data and
actual sensory data in, e.g., visual and proprioceptive modalities. Crucially, this brings
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perception and action together in the same functional profile and also explains some of
the similarities between functions of sensory and motor cortices (Adams et al., 2013).
While this move from a problem of control to one of inference in terms of active
inference does not make the problem mathematically easier in and of itself (Friston,
2011), it offers a different model of skilled action which also respects the
neurophysiological evidence.
In this light, the active inference framework stands in stark contrast to optimal
control accounts described earlier, where forward and inverse models are seen as distinct
functional units with perception and action lying at the two opposite ends of a chain of
sequential processing (cf. the classical sandwich of cognition). The active inference
framework does away with inverse and forward models in favour one single, expanded
generative model.

Figure 2. Motor control in active inference. This figure presents the models employed in the active
inference framework. Note that the cost function has been replaced with proprioceptive prediction-error
based control and that the separate inverse-forward models and state estimator have been merged into an
expanded forward (generative) model. Reproduced from Friston (2011)

3.5.2. From motor commands to proprioceptive predictions
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A second important move afforded by the active inference framework is the
replacement of motor commands in the form of accurate motor plans in intrinsic
(bodily) coordinates, considered to be unrealistic due the required specificity of a plan
and the huge number of degrees of freedom of the neuromuscular system, with
predictions modelling proprioception (Ostry and Feldman, 2003; Adams et al., 2013).
This implicitly solves some of the main issues with models relying on the inversion of
the many-to-one mapping from a high-dimensional intrinsic frame of reference to a lowdimensional external, movement-based, coordinate system. In practice, this summarises
the problem of motor redundancy (see Latash (2012)) where several combinations of
different muscle activations can lead to the same final goal, think for instance of an arm
reaching task and the virtually infinite number of possible arm trajectories that could
satisfy a given final goal in the form of a target location.
In the active inference framework, action planning is described in terms of an
inversion process of a generative model via the inclusion of a proprioceptive modality,
and an ensuing minimisation of proprioceptive prediction errors in the model. While
this proposal provides an alternative, arguably more parsimonious, version to inverse
models, it only apparently solves the most problematic aspect of these models: the
inversion of the process generating musculoskeletal motor plans from patterns of neural
activity. The hard part still consists of ultimately explaining action execution via the
inverse mapping from an extrinsic to an intrinsic frame of reference, for which
predictive coding models don’t provide a natural account (Friston, 2011). To solve this
problem, the active framework inference forgoes explicit movement specification in
terms of a mapping from an extrinsic to an intrinsic frame of reference. It does so by
dropping its reliance on the value function that, in the end, in OMCT, specifies motor
commands in terms of musculoskeletal properties of a system.
The active inference framework proposes an account of perception-action cycles
that is consistent with some ideas of the mechanical description of motor actions
provided in threshold or referent control (previously also known as the “equilibriumpoint hypothesis” or “virtual trajectories control hypothesis”) (Feldman, 2015).
Similarly, to this framework, active inference suggests that, rather than encoding muscle
forces or joint torques, descending motor signals act as thresholds that shift the
activations of stretch reflex muscles in order to create movement as a “chain of reflexes”
(Adams et al., 2013). Unlike referent control however, active inference framework
commits to the idea that such thresholds can be interpreted directly in terms of
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responses to proprioceptive information of the target state, as opposed to thresholds
“lambda” typical of referent models (Feldman, 2015).
In the active inference framework, proprioceptors become perception-action
units whose combined functions for perception and action are controlled by precision
parameters (Adams et al., 2013). This has two deep ramifications for motor control.
First, in active inference, classical motor command and efference copy constructs of
OMCT become redundant; and second, control assumes a dual role in active inference
schemes, reflective of the dual role of action itself in these schemes. The former point
speaks to the idea that frameworks based on optimal control and the separation principle
typically require (efference) copies of motor commands (forces and torques) to be
passed from an inverse to a forward model, such that predictions generated by forward
models can discount the effects of one’s own actions on one’s perception of the world.
While in robotics and control theory, this is classically solved by the presence of an
efference copy of motor signals sent to the estimator (Kawato, 1999) that is known to
the engineer/roboticist; in neurobiology, on the contrary, the role of this copy is hotly
debated (Bridgeman, 2007; Feldman, 2009; Adams et al., 2013; Feldman, 2016). Thus,
for principled reasons, the active inference framework avoids the requirement for a
controller to send an efference copy to the estimator and forward model. This is due to
the fact that forward connections already denote prediction errors in their mappings
from prior beliefs about expected limb trajectories to their (proprioceptive) sensory
outcomes. The active inference framework reveals the tight connections that exist
between perception and action.
Further, by building a framework that takes advantage of simple, lower-level
motor functions, which are increasingly recognised as being more than simplistic, preprogrammed reflexes (Bizzi et al., 2000; Buhrmann and Di Paolo, 2014; Weiler et al.,
2019), the active inference framework introduces an account of the dual effects of action
at different levels.
Having offered reasons to reject both conditions, (1) the presence of forward
and inverse models, as well as (2) instructions as motor commands, we now see that
active inference offers a formal model to explain skilled action, from first principles,
without supposing explicit motor instructions.
3.6. Action as interactive engagement

85

Let us take stock of what has been said so far. We started from the observation that the
most popular models in the field of motor control studies make an Instructionist
assumption. In Instructionist models, skilful performance is explained by appealing to the
construction and execution of motor commands. That is to say, these models posit
motor or practical representations, which harness knowledge about how a specific skilful
performance is to be executed in the form of explicit motor instructions that is specified
in terms of an intrinsic (muscle-based) frame of reference. We then reviewed new
frameworks in the study of motor control – namely, active inference and predictive
coding – which undermine the Instructionist assumption. We saw that, in these
frameworks, nothing like an explicit motor command ever needs to be computed; which
undermines even the weak version of instructionism (Wheeler & Clark, 1999). Where
does this leave us in terms of a positive proposal? What is motor control, if it does not
consist in the skilful execution of motor commands?
The active inference framework offers a formal model of motor control as a
process of online, real-time motor adaptation to an environment. Such adaptation can
be understood in terms of attunement between organisms and their environments
(Bruineberg et al., 2014; Anderson 2017; Ramstead et al., 2019; Hipólito 2018; Hipólito
et al. 2020). The tight and reciprocal reconnection between perception and action in the
active inference framework resonates deeply with several key ideas developed within
embodied and enactive approaches to cognition and agency (Newen et al. 2018; Gallagher
2020; Ramstead et al., 2019). In particular, the inescapable co-dependency between
action and perception in active inference coheres nicely with one brand of enactiveembodied cognition, namely, sensorimotor approaches to the study of cognition (O’Regan
& Noë, 2001; Engel, Friston, & Kragic, 2015; Engel et al., 2013; Di Paolo et al., 2017;
Gallagher 2020).
It might be wondered how the active inference framework could complement
and be used to support interactionist E-approaches, especially those that explicitly reject
CET as realistic proposal about the nature of all varieties of cognition. After all, the
active inference framework is neck deep in talk to of ‘inferences’, ‘predictions’,
‘prediction errors’, ‘priors’, and even ‘beliefs. Prima facie, such references seem to entail
as serious commitment to conceiving of cognition as a form of modelling, one that is
theoretical through-and-through. Accordingly, to take such intellectualist language
seriously appear to commit proponents of the active inference framework to the
assumption that, when cognizing, organisms or their subparts must be making use of
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generative models in order to act on the world intelligently, because having a generative
model is thought to be what enables cognisers “to evaluate potential actions using (as
the name suggests) some kind of inner surrogate of the external arena … [thus they are]
able to ‘navigate into the future’” (Clark, 2016, p. 254).
Yet even the most forthright defenders of the active inference framework have
backed away from making such strongly realist claims about the causally efficacious
character of generative models. Indeed, Friston (2013) has advanced the view that an
“agent does not have a model of its world – it is a model” (Friston 2013, p. 213).
Elsewhere, in line with a recognition of the purely formal character of generative models,
Friston, Thornton, and Clark (2012) advise that, “We must here understand ‘model’ in
the most inclusive sense, as combining interpretive dispositions, morphology, and neural
architecture, and as implying a highly tuned ‘fit’ between the active, embodied organism
and the embedded environment.” Following through on this logic, we are told that “in
essence, [biological/cognitive systems] become models of causal structure in their local
environment, enabling them to predict what will happen next and counter surprising
violations of those predictions” (p. 6).
Crucially, if we understand the generative models16 of the active inference
frameworks in line with these proposals then we must surrender the idea that generative
models are part of the causal efficacious machinery of cognition. A simple reason to do
so is that a generative model cannot be both identified with the system itself and,
simultaneously, a model that the system itself uses to drive its behaviours.
If we understand the status of generative models in the active inference
framework as purely formal tools that framework is evidently compatible with a
sensorimotor approach to understanding skilled action. Sensorimotor accounts assume
that perception (O’Regan & Noë, 2001) and perhaps higher order cognitive functions
(Maye & Engel, 2013) emerge as a process of interactive engagement with the world,
based on an organism’s acquired responsiveness to sensorimotor contingencies, defined
as a series of invariant correlations describing the relations between sensory and motor
modalities (Noë, 2004). Importantly, it is possible to keep this key interactionist idea
from the sensorimotor approaches in play without buying into any of the more
controversial claims about the representational character of perception or it being based

The generative model is interpreted here as a useful instrument. We do not commit to the view that the generative model is
used, substantiated or leveraged by the agent.

16
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on any kind of mediating knowledge (See Hutto 2005, and Hutto and Myin 2013 for
critiques of the latter).
Perception is thus only appropriately defined for agents actively interacting with
their milieu, when the world is dynamically coupled to an agent (Di Paolo et al., 2017);
rather than on the “classical sandwich” of cognition (Hurley, 2001), which casts motor
control in terms of sequential perception, planning, and action. On this account,
perception and action are cast as the mastery of sensorimotor contingencies.
The result is, as suggested by Di Paolo and colleagues (2017), that the
sensorimotor view reflects a spectrum of ideas, which includes simple open-loop
sensorimotor correlations, closed-loops ones, regularities given a goal, and optimal sets
of regularities according to a certain performance metric. These can be understood using
the tools of dynamical models of cognition, captured in terms of differential equations
of motion for the whole system rather than assume the system itself is involved in
symbolic computation. These anti-representational ideas hark back to the explanatory
strategies of ecological psychology (Gibson 1979) and need only speak the “lawful
linkages between sensory and motor systems” advocated by Varela et al. (1991) or the
“subjective physics” of perception (Brette 2013). When they are situated in the context
of biological systems and their biomechanical constraints, sensorimotor contingencies
may also be seen in terms of “synergies,” capturing the attunement of different muscle
groups to specific tasks engaged by an agent (Latash, 2008). Thus, instead of
constructing elaborate instructions harnessed in motor representations, motor control
deploys smooth real-time adaptation to the salient aspects of a situation, leveraging the
biophysics of interacting physical bodies.

Conclusion
This chapter critically discussed the limitations of instructionist approaches to skilful
performance and also to assess what kind of knowledge (if any) is involved in motor
control. The Instructionist assumption is that according to which skilful performance is,
at bottom, driven by motor representations that harness instructions about how to
perform a given task. We examined the manner in which motor representations are
operationalized as motor commands in OMCT. We asked whether the assumption of
modular knowledge-driven motor control in OMCT, which is based on a modular
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architecture implementing separable state estimators, forward models, and inverse
models, is warranted, and concluded that it is not. We argued that the new behavioural
modelling tools and strategies – namely, the active inference frameworks – show that
the Instructionist assumption is ill-motivated. It is concluded that if the generative
models posited by the active inference framework are understood as purely formal tools
it is possible to develop a purely interactionist account of skilled performance by drawing
on the resources of a suitably circumspect sensorimotor account – one that sees
perception and action as integrally connected.
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Chapter 4
Questioning the Compatibility of Predictive
Processing and Modular Theories of Cognition

Introduction
Traditional Modular and Bayesian predictive processing theories of cognition are
seemingly inherently opposed to one another. In their standard interpretations both of
these approaches to cognition assume that cognition is theory-based in that our
intelligent engagements with the world are a matter of forming and testing hypotheses
about what deal with in the world. These two approaches disagree about the flexibility
and openness of the theories that they assume form the basis of cognition.17
Modularists, at least of the traditional stripe, assume that the theories in question
are cognitively impenetrable and informational encapsulated such that they are sensitive
to only certain kind of domain-specific information. Accordingly, for example,
traditional modular accounts of perception see perception as isolated and insulated from
background belief and other more general forms of cognising (Fodor 1983; Pylyshyn,
1999, Raftoupoulos 2019). In the traditional modular theories, it assumed that modules
have a fixed neural architecture tied to preassigned neuronal areas (Gall & Surzheim
1809/2001; Temkin, 1947; Critchley, 1965; Simpson, 2005). In updated versions of this
idea that are do not restrict modules to specific brain areas it is still assumed that modules
at least exhibit functional segregation.
Predictive processing accounts of cognition regard cognition as fundamentally
Helmholtzian, as continually advancing and refining inferential-grounded hypotheses
about the causal structure of the world (Ballard, Hinton and Sejnowski, 1983; Dayan et
al. 1995; Lee and Mumford 2003; Hohwy 2013; Clark 2016). Such theorizing is assumed
to be fundamentally open to revision, on all levels, in a way that apparently rules out or
17 See

the Theory-ladenness special issue by Votsis, Tacca and Schurz (2015).
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is in conflict with the traditional modularist view that there are specialised informationalencapsulated domains of cognition.
Hohwy (2013) tells us that, “[i]t is normal for us to distinguish between, on the
one hand, perception and experience, and on the other hand, belief and thought … Yet
the perceptual hierarchy does not suggest that there is such a difference” (2013, 72, emphasis added).
Focusing more on questions of cognitive architecture, Clark (2013) makes a related
claim, noting that predictive processing accounts of cognition “appear to dissolve, at the
level of the implementing neural machinery, the superficially clear distinction between
perception and knowledge/belief (Clark, 2013, p. 190, emphasis added).
The predictive processing idea that there is no inherent barrier between various
cognitive domains is precisely what motivates some authors to describe perception as a
form of ‘controlled hallucination’ (Koenderink, 2008; Clark 2016; Wiese and Metzinger
2017), or as a kind of ‘inferred virtual reality’ (Clark, 2016), where “people see what they
expect to see” (Clowes 1969, p. 379). Predicative processing accounts thus apparently
follow Quine not Fodor, in supposed perception is continuously updated at the light of
new evidence and background beliefs as cognitive agents sample their environment to
minimize prediction errors.
Despite these seemingly fundamental differences between Modular and
Predictive Processing accounts of cognition, there have been attempts to show that the
approaches to cognition are, in fact, compatible and can be allied.
Why make the attempt? As we have seen in Chapter 2, when considering
perceptual illusions, the empirical evidence throws up anomalies for the predictive
processing accounts of cognition. The empirical evidence appears to show that in some
cases we do not update our thinking, or do not so in the ways that we should if cognition
is an all-access, fully open-channel predictive process. Hence, there is interest in the field
to see if predictive processing accounts might be able incorporate some aspects of
modular theories of cognition, at least to some limited extent, so as to account for
informational or functional constraints on what they predict would otherwise be fully
open-channel cognitive processes (Hohwy 2013, 2017, 2020a; Drayson 2017).
In what follows, we review three arguments for thinking that it is possible to
incorporate aspects of modular theories of cognition within a Bayesian predictive
processing framework.
The first argument we call the courtroom of perception argument (Hohwy 2013).
It seeks to establish that PP allows perceptual inference to exhibit canonical features of
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modularity; specifically, functional segregation and informational encapsulation. The
second and third arguments that seek to show that PP can incorporate aspects of
modularity within its framework rely on formalisms from machine learning and
probability theory. The second – intransitivity – argument – aims to establish that PP is
committed to causal influences across hierarchical levels in probabilistic models that
exhibit intransitivity (Drayson 2017). In this sense, the intransitivity argument holds that
PP entails and requires functional and informational modularity given considerations
about causal chains in Bayesian networks. The third argument draws on Markov blanket
formalisms in machine learning to establish that PP is compatible with modularity. It
relies on the notion of a Markov blanket to ground the idea that predictive processing
exhibits modularity given the conditional independence and functional segregation
between different hierarchical levels induced by the presence of a Markov blanket, or
multiplicity of Markov blankets (Hohwy 2016).
In what follows, it is demonstrated that each of these three arguments in favour
PP incorporating modularity come up short, albeit for different reasons.

4.1. The Courtroom of Perception Argument
This section considers the courtroom of perception argument (Hohwy 2013). It seeks
to establish that PP allows perceptual inference to exhibit canonical features of
modularity; specifically, functional segregation and informational encapsulation.
It proceeds by way of analogy to a courtroom, arguing that “[r]eality testing is
somewhat like engaging an epistemic courtroom” (Hohwy, 2013, p. 152). The idea
motivating the analogy is that exteroception (vision, hearing, etc.) functions akin to
isolated witnesses delivering fine-grained information to perceptual inference (the judge
and jury) vis-a-vis a specific event in question. The more sensory independent witnesses
are (and the way each one independently taps into different aspects of the same event),
the more efficient the process of Bayesian model optimisation is.
This argument relies on the notion of conditional independence. An example will
help clarify this notion. Intuitively, the observation that the room is cold could be
explained either by a window having been left open; or, given that the air conditioning
system having been left on some excessively high value. If you were to make the further
observation that the air conditioning system in on high, then the observation that it is
cold now carries no information about whether the window is open. This example
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shows that the coldness in the room and the window being open are conditionally
independent, given that the air conditioning is on high assuming that the two events
(open window, air conditioning system on high) can be treated as statistically
independent. We can note, more formally, that for any variable A, A is conditionally
independent of B, given another variable C if and only if the probability of A given C
and the probability of B given C can be written as p(A|C) and p(B|C). In other words,
A (it being cold) is conditionally independent of B (the window being open) given C
(high air conditioning) if, when C is known, knowing A would provide no additional
information about B (Beal 2003).
Conditional independence within the brain can be captured by appeal to the
brain’s “organic structure preventing information flow across processing streams in
lower parts of the cortical hierarchy” (Hohwy 2013, p. 252). In neuroscience, this
property of the brain is also known as functional segregation. Crucially, according to Hohwy,
the chief architect of the courtroom argument, this “is not too dissimilar from the
courtroom where witnesses might be kept in separate rooms and be prevented from
phoning each other.” (2013, p. 252) Hence, the courtroom argument, if correct, implies
that brain and cognitive function can be captured in terms of functional (segregation)
modularity and informational modularity given the presence of conditional
independencies between lower and higher levels with the predictive structure of the central
nervous system. This conclusion is reached by appeal to the assumption that predictive
processing - i.e., prediction error minimisation routines - can be understood by analogy
to how a verdict is reached in court.
The motivating premise of predictive processing is that the brain is able to keep
its states within a limited and bounded set of states, under the assumption that the brain
is a locally ergodic system. In other words, it can on average and over time avoid states
with high surprise (i.e., prediction error) by having a good or close to optimal model of
its own states and its wider environment. First, the environment is cast as having a true
hidden variable or state, s, which generates outcomes (i.e., observable sensory states), o.
In this sense outcomes are elicited by hidden states in the world, and these states can be
further influenced by the action policies an agent pursues (Parr & Friston 2017).
Crucially, hidden states are ‘hidden’ because the information an agent has access to is
contained wholly and exhaustively in observable sensory states. The relationship
between hidden states and outcomes is referred to as the generative process. Note that it is
not feasible to determine the hidden states resulting in outcomes solely on the basis of
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the information contained in the outcomes. This has been shown to be computationally
intractable (Murphy 2012), given that the relation between s and o is non-linear. Second,
predictive processing solves this problem by appeal to the idea that the brain has a
generative model of the generative process. That is, brains are able to approximate the true
hidden probabilistic state causing its sensory observations by inferring the probability of
different hidden states given some observation, P(s|o), by leveraging its generative
model, which is formally defined as a joint probability distribution between a prior belief,
P(s), and a likelihood function, P(o|s). If successful, the brain will encounter no or only
minimal prediction error signals, i.e., deviations between its predictions about the causes
of outcomes and the actual outcomes it has access to. Third, and finally, the accuracy
and credibility of inferring the true hidden cause of a specific observation can be helped
significantly by keeping different sensory modalities and higher-level predictions isolated
from one another. The same is the case in a courtroom, where a “defendant’s claim is
being interrogated in the light of supporting or contradicting witnesses” (Hohwy, 2013,
p. 152). Indeed, to ensure the accuracy and credibility of a verdict, witnesses, prosecutor
and defence, should be segregated from one another. To illustrate this, we quote Hohwy
at length:
It is essential for a trial that different witnesses are independent. This is why the witnesses should
not be allowed to chat about the case in the corridor or meet with the defendant before being
let in to testify. If the witnesses are not independent with respect to the case in question, then
we cannot trust their evidence. Similarly, the judge needs to be impartial and the jury needs to
be independent too. For example, the jury members should not be bigots and should not have
had access to copious media reports before the trial begins; and the judge is not allowed to
influence any testimony. If the judge and jury are not independent in this sense, then we cannot
trust them to evaluate and weigh the evidence in a fair way. This imposes a kind of evidential
architecture on the legal system: checks and balances are in place to ensure independence.
Fairness is violated when this fails. (2013, p. 152)

In short, conditional independency, i.e. the insulation of senses, according to Hohwy
(2013), is analogous to the insulated witnesses in a courtroom. Witnesses are kept away
from each other all times without being able to communicate in order to ensure that
their testimony is not biased at any point.
The suggestion is that Bayesian inference over neural states maps onto an
evidential architecture akin to that of the courtroom. Hohwy states that different
“sources of evidence need to be independent witnesses with respect to the event in
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question, and higher-level expectation needs to evaluate evidence from lower levels in a
balanced way.” (2013, p. 152) The reason being that if evidence is influenced by multiple
sensory modalities at the same time, this lowers the credibility of making use of it as a
means to testing one’s predictions up and against the world (Hohwy 2013, p. 152).
Translate this into the language of modularity and you get the following picture.
Processes of Bayesian model optimisation (i.e., updating the generative model in light
of new evidence) entail functional segregation and informational encapsulation in the
specific sense of Fodorian modularity. Hohwy is explicit about this as he says: “different
parts of the system specialize in different tasks and seem relatively unimpeded by other
processes (this relates to Fodor’s (1983) notion of informationally encapsulated
cognitive modules).” (2013, p. 152) Lower and higher levels of the Bayesian hierarchy
are taken to be functionally segregated from each other, on the one hand, and
informationally encapsulated given the presence of conditional independence between
levels. Hohwy (2013) calls to this ‘horizontal insulation’. He treats the relationship
between sensory modalities in a similar fashion, which he refers to as ‘vertical insulation’
(Hohwy 2013).
Returning to courtroom analogy. Sensory states (witnesses) act as channels for
testimonial evidence, which are arguably horizontally segregated (i.e., epistemically and
functionally segregated) from higher-level cognitive states. Higher-level states, like any
good judge sitting at the top of the hierarchy, should be impartial and carefully consider
incoming information. Further substantiation for horizontal insulation comes from the
idea that Bayesian model optimisation can be cast as a form of inference to the best
explanation. In inference to the best explanation, when a hypothesis hi best accounts for
— i.e. explains away — some occurring evidence ei, the latter becomes evidence for the
former in so far as hi accounts for ei. In this sense, hi becomes self-evidencing. As Hohwy
puts it:
When hi is self-evidencing, there is an explanatory-evidentiary circle (EE-circle) where hi explains
ei and ei in turn is evidence for hi. In Bayesian terms, generative models — when inverted —
generate predictions (hypotheses) that explain away prediction error (the sensory evidence), thus
maximizing its evidence.” (2016, p. 263).

The presence of EE-cicles are argued to induce a form of epistemic seclusion
conditioned on conditional independence between different levels across the evidentiary
(Bayesian) architecture, implying vertical insulation of sensory modalities, on the one
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hand, and horizontal insulation between sensory modalities and higher-level operations
(i.e., the judge), on the other.
The question to be considered now is: how well does the courtroom analogy
work? In what follows we consider examples raising doubts about both horizontal and
vertical insulation, thereby questioning the entailment relation from predictive
processing to both functional and informational modularity. In sub-section 2.1., we
target cross-modal predictive processing, focusing on vertical insulation between
exteroception, interoception and proprioception. In sub-section 2.2, we rely on recent
work on so-called embodied predictive processing that runs counter to the idea of
horizontal insulation in the domain of the classical exteroceptive senses.
4.1.1. Cross-modal predictive processing: against vertical insulation
The first item of Hohwy’s prediction-driven account of modularity is vertical insulation,
i.e., functional and informational modularity between exteroceptive sensory modalities.
The courtroom argument states that exteroceptive sensory modalities are
informationally encapsulated from one another. Evidence for this might seem easy to
come by. We do not hear with our noses, after all. This might make vertical insulation
appear almost inevitable. There is however evidence for vertical insulation being difficult
to come by. Here we draw on empirical work from the literature on brain connectivity
and multisensory integration to press on the results of the courtroom argument.
Multisensory integration is the view that sight, sound, smell, taste, and touch are
integrated to influence perception and action (Stein et al., 2009; Stein 2012). It refers to
the neural processes by which unisensory signals are combined to enhance
disambiguation. The gist here is that findings show that exteroceptive sensory modalities
modulate each other during different but overlapping stages of neural activity (Ball et
al., 2018; Ferraro et al., 2019). If coherent, this raises doubt about the vertical insulation
between exteroceptive sensory modalities. Atilgan et al. (2018), for example, show that
visual stimuli shape how auditory cortical neurons respond to sound mixtures, by
eliciting changes in the phase of the local field potential in auditory cortex (see Fig. 1).
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Figure 1 Temporal coherence between auditory and visual stimuli shapes the sound scene in auditory
cortex. Auditory cortex is identified as a site of multisensory binding, with inputs from visual cortex
underpinning these effects (Atilgan et al. 2018).

This makes it hard to support informational encapsulation in exteroception. Indeed,
Atilgan et al. (2018) observed that vision effects are lost when the auditory cortex is
reversibly deactivated. This means that sensory signals not only affect one another but
that activation of one sensory modality depends on the activation of another sensory
modality (Schroeder & Foxe 2004). Findings like these make the courtroom argument
hard to defend.
The classic (exteroceptive) five senses are of course only part of the story about
how agents sense their world and themselves. Under predictive processing,
interoception (internal states of the body) and proprioception (the location of the body
and its potential for action) play key roles in the overall process of prediction error
minimisation. For example, motor governed actions such as plucking an apple from a
tree comprises not only exteroceptive sight and touch but also proprioceptive sensations
of location and trajectories of bodily parts. Proprioception influences exteroception as
visual sensing interacts with eye and head movement (Friston & Parr 2018).
Interoceptive sensations such as hunger influence exteroception, given that these kinds
of internal sensations motivate action and make salient things in the environment for
sight and touch, say. Too see this a little more clearly, consider that your hunger would
hardly be satisfied by the accuracy and credibility of an exteroceptive verdict. Motorsystem governed biomechanical action requires perception, in the sense that
interoception is what motivates the action in the first place (hunger). But it also requires
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proprioception given that action is part of what enables organisms to minimise
prediction error - e.g., via eye movement and touch (Linson et al. 2018). As Linson et
al. put it: “we must recognize the continuous interactions between interoception and the
other modalities … [given that] the generative model embodies continuous relationships
between extero-, proprio-, and interoception” (2018, p. 3). All modalities exteroception, interoception to proprioception - mutually influence one another in the
overall quest to minimise prediction error.
4.1.2. Cross-modal predictive processing: against horizontal insulation
Evidence of cross-modal predictive processing is being extended under the notion of
embodied predictive processing (Allen et al. 2019; Allen and Friston 2018; Allen et al.
2016; Limanowski and Blankenburg 2013; Wilkinson et al. 2019). The idea is that
sensory evidence in hierarchical predictive processing is dependent on and influenced
by bodily processes. This is motivated by empirical evidence suggesting the presence of
coupling and modulation between bodily cycles (biorhythms) and neuronal oscillations
and behaviour (Herrero et al., 2017; Tort et al., 2018).
Allen et al., (2019) provide a proof of principle of this via computer simulations.
They focus on the coupling between interoception and exteroception - what they call
multimodal integration - mapping interoceptive cardiac cycles to exteroceptive stimuli.
They do so by simulating a cardiac arousal response to threatening stimuli (seeing a
vicious looking spider) in comparison to non-arousing stimuli (seeing flowers) within a
Markov decision process (MDP) scheme. A MDP determine the transitions between
states in generative models of the dynamics of the (hidden) variables, constituted by
hidden states and actions or policies. Generative models embody the combinations
between these variables. An observation is generated from the hidden states. States are
generated by a time transition, depending on the state at the previous time, and on the
policy (Fig. 2).

99

Figure 2 This schematic illustrates how hidden states cause each other and sensory outcomes in the
interoceptive and exteroceptive domain. The upper row describes the probability transitions among
hidden states (seeing a flower or seeing a spider), while the lower row specifies the outcomes that would
be generated by combinations of hidden states that are inferred on the basis of outcomes. (Allen et al.,
2019, p. 8).

Outcomes are generated according to preferences (green box) that couple exteroception
(flower; spider) with interoception (diastolic state; systolic state). Outcomes depend
upon the multimodal integration of the policies (i.e., being relaxed conditioned on seeing
a flower; conversely, being aroused given spider observations). Probabilistically, if the
subject is aroused (hidden states on the top row) the likelihood of seeing a spider is high
(outcomes on the bottom row). This means that it is the interoceptive state that ensures
the precision on the mapping from hidden states to outcomes.
Though interoceptive and exteroceptive outcomes are portrayed separately, they
are causally influence one another. According to preferences, a spider causes diastole,
and diastole indicates that a spider was seen, in which case, arousal is the proper response
(i.e., the one affording the least expected prediction error). Conversely, a flower causes
systole and systole indicate that a flower was seen, in which case relaxing is the
appropriate effect.
This means that sensory outcomes in the interoceptive and exteroceptive domain are
caused by the combination of these hidden states. The result of the simulations is that
exteroception is dependent, in a probabilistic sense, on interoception. In other words,
one appraisal or prediction about the world (vicious spider, beautiful flower) turns on
inferring hidden states (arousal, relaxed) via interoceptive processing. The generative
model maps the probability over hidden states, outcomes, and policies for multimodal
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integration of intero- and exteroception. If the analogy holds, then it follows that senses
never communicate with one another, so cross-modality is not possible. In this chapter,
we challenge the claim that senses remain insulated all times by offering
counterexamples from cross-modality.
This runs counter to the claim about horizontal insulation made in the
courtroom argument, as interoception and exteroception are coupled to one another in
a hierarchical sense, from body to brain, and back again. Of course, those sympathetic
to the courtroom argument might try to press the following point: namely, that not all
information is relevant to the judge; and by extension, not all information is relevant to
the brain. In this sense, modularity follows given that the brain is informationally
selective. There is no problem with making this specific observation. It is correct to say
that not all kinds of information are relevant at any given point to neural processing. Yet
this observation does not warrant any further claims about informational encapsulation,
which the courtroom argument relies on. Hence, the courtroom argument is guilty of
this kind of fallacious interference: from informational selectivity to informational
encapsulation.

4.2. The Intransitivity Argument
This argument starts from the observation that prediction error minimisation unfolds
across a cortical hierarchy. On this view, priors at each level in the hierarchy are provided
by the level above and prediction errors from the level below. That is, in hierarchical
message passing schemes such as predictive processing, prediction error signals are
influenced by states at the same level and by states at the level above. Conversely,
predictions are influenced by states at the same level and by states at the level below.
Under Bayesian model optimisation, to invert a generative model (i.e., to approximate
the posterior probability of a prediction in light of new evidence) requires input from
the level below in the form of a prediction error signal (Friston 2009). This means that
hierarchical message passing “drive expectations … towards better predictions to
explain away prediction error.” (Friston 2009, p. 297) Crucially, hierarchical message
passing implies that connections between predictions and prediction errors are mutual
or reciprocal. Or, put differently, the only activities linking different hierarchical levels
are forward prediction errors and backward mediating predictions. This speaks to why
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hierarchical predictive processing supports the idea that forward and backward
connectivity is pervasive in brain and cognitive function (Friston 2009; Hohwy 2007).
The intransitivity argument is intended to block this conclusion; to show that
this species of large-scale mutual influence is not the case in the predictive architecture
of the brain. The argument is due to Drayson (2017), and can be given the following
form. Premise one: If predictive processing is non-modular, then activity across different
hierarchical levels causally influence one another. Credibility for premise one comes
from the principle of transitivity. In particular, if "Level A + 1 influences Level A, and
Level A influences Level A - 1, then Level A +1 influences Level A - 1." (Drayson 2017,
p. 8) Premise two: activity across different hierarchical levels do not causally influence one
another. Conclusion, predictive processing is modular. Drayson (2017) states that Bayesian
networks such as predictive processing implement a form of non-transitive
computation. They exhibit or instantiate “mechanisms that implement causal Bayesian
networks.” (Drayson 2017, p. 9) Crucially, according to Drayson, probabilistic causal
models are not models where causal influence is likely to be preserved over long causal
chains. She takes this to suggest that the “further apart the levels in the [predictive]
hierarchy are, the less likely there is to be causal influence from the higher level to the
lower level.” (2017, p. 9).
The intransitivity argument is developed within the formalism of Bayesian
networks. Yet it is an argument that ultimately pitches the causal architecture of
predictive processing in terms of ‘directed acyclic graphs’ (DAGs), as opposed to
‘directed cyclic graphs or models (DCMs). A DAG is a form of structural causal
modelling that picks out conditional independence between nodes in a network. For
example, in figure 3, X3 is statistically independent of X1 given X2. This means it is
possible to understand the properties and dynamics of X3 independent of X1 . DCMs,
on the other hand, capture causal influence between nodes standing in reciprocal
relations in a network.
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Figure 3 Schematic highlighting the distinction between structural causal modelling in the form of a
directed acyclic graph and dynamic causal modelling in the form of a directed cyclic model (Friston 2011,
p. 25)

The argument we shall present turns on the distinction between DAGs and DCMs. We
shall argue that the intransitivity argument is based on Bayesian (causal) computation
understood in terms DAGs. We start by motivating why the intransitivity argument is
formulated in terms of DAGs. This will involve some degree of formality. Yet the
formalities are important, as they show why the argument under consideration concludes
as it does. We then go on to highlight two limitations with using DAGs to discover
causal connectivity in Bayesian networks such as the brain. We conclude that DCMs,
having none of the limitations of DAGs, are consistent with predictive processing and
do not imply modularity. In fact, DCMs capture the importance of functional and
effective connectivity to understand brain and cognitive function in cognitive
neuroscience.
To foreshadow the structure of our argument: DAGs are often used in
computational neuroscience to model dependencies between states; yet this way of
modelling the brain is a methodological simplification; it is not intended to show that
state dependencies are in fact acyclic. Moreover, claiming that a particular system was in
a specific state at a particular point in time, is actually to say that the average of the
system’s states was in that particular state during that period of time. As Spivey has
pointed out: “This kind of coarse averaging measurement is often a practical necessity
in science, but should not be mistaken as genuine evidence for the system actually resting
in a discrete stable state.” 2007, pp. 30-31). Crucially, the intransitivity argument
conflates a way of modelling the brain with what is actually the case about neural-based
state dependencies. This is the key problem for the intransitivity argument: it conflates
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models with the actual thing we want to understand. We spell this out in further detail
below.
A DAG is also known as a Bayesian network (Pearl 1988). Bayesian networks
are sometimes referred to as causal networks. The intransitivity argument helps itself to
this notion. Yet there is nothing inherently causal about directed graphical models, of
which a DAG is an example (Murphy 2012).18 The key property that merits attention is
that a DAG has a particular topological ordering. This ordering implies that the nodes
comprising a DAG can be ordered such that parents come prior to children, which over
the course of time become parents, and so on. This ordering is also known as an ordered
Markov property. Crucially, for any network, if that network has an ordered Markov
property, then a node only depends on its immediate parents, and consequently not on
all other parents in the topology of the network. A DAG is thus an acyclic graph without
any directed cycles between nodes. For this reason, DAGs are sometimes said to be
‘memoryless’ or ‘ahistorical’, given that dependence between states of a DAG is
restricted to a chain of successive influences with no reciprocal influences or loops.
This maps onto the notion of a Bayesian network assumed in the intransitivity
argument. To see this in more detail, consider next that DAGs highlight one widespread
way of casting decision-making and action selection in terms of a Markov decision process
(MDP). Under predictive processing, MDPs are refined and augmented in order to deal
with the only partial observability of hidden (external) causes of sensory observations.
Decision-making and action selection in predictive processing are therefore more
commonly approached through the lens of partially observed Markov decision processes
(POMDPs). This is an important distinction in machine learning. It is however not
important for present purposes, given that both MDPs and POMDPs turn on the
Markov assumption that nodes stand in a relation of unidirectional conditional
dependence, i.e., any given node in an MDP is governed wholly and exhaustively by its
immediately preceding states (its parent). Modelling causal pathways in predictive
processing via DAGs therefore fits snugly with the intransitivity argument, as it breaks
with the idea of large-scale causal connectivity between multiple nodes in a network.
All of this is standard machine learning textbook. Nevertheless, there are two
problems with utilising DAGs to argue for functional and informational modularity in
Bayesian models such as predictive processing. The first is that it restricts conditional
independence between nodes in a network to the strict and linear topological ordering

18

We set this specific issue aside in the remainder of this discussion.
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of a Markov property. Put differently, a DAG is just a special case of a system with a
Markov topology, implying that the particular properties of a DAG do not generalise to
all systems with an ordered Markov property. Biological systems such as the brain can
be cast with a Markov topology even if functional segregation in the brain rests on
integration. The second is that DAGs ignore time; or, more accurately, it treats time as
discrete, whereas time at the scale of brain dynamics is continuous.
Dynamical causal modelling (DCM), by contrast, is a generic Bayesian
framework for inferring hidden (neuronal) states from brain activity (Stephan et al.
2010). Unlike DAGs, DCMs capture (1) how a particular state of some population of
neuronal dynamics cause changes in other populations via synaptic connections, and (2)
how these interactions change and shift given influence of external causes (e.g.,
endogenous brain activity). This speaks to the idea that DCM describes how distinct
dynamics and regions are coupled to one another, endowing “the system with memory
such that future states are influenced by current states” (Stephan et al. 2010, p. 3099).
This is important for a couple of reasons. The first is that DCMs underpin a central
tenet of predictive processing; namely, that the brain is a locally ergodic system. That is,
the recurrent dynamics of DCM captures the notion that the states that an agent (i.e.,
nervous system) occupies are bounded and limited, and that the dynamics operate so as
to enable the agent to keep frequenting those states, again and again, given that it is this
limited distribution of states that define the agent as the kind of organism that it is. The
second is that DCMs avoids being ‘memoryless’ and ‘ahistorical’ - something DAGs are
vulnerable to. Neural dynamics are self-organising and adaptive, and therefore regulate
their changes with respect to certain viability constraints. DAGs capture this by
constraining the temporal extension of such processes such that state changes in a
system always unfold at a particular point in time as a result of current dynamics. DCMs
however illustrate how past changes inform future states given the current state of the
system in question. This allows DCMs to capture how memory is essential to cognitive
functions such as planning and decision-making. Finally, DAGs represent state
transitions in discrete time. Natural systems such as brains however function in
continuous time. Real or continuous time “does not function like a digital computer's
clock. It does not move forward and then stop to be counted, and then move forward
again only to stop again.” (Spivey 2007, p. 31) DCM thus provides a more ‘natural’ way
of modelling state transitioning in hierarchical predictive processing.
More specifically, DCMs allow for the representation of brain activity that takes
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the form of a directed cyclic graph (Fig. 4).

Figure 4 Schematic of neurobiological instantiation of perceptual inference in predictive processing (Parr
& Friston 2018, p. 6)

This figure is a general model of the neurobiological instantiation of perceptual inference
in which perceptual inference takes the form of brain connectivity, represented as a
directed cyclic graph. Unlike a DAG, a directed cyclic graph defines a series of nodes
with recurrent and reciprocal connections in a network or system, which nevertheless
respects the Markov topology crucial to modelling state transitions in terms of
POMPDs19. In figure 4, layer IV represents nodes (spiny stellate cells) influenced by
lower level nodes (relay nuclei) of the thalamus, and from lower cortical levels (e.g., the
lateral geniculate nucleus). Layer IV nodes signal predictions errors, reflecting a
mismatch between layer V/VI predictions and sensory input received via the thalamic
relays. If this is sound, it suggests that visual activity is best cast in the form of brain
connectivity represented by a directed cyclic graph; not a DAG. This is important, for it
speaks against the conclusion of the intransitivity argument. The intransitivity argument
states that there are no large-scale reciprocal causal connections across the inferential or
predictive hierarchy. DCM informed analyses of perceptual inference suggest otherwise.
Crucially, although figure 4 only represents brain connectivity across a limited number
of levels, this pattern could be recursively extended to any arbitrary number of levels.
Specifically, in their discussion of figure 4, Parr & Friston (2018) go on to conclude that
perceptual inference rests on anatomical and functional interconnectivity over long

Note that the network represented in figure 4 can be written mathematically in terms that represent a directed acyclic graph. The
point we wish to emphasise however is that once a Markov decision process is implemented in a hierarchical or temporally deep
architecture, it leads to a view of message passing in predictive networks that take the form of a directed cyclic graph.
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causal chains. Crucially, our argument does not jeopardise the notion that state
transitions within DCM schemes exhibit an ordered Markov topology; it undercuts the
idea that the brain and its transitions can be understood as intransitive across levels of
organisation.
We wish to finish this section by considering a possible objection; namely, that
while it might be true that modelling brain connectivity in terms of directed cyclic graphs
preserves transitivity across levels, a treatment of the same issue in the form of DAGs
still supports the intransitivity argument. Here is the problem should one pursue this
kind of response. It makes the argument for modularity model relative. This is not an
outcome an argument for modularity should (even implicitly) accommodate, for the
notion of modularity is only really informative if it gets at the actual architecture of brain
and cognitive function. Let us therefore look at a different line of support for modularity
in predictive processing.

4.3. The Markov Blanket Argument
Previously we considered the role of conditional independence in the courtroom
argument for modularity, and found it wanting. A different and more applicable route
from formalism to biology, when aiming to secure the functional segregation claim, is
likely to come from the Markov blanket formalism applied to brain connectivity. We call
this the Markov blanket argument for modularity. It elaborates on the notion that
different levels in the perceptual hierarchy stand in a relation of conditional
independence. The Markov blanket argument makes this a centrepiece in an argument
for modularity in predictive processing. So, we now turn to conditional independence
in the context of Markov blankets. Like the intransitivity argument, the Markov blanket
argument focuses on the notion of horizontal insulation between lower and higher levels
in perceptual inference. Before we consider the Markov blanket argument, we start by
motivating the notion of a Markov blanket.
Pearl (1998) introduced the Markov blanket into machine learning and
probability theory. In his treatment, it was used to denote a set of properties specific to
Bayesian networks (like DAGs and DCMs). Figure 5 provides a general schematic of
the Markov blanket for a node.
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Figure 5 Schematic depiction of a Markov blanket with full conditionals (Hohwy 2017, p. 3).

The Markov blanket is a statistical boundary, comprised of parents, children and parents
of children. It renders internal states, green node, conditionally independent from
external states, black nodes. This means that if one is trying to predict the behaviour of
a state with a Markov blanket, then knowing the states comprising the Markov blanket,
red nodes, will be sufficient. This implies that external states are rendered uninformative
with respect to predicting the values of Markov blanketed states. It is this kind of
statistical blanket for the green node in figure 5 that is referred to as a Markov blanket.
Technically, a Markov blanket can then be defined as the parents (u), the children (a),
and the parents of the children (!).
In biology, more specifically, the notion of a Markov blanket allows one to
define any system in a way that delineates it from the environment in which it exists. In
this sense, the Markov blanket is best understood as a boundary (Schrödinger 1943).
Markov blanket boundaries can be found at many different scales of life, from
macromolecules to organelles, organs and humans (Clark 2017; Kirchhoff et al. 2018;
Kirchhoff & Kiverstein 2019; Palacios et al. 2017; Ramstead et al. 2017). A key aspect
of a Markov blanket is that it yields a formal way by which to define what it means for
internal and external states to be conditionally independent of one another given a third
set of states: active and sensory states. Specifically, the partitioning rule of a Markov
blanket states that internal states can only influence external states via active states, while
external states can only influence internal states via sensory states. Thus, the partitioning
rule of the Markov blanket formalism precludes direct coupling between internal and
external states. Crucially, the delineation between states only arises given coupling. As a
cell, for example, separates itself from its extracellular milieu, it remains statistically
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coupled to it given the states that define its Markov blanket (Fig. 6).

Figure 6 Illustration of the partitioning rule governing Markov blankets (Kirchhoff & Kiverstein, 2019)
This figure highlights the conditional independencies induced by the presence of a Markov blanket. On
the one hand, external states, E, cause sensory states, S, which influence, but are not also influenced by,
internal states, I. On the other hand, internal states cause active states, A, which influence, but are not
themselves influenced by, external states (Friston et al. 2015; Kirchhoff et al. 2018; Palacios et al. 2017).

The question we now turn to is: how does the Markov blanket play a role in making a
case for modularity in predictive processing, and is it justified? We shall argue that even
the appeal to the Markov blanket formalism comes up short in an argument for
modularity; in particular, in an argument for horizontal insulation. Before we present
our argument, let us first present the Markov blanket argument for modularity.
The argument is due to Hohwy (2013).20 The form of the argument can be cast
as follows. Premise one: given the presence of a Markov blanket (aka EE-circle), it
becomes possible to draw a principled distinction between internal causes as they are
inferred by a model (i.e., predictions) and external causes, outside of the Markov blanket.
Crucially, this holds over the entire predictive hierarchy given that it is possible to
distinguish between higher-level predictions, lower-level input and intermediate error
signals. On this view, then, any level in the predictive hierarchy has its own Markov
blanket, i.e., sensory and active states. This means that internal states (the generative
model) can influence the immediate level below via top-down predictions, and external
states at a lower level can influence higher levels via sensory signals (prediction errors).
Hence, strictly speaking, for any level of neuronal connections this division between
states holds. Premise two: the statistical division of states induced by a Markov blanket is
sufficient for evidential insulation. As Hohwy says:
The perceptual hierarchy, and the iterations of prediction error minimization mechanisms
implemented at each of its levels, seem apt to deliver evidential insulation between horizontal

We note here that Hohwy does not use the terminology of a Markov blanket. He uses, as we saw in the courtroom argument
the notion of an EE-circle. This notion is however the Markov blanket as it is used in the context of predictive processing and
active inference. Hohwy takes up the notion in later papers (e.g., Hohwy 2017).

20
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levels. Each overlapping pair of levels forms a functional unit where the lower level passes
prediction errors to the higher level, and the higher-level passes predictions to the lower level
… In this sense the upper level in each pair of levels only “knows” its own expectations and is
only told how these expectations are wrong, and is never told directly what the level below
“knows” … For this reason, the right kind of horizontal insulation comes naturally with the
hierarchy. (2013, p. 153)

The conclusion is that brain and cognitive function exhibit horizontal insulation. This is
the Markov blanket argument for modularity. A few remarks about this argument before
moving on to develop an alternative to modularity premised on the Markov blanket
formalism. It is formulated epistemically, in terms of what higher and lower levels ‘know’
and ‘do not know’. This epistemological formulation need not be the right formulation.
Others are possible (Bruineberg et al. 2018). Regardless, it signals the evidential seclusion
needed to arrive at a conclusion about horizontal insulation. It does this by utilising the
idea that a Markov blanket around a node or level shields such a level (epistemically,
statistically, or some other variation) from any other node or level, and vice-versa. So,
the argument for modularity is formulated with an eye to conditional independence
between nodes (or states at different levels of hierarchical organisation).
We now develop a reason for resisting the conclusion of the Markov blanket
argument, yet without resisting the Markov blanket formalism. One can start to develop
an answer to why Markov blankets do not imply modularity by taking into consideration
initially that the statistical structure of the Markov blanket formalism is scale-free. That it
is scale-free implies that it allows for the formation of Markov blankets at recursively
larger and larger scales of organisation. It is not restricted to any particular scale of
systemic organisation. This means that at any level of the predictive hierarchy one can
define a Markov blanket consisting of active and sensory states that separates higher and
lower levels, resulting in a view of Markov blankets comprised of multiple other Markov
blankets (Fig. 7).

110

Figure 7 Schematic depiction of Markov blankets. The top figure depicts a single Markov blanket. The
middle figure represents a multiscale and nested organisation of Markov blankets. The final figure suggests
that cultural practices can envelope a multiplicity of individuals given its nested structure. Thus figure 7
represents the Markov blanket organisation all the way down to individual cells and all the way up to
complex organisms like human beings (Kirchhoff et al. 2018; cf. Clark 2017).

To see how this scale-free organisation of Markov blankets speaks against the notion of
horizontal insulation in predictive processing, we need to consider the reciprocal or
circular causal interactions that occur across the hierarchy of Markov blankets. First, it
is a common observation that low levels of the hierarchy predict causal regularities
unfolding at very fast, millisecond, timescales, whereas more complex regularities unfold
at higher levels and over much slower timescales. This suggests that prediction errors
are minimised over the entire hierarchy at any given time. Second, Hobson & Friston
(2014) have argued that macroscale dynamics constrain microscale dynamics in
hierarchical predictive processing. A different way of putting this would be in terms of
multilayered Markov blankets such that Markov blankets at the microscale give rise to
Markov blankets at the macroscale, while Markov blankets at the level of the ensemble
constrain the activities of Markov blankets nodes at lower and lower levels in the
predictive hierarchy. This is entirely consistent with the idea of slower unfolding
dynamics at higher levels and faster evolving dynamics at lower levels in the hierarchy.
This division of timescales between the micro- and macro-scale in dynamical systems
such as the brain is a signature feature of the slaving principle in statistical physics and
synergetics (Haken 1983; Hobson & Friston 2014). The slaving principle shows how
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activities at the microscale are constrained by activities at the macroscale such that
activities at the microscale no longer behave independently of activities at the macroscale
but are “sucked into an ordered coordinated pattern.” (Kelso 1995, p. 8) This is entirely
consistent with work in the cognitive neuroscience focus on global brain dynamics. As
Deco et al. (2012) put it:
Global network dynamics over distributed brain areas emerge from the local dynamics of each
brain area. Conversely, global dynamics constrain local activity such that the whole system
becomes self-organizing. The implicit coupling between local and global scales induces a form
of circular causality that is characteristic of complex, coupled systems that show selforganization, like the brain. (2012, p. 18)

Palacios et al. (2017) have developed a proof of concept of this idea via computer
simulations, showing the self-organisation of an ensemble Markov blanket, comprised
of fifteen Markov blankets within it, with the Markov blanket at the global level
constraining the dynamics of every Markov blanket at the local level (see Palacios et al.
2017 for detailed discussion).
So here is the real problem with using the Markov blanket formalism to run an
argument for horizontal insulation. If the Markov blanket formalism does not imply
insulation of this kind, it cannot be used in support of modularity. It does not follow
from this that the presence of a scale-free and multilayered Markov blanket organisation
does away entirely with the notion of functional segregation. For lower and higher levels
in the hierarchy differ in their processing style, at least with respect to the timescales
over which they unfold. Modularity however does not come for free, even once this
much is acknowledged. The reason for this is that functional segregation, given the
Markov blanket formalism, can only be understood in the context of functional
integration (Friston 2011). This is because the segregation between states induced by
Markov blankets only arise given the presence of integration or coupling. Or, put
differently, a state or node differentiates itself from another state or node, yet remains
statistically coupled to it. This follows because two states or more are conditionally
independent not merely due to spatial distance or separation, but given the states
comprising the Markov blanket: active and sensory states.
There may be one way for a defender of modularity in predictive processing to
attempt to save modularity. It is easy enough to imagine that defenders of the
intransitivity argument and the Markov blanket argument might take this route. They
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may wish to give up on the philosophically substantial notion of modularity from Fodor
(1983), adopting instead a much weaker notion. Integrative modularity provides a
weakening of Fodorian modularity. It picks out the idea of functional segregation, at
least to a certain extent. There are two problems with opting for a weak notion of
modularity. The first we have already stated: in neuronal connectivity, functional
segregation is premised on functional integration. This is not likely to be a satisfying
result for the proponent of modularity. The second turns on value in the context of
explanation. Choosing to adopt a weak notion of modularity has a price; it threatens to
render the notion itself explanatorily vacuous. Specifically, if the notion ceases to exhibit
any of its robust properties, enabling it to make a difference to description or
explanation, then what is the value of keeping it? It is not evident that there is any value.
Conclusion
This chapter has considered arguments for incorporating modularity within in the
predictive processing and active inference frameworks. Three kinds of arguments for
the incorporation of modularity were reviewed: (a) the courtroom of perception
argument; (b) the intransitivity argument; and (c), the Markov blanket argument. We
argued that each of these pro-modularity arguments has its own compelling features,
although all three of them come up short in showing that predictive processing entails
modularity in the context of brain and cognitive function.
The final analysis of this chapter is consistent with another explanatory
possibility, supported by systems neuroscience: that global network dynamics arise from
local dynamics, where global dynamics constrain local activity such that the entire brain
becomes a self-organising system (Deco et al. 2012; Hipólito et al. 2020). Showing that,
as yet, there are no grounds for thinking that a predictive processing and modularity
alliance is on the cards. This conclusion motivates the next chapter which seeks to
articulate and test other hypotheses about the brain’s role in cognition – such as the
hypothesis that global network dynamics enslave activity at lower scales of brain activity.
Clarifying what we deem to be problematic about argument for a predictive processing
and modularity alliance in this area of research thus motivates consideration of other,
more interactionist-friendly possibilities for the brain’s contributions to cognition.
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Chapter 5
Markov blankets of the Nervous System:
Dynamically Unfolding Interactions

Introduction
Scientific investigation in neurobiology often begins – perhaps only implicitly – by
partitioning the brain into functional units. While the most obvious partition of neural
tissue is into individual neurons, the same process takes place over a range of
spatiotemporal scales. The division of the cortical surface into Brodmann areas
represents one such carving up of neural tissue (Brodmann, 2007; (Zilles and Amunts
2010). Brodmann maps have enduring practical implications. For example, the Talairach
Atlas (Talairach and Szikla, 1980), commonly in use in neuroimaging, may be seen as a
direct descendent. In this setting, the assumption is that brain function depends upon
interactions between architectonically defined brain regions (Lazar, 2008). This
assumption underwrites the study of connectivity in the brain, as we need to know what
is being connected. Effective connectivity studies go as far as to distinguish between
connections ‘intrinsic’ or ‘extrinsic’ to a given region (or cortical column) (Tsvetanov,
Henson et al. 2016, Zhou, Zeidman et al. 2018). Again, this rests upon drawing
boundaries around parts of a brain. Our focus in this chapter is on how such boundaries
may be licensed.
A prominent justification for drawing boundaries – from the last century – is
the ‘modularity of mind’ paradigm (Fodor 1983), which itself inherits from the
phrenology of the century before that (Gall and Lewis 1835). This conceptualisation of
cognitive processes depends upon discrete cognitive units that interact with oneanother, which might manifest in the tissue engaged in cognitive operations. An
important limitation of this paradigm is that it typically only considers a single level of
description, neglecting the rich intrinsic and extrinsic dynamics across regions and
microcircuits. In addition, the philosophical assumptions of modular perspectives on
neuronal organisation have been criticised (Friston 2002; Colombo, 2013; Palecek, 2017;
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George and Sunny, 2019; Hipólito and Kirchhoff, 2019). In short, this calls for a more
nuanced treatment of partitions and functional interactions.
A growing literature leverages the Markov blanket construct (Pearl 1988) to
formalise dynamic coupling in physical and biological systems (Friston, 2019, Hipólito,
2019, Ramstead et al., 2018a, Ramstead et al., 2019a, Palacios et al., 2020, Kirchhoff et
al., 2018). This construct is a description of the dependencies within and between
random dynamical systems – like the brain – that sets a boundary between the inside
and outside of each system. Here, we focus upon the Markov blankets implicit in the
kinds of models used practically in investigating brain function. Specifically, we examine
the dynamics implied by neural mass models21 of the kind that underwrite Dynamic
Causal Modelling (DCM) (Bastos, Usrey et al. 2012, Moran, Pinotsis et al. 2013).
Building from this to the connectivity of a canonical cortical microcircuit, we set out a
series of Markov blanketed structures at increasing spatial scales.
This approach endorses the segregation of the brain into regions but also
emphasises the absence of a privileged scale of description at which ‘modules’ might be
defined. By selecting a Markov blanket, we implicitly identify the variables that define
the simplest element of our system at a given scale. It follows that, depending on the
scale of interest, the variables comprising the Markov blanket will be different. For a
single neuron, the blanket includes the presynaptic and postsynaptic membrane
potentials that mediate its interactions with other neurons. For cortical columns, the
blanket will include neural populations mediating interactions between different
columns. In principle, the identification of functional boundaries can proceed at finer
(ion channels and molecules) and coarser (networks, brains, and people) levels.
While identifying blankets at each level may seem an abstract exercise, it has
important implications for experimental neuroscience. Specifically, it offers an
important part of the conceptual analysis we need to ensure our hypotheses make sense
(Nachev and Hacker 2014). For example, if we want to know whether condition specific
differences in measured brain activity are mediated by changes in ‘intrinsic’ or ‘extrinsic’
connectivity (Zhou, Zeidman et al. 2018), we need to be able to define what we mean
by these terms, and to say what they are intrinsic or extrinsic to. We aim to make this
explicit in a series of examples.
The aim of this chapter is to argue that an appeal to the Markov blanket
construct provides a formal basis for partitioning the brain into functional units – from
We will occasionally appeal to technical terms that are in common usage in this field. Please see the glossary of terms for
definitions in Appendix A.
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individual neurons to functional assemblies of neurons, through to independent brain
regions and networks of regions. In particular, we will argue that a recursively iterated
version of the formalism, where each component of a Markov blanketed system is itself
a Markov blanketed system, is apt for the task. This chapter comprises four parts. The
first provides a brief overview of the Markov blanket construct and its relevance to a
dynamical setting. The second section zooms in on the individual neurons and illustrates
how synaptic dynamics conform to the conditional independence structure of a Markov
blanket. The third takes a more detailed look at the asymmetries of the neuronal Markov
blanket, and emphasises the need for these to be replicated at the network level. The
fourth section zooms out and shows how the same structure is recapitulated at larger
spatial scales.

5.1. Markov blankets
The Markov blanket construct, which underwrites the current proposal, was introduced
into the literature by Pearl (1988) in the context of statistical inference. To distinguish a
set of systemic (or internal) states from their embedding environment (of external
states), a third set of states are implied. These are the Markov blanket (Friston, 2013).
The Markov blanket consists of sensory states, which affect but are not affected by
internal states; and active states, which affect but are not affected by external states
(Figure 1)22. This implements a form of conditional independence between internal
states and external ones.
A Markov blanket (b) around internal states μ – where all other (external)
variables are labelled η – is defined as the set of variables that renders μ conditionally
independent from η. Mathematically, this is written as follows:

µ ^ h | b Û p( µ ,h | b) = p( µ | b) p(h | b)

(1)

Equation 1 illustrates this dependency structure in the factorisation of the joint
distribution conditioned on blanket states into two independent distributions; by

We should note that our interpretation of the Markov blanket as a causal construct might be controversial to some. Some
authors employ a more restrictive definition of a Markov blanket and take this to be the minimal set of variables that satisfies the
conditional independence relationships in Equation 1 (Hausman & Woodward, 1999).
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definition, two variables are conditionally independent if and only if their joint
probability, conditioned on some third variable, is equal to the product of their
individual probability conditioned on that third variable. It is common to speak of the
random variables separated in this way by Markov blankets – and the associated
conditional dependencies – in terms of ‘parents’ and their ‘children’, where ‘parent’
nodes cause their children. A Markov blanket is then the set of the parents, the children,
and the parents of the children of the variable in question. An alternative way to frame
this is to think of the parents as mediating the influence of external states on internal
states (i.e., sensory states) and the children (and their parents) as mediating the influence
of internal states on external states (i.e., active states). This suggests a separation of
blanket states into active (a) and sensory (s) states.

Figure 1. Markov blanket. A Markov blanket highlights open systems exchanging matter, energy or
information with their surroundings. Variables ! are conditionally independent of variables " by virtue of
its Markov blanket (b). If there is no route between two variables, and they share parents, they are
conditionally independent. Arrows go from parents to children. We will use the colour-scheme in this
figure consistently through subsequent figures.

In a dynamical setting23 (Friston, Da Costa et al. 2020), Equation 1 means that
the average (represented in bold) rate of change of each component of a Markov

The Markovian formalism has been used also in the context of structural equation modelling. We are interested in dynamical,
as opposed to static, systems, however. Give this, dynamic systems approaches, such as dynamic causal modelling and neural
mass models, are more appropriate for our purposes.
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blanketed system can only depend on two other sorts of state in order to preserve the
structure of Equation 1. This is shown in Equation 2 and Figure 2:

μ! = f µ (μ, s, a)
a! = f a (μ, s, a)
η! = fh ( η, s, a)
s! = f s ( η, s, a)

(2)

Equation 2 means that a dynamical system that preserves the conditional
dependency structure of the Markov blanket ensures that the flow of internal and
external states do not depend upon one another; i.e., that internal states cannot influence
sensory states, and that external states cannot influence active states. Additionally, note
that the Markov blanket structure is preserved if dependencies are lost (e.g., if the active
states were not influenced by sensory states), but not if they are gained, since that would
undo the conditional independence. We will see over the next few sections that this
structure can be identified at numerous levels of a neural mass model (David and Friston
2003; Pinotsis et al. 2014; Moran et al. 2016).
Before we move on, it is worth briefly unpacking the reason for the names of
the variables. While the Markov blanket formulation in general and applies to any
random variables, recent work has leveraged Markov blankets to talk about the structure
of exchanges between an organism and its environment (Friston, 2013; Kirchhoff et al.
2018; Parr and Friston, 2018,) and to describe self-organisation across spatial and
temporal scales (Hipolito, 2019, Ramstead et al., 2018b, Palacios et al., 2017). In this
context, we associate the variable of interest with the internal states of a Markov blanket;
which allows us to think of the ‘parents’ of that variable as mediating the influence of
external states on internal states (i.e., as sensory states) and of its ‘children’ and the
‘parents of the children’ as mediating the influence of internal states on external states
(i.e., as active states). This conception of the Markov blanket as the mediating influence
of external states on internal states through the effects of sensory and active states
resonates with the action-perception cycles typically considered in cognitive systems
(Fuster, 1990; Parr and Friston, 2017; Parr and Friston, 2018). This is the reason for the
words ‘active’ and ‘sensory’. While it may seem strange to use these terms for
interactions at cellular or network levels, it should be emphasised that these are simply
names for statistical constructs.
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Figure 2. This schematic illustrates the partition of states into internal states (purple) and hidden or
external states (orange) that are separated by a Markov blanket – comprising sensory (green) and active
states (blue). Specifically, it focuses on the dynamical formulation of Equation 2. Directed influences are
highlighted with dotted connectors. Autonomous states are those states that are not influenced by external
states, while particular states constitute a particle; namely, autonomous and sensory states – or blanket
and internal states. Sensory states, active states and internal states comprise the particular states that are
constitutive of a functional neuronal unit (for more detail see Hipólito 2019).

5.2.

Neurons and their Markov blankets

In this section, we consider the partition of brain tissue into neurons. From a dynamical
perspective, this means finding equations of motion consistent with Equation 2 and
Figure 2. We know that synaptic dynamics conform to the conditional independence
structure of a Markov blanket, as the internal states (e.g., conductance of ion channels)
of one neuron are distinguishable from the same states of other neurons, but interact
through presynaptic and postsynaptic voltages. The implied partitioning of tissue into
Markov blanketed neurons allows neurons to change their behaviour without losing
their identity.
Figure 3 shows explicitly how synaptic dynamics conform to the conditional
independence structure of a Markov blanket. This is based upon the neural dynamics
formalised in dynamic causal models (Bastos, Usrey et al. 2012, Moran, Pinotsis et al.
2013). This is one of many models of neural dynamics, and we have summarised
common alternatives in Table 1 with varying degrees of biophysical detail. As we said
earlier, the existence of a Markov blanket implies a partition of states into external,
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sensory, active and internal states. The dynamics set out in Figure 3 assign these labels
to the variables that preserve the form of Equation 2 – i.e., internal states evolve based
upon internal and blanket states but not external states, active states do not depend upon
external states, and so on.

Figure 3 Neuronal Markov blankets. This figure illustrates a Markov blanket separating the membrane
conductances of a pair of neurons (or between one postsynaptic neuron and all presynaptic neurons). The
A terms here are constants that act as connectivity strengths from the active state of one neuron to the
external state of another (Aη), and from the sensory states of the latter to the internal states of the former
(Aμ). When many neurons are in play, this becomes a connectivity matrix. The σ-function is a sigmoid
shape and may be thought of as converting potentials to firing rates. An interesting feature of this structure
is that the sensory states, from the perspective of a given neuron, can arise from many different external
states (other neurons) while the active states (membrane depolarisation) depend only on the conductance
(internal state) of the neuron being depolarised. Normal arrowheads indicate an excitatory influence, while
round arrowheads show inhibitory influences.

It is worth noting that Markov blankets do not trivially correspond to the
boundaries of the neuronal cells. Rather, the idea is that the presence of a Markov
blanket ensures the influences of blanket variables (here, membrane potentials)
vicariously enable internal and external states (ion channel conductance) to
communicate. This is fundamental because it means that internal and external states,
though not influencing each other directly, are the common units that, when coupled,
will determine the large-scale network. Moreover, as the blanket is defined in terms of
dynamics as opposed to physical boundaries, which would correspond to the cell
membrane at the neuronal level, we start to see how the same formalism applies even in
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the absence of clear spatial boundaries (Friston, 2013; Kirchhoff et al. 2018). At the
neuronal level of description, the Markovian demarcation is not insulation of internal
states, but rather a way of highlighting (statistically) which states are relevant for the
current investigation (Friston 2019; Hipólito 2019). Ultimately, the dependencies
induced by Markov blankets create a circular causality24: external states, such as the
presynaptic conductance, cause changes in internal states, such as the postsynaptic
conductance, via sensory states, i.e. presynaptic voltage, while the internal states couple
back to the external states through active states, i.e. the postsynaptic voltage.
Table 1 – Neural models and their blankets
Model

Dynamics

States

Hodgkin–

a! = C1 ( s - gμ n × (a - v) )

a

μ! = a (a)(1 - μ) - b (a)μ
s! = f s ( η)
η! = fh (a, s, η)

μ – Ion channels

Huxley

–

potential

Citation
Membrane (Hodgkin
and Huxley
1952)

s – Injected current
η – Electrophysiologist

FitzHugh–
Nagumo

a

a! = a - 13 a3 - μ + s

μ! = t1 ( a + a - b μ )

–

potential

Membrane (FitzHugh
1955,

μ – ‘Recovery’ variable Nagumo,

s! = f s ( η)
η! = fh (a, s, η)

s – Injected current
η – Electrophysiologist

Morris–Lecar

a! = C1 ( s - gμ × (a - v) )

a

μ! =

potential

1
2t ( a )

(1 + tanh (

1
u

( a - v ) ) - 2μ )

s! = f s ( η)
η! = fh (a, s, η)

μ

–
–

Arimoto et
al. 1962)

Membrane (Morris and
Lecar 1981)
Potassium

channels

s – Injected current
η – Electrophysiologist

5.3.

Blanket asymmetries

A causal interpretation of the Markov blanket is not uncontroversial. For us to interpret the Markov blanket construct causally
in the context of structural equation modelling, the system must conform to the causal Markov condition (Hausman and
Woodward, 1999). This would usually be very restrictive (Bongers et al., 2018). However, this is arguably not an issue for the
current formulation, which grounds its causal interpretation not in structural equation modelling but in dynamical systems theory,
i.e., in the dynamic causal modelling approach, the causal status of which is uncontroversial (Moran et al., 2013).
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This section deals with the way in which neurons – the basic units of Section 2
– may be connected together to form microcircuits (David and Friston 2003; Moran et
al. 2013; Friston et al. 2019; Coombes and Byrne 2019) – which form the basic unit of
Section 4. Specifically, we emphasise the key role of asymmetric interactions between
blanketed structures. First, we take a step back to briefly highlight the way in which
neurons may be studied in isolation. Neurons – as complex, dynamic systems – are
highly sensitive to initial conditions, exhibiting organised patterns that result from
localised interactions without centralised control (shown schematically in Figure 4).
These non-linear interactions may be studied through electrophysiological experiments
on single neurons. Typically, this means using voltage clamp experiments and injecting
electrical currents. A few examples of physiologically detailed models to account for
these non-linear interactions are outlined in Table 1, and include the Hodgkin-Huxley
model. This has many moving parts and is therefore rarely used in studies of connected
neural populations – where dynamics more akin to those in Figure 3 predominate – but
is a good starting point in understanding how sensory states influence the internal state
dynamics. This will be essential when we move to sensory states generated by other
neural populations in a network.

Figure 4. On the left a centralised system, representing a central controller. This model is typically
motivating modular theories, where a central cognitive system is bounded by lower-level modules. On the
right, a decentralised system where elements are not isolated from their environment, and the focus is on
the dynamics of the relations among properties and elements.

Intuitively, the Hodgkin–Huxley model expresses the evolution of the
membrane potential under time-dependent input currents in terms of the equivalent
electric circuit25, with a potential that evolves based upon membrane capacitance and
currents. More specifically, the Hodgkin–Huxley model describes how action potentials
Note that this is not what is meant by the term ‘microcircuit’, which refers to the ‘wiring’ of a population of neurons into a
local network.
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in neurons are initiated and propagated through a set of non-linear differential equations
that approximates the electrical characteristics of excitable neurons in a continuous-time
dynamical system (Douglas and Martin 1991). Formulating the Hodgkin-Huxley (and
other models) in terms of the constituents of the Markov blankets inherent in voltageclamp experiments allows us to highlight the specifics of the influence of the external
states (electrophysiologists) via sensory states (injected current) on internal states (ion
channels), themselves influencing active states (membrane potential). Unpacking the
Equation in Table 1 in terms of the specific ion channels, this is:

a! = C1 ( s - g K μ 4K (a - vK ) - g Na μ3Na (a - vNa ) - gl μl (a - vl ) )
μ! i = a (a)(1 - μ i ) - b (a)μ i , i = ( Na, K , l )
s! = f s ( η)
η! = fh (a, s, η)

(3)

Here, the capacitance (C) mediates the influence of an injected current (s) and ion
channel currents on the membrane potential (a). This depends upon the ion channels
of the system – i.e., the conductance of the sodium (Na), potassium (K), and leakage (l)
channels. These depend upon constants (g) and the associated internal states (μ). In
addition, it depends on the ‘reversal’ potentials for each channel (v) which specify the
potentials at which the direction of ionic flow reverses. The internal states for each
channel evolve based upon the (functions – α and β – of the) potential, as voltage-gated
channels open and close to increase or decrease the magnitude of this flow. The
nonlinearity inherent in Equation 3 facilitates many interesting biophysical phenomena,
including bifurcations and limit cycles (Wang, Chen et al. 2007). However, the purpose
of this section is to move us away from the single neuron, and towards the kinds of
dynamics exhibited by populations of connected neurons. This requires that we consider
the blanket states that mediate these connections. The first step is to notice that the
sensory state for the single neuron described by the Hodgkin-Huxley model is an
experimental intervention, driven by an experimenter (i.e., an electrophysiologist, η) who
injects current and measures the resulting potential. We need to move to a situation
where this comes from other neurons. This is afforded simply by the equations of
motion set out in Figure 2 for a pair of neurons.
To understand the way in which blankets connect to one another, it is useful to
consider that the membrane potential (active state) of a given neuron can only be directly
influenced by the conductance (internal states) of that neuron. In contrast, the
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presynaptic potentials (sensory states) of many other neurons contribute to the internal
states. This asymmetry in the blanket states recapitulates that seen in physical systems.
Specifically, the position of many different particles (sensory states) can influence the
momentum (internal state) of a single particle. However, the position of the particle in
question (active state) is only influenced by the momentum of that same particle. This
suggests a clear analogy between Newtonian mechanics and neuronal mechanics.
Newton’s second law denotes that the rate of change of momentum of a body is directly
proportional to the force applied. Conversely, this change in momentum takes place in
the direction of the applied force, which itself can depend on position (e.g., the force
due to a spring). Rewriting this law, from the perspective of a single particle, in terms of
a Markov blanket partition (Friston 2019), we have:

a! = m1 μ
μ! = F (s, a)

(4)

For a single particle, a and μ are each 3-dimensional (each spatial dimension), while s
can be many-dimensional, as each particle it describes will have three degrees of
freedom. The second law of motion is consistent with neural mechanics in terms of
dynamical functions described here in the sense that they both exhibit asymmetrical flow
dependencies. This ubiquitous asymmetry is the key to moving to larger spatial scales,
and networks of neurons in section 4. This rests upon the structure in Figure 5, which
shows the asymmetric connectivity structure between cortical columns. The neurons,
which each include conductance and potential variables, now themselves become parts
of sensory, active, internal, or external states with respect to a cortical column. The
asymmetry now manifests in forward and backward connections along cortical
hierarchies.

5.4. Cortical columns and networks
This section deals with how the same Markov blanketed structure is recapitulated at a
larger spatial scale: the cortical microcircuit. Neurons are themselves components of
complex self-organising systems. A key characteristic of such complex systems is that
they are greater than the sum of their parts: summing up all the interactions between
constituent components would not give us the full story. The properties of a complex
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system cannot be sufficiently understood from the level of individual components. In
the present context, the brain cannot be sufficiently understood from the perspective of
interactions between individual neurons. Here we appeal to the canonical microcircuit
model which uses the dynamics of Figure 3 but connects the neural populations as in
Figure 5. In brief, this divides neural populations into superficial and deep pyramidal
cells (which turn out to be out blanket states), spiny stellate cells and inhibitory
interneurons.
Considering the canonical microcircuit model has several advantages. First
among these is the fact that it is used practically in the analysis of empirical brain data.
This is because it can be used to specify models (i.e., hypotheses) of distributed
responses – as measured with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) or
electroencephalography (EEG) – that are physiologically grounded (Friston, Preller et
al. 2019). For example, it is possible to specify architectures in terms of their forward
and backward connections and experimental effects either as extrinsic (between region)
or intrinsic (within-region) connectivity at a specific level. A third advantage is that it
permits combining different imaging modalities in the form of multimodal Bayesian
fusion (Wei, Jafarian et al. 2020).
The above highlights its importance for hypothesis testing. A number of
neuropsychiatric conditions cannot be tackled in a compartmentalised manner and
benefit from the segregation into functional units (cortical columns) offered by these
microcircuits. A good example is the case of schizophrenia, in terms of the dysconnection
hypothesis (Yang et al. 2015, Friston et al. 2016, Keher et al. 2008). The focus of the
hypothesis is the functional disconnection of different brain regions, based on NMDAhypofunction models of the disease. This has dramatic effects on both cortical neuronal
and network activity. This hypothesis cannot be framed without knowing what is being
disconnected from what. Similarly, questions about cognitive (e.g., attentional) function
in health depend upon the same construct (Limanowski and Friston 2019). Other
important questions, amenable to interrogation using the canonical microcircuit include
questions about the nature of neurovascular coupling. For example, does it depend upon
afferent presynaptic activity from extrinsic sources or (only) report to local activity
mediated by recurrent (intrinsic) connectivity (Jafarian, Litvak et al. 2020)?
The brain organises itself in a decentralised way. A decentralised system, under
complex systems and dynamic modelling theory, is a system whose lower-level
components operate on local information to accomplish goals, i.e. control is distributed.
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The decentralised control is distributed such that each component of the system is
equally responsible for contributing to the global, complex activity based on the
component's interaction with other components (Deco et al. 2008; Chialvo, 2010; Zuo
et al., 2010; Gliozzi and Plunkett, 2019; Hipólito and Kirchhoff, 2019). Figure 4
illustrates the distinction between centralised systems, i.e. a central controller exercising
control (e.g. control fixed mechanism), and decentralised structures for patterns or
behaviours as emergent properties of dynamical mechanisms.
Markov blankets allow us to delineate the microcircuitry connections by
nuancing their intrinsic connections and how they may also change within the same
network. Laminar specific connections underlie the notion of canonical microcircuit
(Bastos et al. 2012). As seen in Figure 5 (second row), we can use the dependencies of
this connectivity structure to provide a principled segregation into regions. Considering
two columns – connected to one another – we see that if the internal and external states
comprise the spiny stellate cells and interneurons of each column, the superficial
pyramidal cells of one column act as the active states, while the deep pyramidal cells of
the second become sensory states. Unpacking this in detail, the absence of spiny stellate
or interneuron connections to the superficial pyramidal cells of other columns is
consistent with the absence of influence of external on active states. The reciprocal
influence is in place, allowing active states to change external states. Similarly,
connections from deep pyramidal to interneurons and superficial pyramidal cells in
other columns matches the directed influence of sensory over internal and reciprocated
influence between sensory and active states respectively.
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Figure 5 Cortical micro-circuitry. The upper schematic shows the connectivity of the canonical microcircuit
as employed for DCM (Bastos et al., 2012). This comprises four cell populations with a stereotyped
pattern of connectivity. From left to right, we show forward (ascending) connections. The opposite
direction shows descending connections. The dynamics of each neural population shown here obey the
equations given in Figure 3, where the likelihood mappings (or A-matrices) in those equations specify
which populations are connected to one another. As further shown by Bastos et al. (2012), feedforward
connections originate predominantly from superficial layers and feedback connections from deep layers,
thus suggesting that feedforward connections use relatively high frequencies, compared to feedback
connections. The second row here shows the Markov blankets that underwrite the separation into distinct
cortical regions (where the superficial and deep pyramidal cells play the role of active and sensory states
respectively), and the final row shows a separation into a network of regions, where the middle two regions
act to insulate the far left and right regions.

What the Markov blankets in Figure 5 show is that, while a certain sparsity mediates
interactions via blanket states, the internal states of a canonical microcircuit show
strikingly, interconnected intrinsic architectures. In other words, we can highlight via
Markov blankets, the interconnections between the neurons of origin and termination
by highlighting intrinsic connectivity and extrinsic projections. This allows us to
determine how top-down and bottom-up processing streams are integrated within each
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cortical column. Ultimately, this emphasises that intrinsic (local) behaviour is highly
dependent upon extrinsic (global) behaviour via specific pyramidal populations. In
short, organised patterns are observed as resulting from localised interactions without
centralised control. This observation is recapitulated when we zoom out further.
Zooming out to a larger spatial scale, neuronal structures can be viewed as
higher-order neural packets (Yufik and Friston 2017); i.e., as functional, larger-scale
assemblies of neural packets, wrapped in their own superordinate Markov blankets. This
is illustrated in the final row of Figure 5, where cortical columns now become the
functional units comprising the states of a Markovian partition to define a network.
Figure 6 takes this one step further, and expresses brain-wide networks as active,
sensory, internal, and external states. Bounded assemblies at larger spatial scales are
formed spontaneously, consistent with the self-organisation of complex systems defined
as structures that maintain their integrity under changing conditions. Especially in
approaches such as the one we suggest here, where coordination, segregation and
integration are crucial for the self-organisation of the brain as a complex dynamic
system.

Figure 6 A Markov blanket of networks. The image in this figure takes the ideas from Figure 5 one step
further and shows how we could treat the connections between nodes in different networks as
dependencies between states in a Markov blanketed system. Here, the networks themselves become the
active, sensory, internal, and external states. This graphic is loosely structured around the kinds of
networks identified using resting-state fMRI (Razi et al., 2015; Sharaev et al., 2016; Betzel et al., 2014).
However, the specific connections and anatomy shown here should not be taken too seriously. Here we
treat the visual networks as internal states that reciprocally influence active states (dorsal and ventral
attention networks). The default mode network then plays the role of the sensory states, which mediate
the influence between the above and external (sensorimotor network) states. The assignment of these is
equally valid if reversed, such that sensorimotor networks become internal and visual external.
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Markov blankets allow us to make salient the neuronal assemblies, as flexible but also
stable biophysical structures. Put otherwise, structures such as these maintain their
integrity under changing conditions. In this treatment, Markov blankets highlight the
assemblies conserved over multiple levels of description, i.e. they are scale-free.
Monitoring the variations in such larger spatial scales enables attributing to neurons,
microcircuits, and networks the ability to undergo changes without loss of self-identity.

5.4.

Discussion

Anticipatory mechanisms are shared by all living systems. Indeed, for an organism to
remain alive, it must regulate – and therefore anticipate – the structure of its exchanges
with its embedding environment. In some organisms, especially those animals that
possess a nervous system, anticipatory mechanisms are evident in patterns of organised
behaviour and are made particularly evident by whole-brain dynamics over longer
timescales. This motivates a specific research agenda in neuroscience: to investigate how
microcircuits organise (and why they reorganise) on the local level and smaller, micro
scales, crucially, without losing sight of the embodied brain.
The crucial point for the Markov blanket, at any scale, is that its boundaries are
dictated by flows that depend upon certain states. It is by their flexibility that Markov
blankets allow us to explain dynamic couplings while still drawing statistical boundaries.
Markov blankets demarcate boundaries of couplings from pairs of neurons, to cortical
columns and brain-wide networks. The description of neural connectivity with
Markovian formalisms allows zooming in and out, identifying different functional units
at different scales.
It is important to recognise the limitations of this chapter. While we have
outlined how dynamic Markov blankets may be identified, we have done so with known
equations of motion. When these are not known, as in most practical settings, the
interactions between variables must be estimated. In addition, we have largely restricted
our conceptual analysis to how we partition systems into fundamental (at a given scale)
units.
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Conclusion
This chapter investigated the characterisations of neural systems as depending upon the
presence of a boundary – or Markov blanket. That is a mediation of the interaction
between what is inside and outside of a system. This treatment was based upon the
canonical micro-circuitry used in empirical studies of effective connectivity, to directly
connect this analysis to models used in neuropsychiatric and computational psychiatry
research (Frank et al. 2016; Shaw et al. 2020). The key point is that brain function
depends upon the cooperative dynamics of networks, regions, and neurons. To talk
meaningfully about these units of nervous tissue, we need a principled means of
partitioning these from one another. This partition is afforded by the dependency and
flow structure of a dynamic Markov blanket, whose structure is recapitulated each levels
of analysis. This endorses the partition of neural systems at each of these stages (e.g.,
into neurons, regions, networks etc.), but also highlights the limitations of ‘modular’
perspectives on brain function that only consider a single level of description. In short,
the level of analysis we choose to adopt defines a Markov blanket that tells us the
appropriate functional units we need to consider. In all cases, these can be broken down
into four classes of variable: active, sensory, internal, or external. In this light, the physics
of the mind is consistent with the “enactive” view (Hipolito 2018), deriving cognition
from an interplay between external conditions and self-organisation in the nervous
system.
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General Conclusion

Whether or not the cognitive activity is theoretical in any sense is not an empirical
question. Formal techniques, such as those used in the Bayesian framework, offer
important insights into cognition. Yet, as the last chapter has shown, even if we can use
Markov blankets as a formal tool to map and investigate neuronal activity (see also
Hipólito 2019; Hipólito et al. 2020), it does not follow that Markov blankets exist in the
nervous system. As such, these tools allow to answer philosophical questions about
how to best conceive of cognition.
The chapters of this thesis argue against a picture of cognition which I have
labelled CET – one that depicts it as always and everywhere, essentially theoretical. This
thesis offers reasons to be sceptical of CET’s metaphysical assumptions. Neither
modular theories, predictive processing theories nor their proposed combination – the
chief examples of CET approaches in the philosophical landscape – exhaust all of the
possibilities for understanding cognition. The thesis concludes that there are positive
reasons to make room for atheoretical cognition – for, as things stand, we have good
reasons to be sceptical of the claim that all forms of cognition are essentially theoretical.
The conception that cognition as essentially theoretical is promoted by a philosophical
picture – one that drives to see all cognition of through a particular lens we use to make
sense of it.
This thesis motivates seriously exploring interactionist ways of understanding
cognition that reject CET. In my future work, I will continue to investigate to what
extent cognition can be understood in terms of unfolding interactions that adjust and
adapt without assuming those adjustments and adaptations necessarily involve
theorising or modelling the world. More specifically, my future project is to elucidate
how we understand cognition in everyday life in a way that is consistent with using the
technical apparatus of dynamical systems theory to investigate it without our falling foul
of misleading philosophical pictures.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Canonical microcircuit: Distributed network of relatively simple elements that give rise to
complexity of cognitive processing by virtue of (1) their extensive interaction with other
elements; and (2) their own intrinsic rich circuits. Originally introduced by (Douglas and
Martin 1991) as a functional motif of interconnected neuronal populations that is considered
to be replicated over the cortical sheet.
Complex system: a system that is composed of many components which may interact with
each other. Examples include Earth's global climate, organisms the human brain, or living
cells. Their behaviour is particularly difficult to model due to the dependencies and
relationships between their parts and the system with the environment.
Decentralised system: local interactions between components of a system establish order
and coordination to achieve global goals without a central commanding influence.
Interactions are formed and predicated on spatiotemporal patterns, which are created through
the positive and negative feedback that interactions provide.
Dynamic causal modelling: modelling treatment of the neural dynamics as a non-linear
dynamic system. Differential equations describe the interaction of neural populations, which
direct or indirectly give rise to functional neuroimaging data, particularly by parameterising
over directed influences or effective connectivity, usually estimated using Bayesian methods.
Emergence: traits of a system that are not apparent from its components in isolation, but
which result from the interactions, dependencies, or relationships they form when placed
together in a system. These components are impossible to predict from the smaller entities
that make up the system.
Neural mass models: models of coarse-grained activity of large populations of neurons and
synapses especially useful in understanding brain rhythms and synchronisation.
Non-linearity: Non-linearity describes systems with high dependence on initial conditions,
current state, and parameter values. The differential equations of non-linear dynamical
systems are non-linear in the states (and parameters; in other words, they have high order
terms beyond linear coupling.
Relative entropy: mutual information, or the uncertainty about particular states minus the
uncertainty, given the external states. In other words, the information gained about one set
of states, given another.
Self-entropy: entropy of particular states, i.e. of states that constitute a particle, namely
autonomous and sensory states. Entropy is a measure of uncertainty, disorder or dispersion.
Self-organisation: a process of spontaneous pattern formation across time scales – from
microscopic cells to macroscopic organisms – that entails the emergence of stable systemic
configurations that distinguish themselves from their environments.
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